Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the FCC promulgated a rule requiring "hybrid" cable companies to "downconvert" from digital to analog broadcast signals from must-carry stations for subscribers with analog television sets. In 2012, the FCC allowed the downconversion requirement to expire and promulgated a new rule that allowed cable operators to provide conversion equipment to analog customers, either for free or at an affordable cost (Sunset Order). Petitioners, a group of must-carry broadcasters, sought review of the Sunset Order, arguing that the FCC's new rule could not be squared with Congress's mandate that must-carry broadcast signals "shall be viewable via cable on all television receivers of a subscriber which are connected to a cable system" pursuant to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the Cable Act), 47 U.S.C. 534(b)(7). The court concluded that petitioners' claims lack merit. The FCC's 2007 rule was not mandated by the statute. Rather, the rule was promulgated by the Commission as a stopgap measure. Since 2007, the telecommunications market has changed dramatically. Petitioners' argument effectively freezes time in the face of shifting technology and finds no support in the law. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Agape Church, Inc, et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

America’s largest law school, Thomas M. Cooley, has four Michigan campuses and one in Florida and about 3,500 students. . Anziska was “of counsel” at a New York law firm. On June 8, 2011, under the title “Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law,” Anziska posted on the website “JD Underground,” that the firm was investigating law schools for preying on the ignorance of “naive, clueless 22-year-olds. Perhaps one of the worst offenders is the Thomas Cooley School of Law, which grossly inflates its post-graduate employment data and salary information…. students are defaulting on loans at an astounding 41 percent… most likely … will continue to defraud unwitting students unless held civilly accountable. If you have any relevant information or know of anyone who has attended Thomas Cooley … correspondences will be kept strictly confidential.” On June 13, the firm received a cease-and-desist letter from Cooley, claiming that the post was defamatory. On June 15, under the title “Retraction re: Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law,” a partner posted on JD Underground that the earlier post “contained certain allegations which may have been couched as fact regarding employment and default data. These statements are hereby retracted.” Meanwhile, Anziska disseminated a draft proposed class action complaint involving 18 former or current Cooley students, containing the same allegations. The complaint became publicly available on the internet. Cooley sued, alleging defamation, tortious interference with business relations, breach of contract, and false light. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cooley was a limited-purpose public figure and the record would not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendants published the challenged statements with actual malice.View "Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss, LLP" on Justia Law

Pacific Lightnet, Inc. (PLNI) brought claims against Time Warner, asserting that it had been wrongfully billed by Time Warner for services that it had never received and that it was owed credits to its account from Time Warner based on assets PNLI had purchased, called Feature Group D claims. The circuit court entered judgment for Time Warner on all claims, notwithstanding a jury verdict in favor of PLNI on certain claims. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Feature Group D claims based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and vacated the jury verdict on those same claims. PLNI appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the ICA erred in vacating the jury's verdict because it violated the filed-rate doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss this case; and (2) inasmuch as the filed-rate doctrine applied, the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Appellant could not recover for any claims involving charges not filed within 120 days of receipt of billing in accordance with the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission and Federal Communications Commission filed tariffs.View "Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law

West Side Christian Church applied to the City of Evansville, Indiana, for a permit to set up its “Cross the River” display, consisting of 31 six-foot tall decorated crosses on four blocks of public Riverfront. After Evansville approved the application, residents sought an injunction, claiming that the display violated their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed. The City did not appeal, but West Side, which was an intervenor in the district court, did. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, finding that West Side did not have standing to appeal. The court could not redress any injury West Side might have suffered because Evansville was not party to this appeal and could prohibit the display regardless of any order issued. Any First Amendment injury West Side might have suffered from the injunction was not fairly traceable to, or caused by, Evansville. View "Cabral v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's determination that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, preempted its decision to require T-Mobile to obtain voter approval before constructing mobile telephone antennae on city-owned park property. T-Mobile cross-appealed the denial of permanent injunctive relief. The court concluded that section 332(c)(7)(A) of the Act has the following preemptive scope: (1) it preempts local land use authorities' regulations if they violate the requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) and (iv); and (2) it preempts local land use authorities' adjudicative decisions if the procedures for making such decisions do not meet the minimum requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (iii). In this case, the voter-approval requirement imposed by Measure C was outside the City's framework for land use decision making because it did not implicate the regulatory and administrative structure established by the City's general plans and zoning and subdivision code. Therefore, the court concluded that it was not preempted and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Omnipoint v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations. View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law

Sorenson is a purveyor of telephones for the hearing-impaired that have words scrolling on a screen during a call. Sorenson's technology uses the Internet to transmit and receive both the call itself and the derived captions (IP CTS). Sorenson gives its phones out for free, with the captioning feature turned on. On appeal, Sorenson challenged the FCC's promulgation of rules regarding IP CTS under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court concluded that the FCC's rule requiring all new users to register and self-certify their hearing loss, but only if the provider sold the IP CTS equipment for $75 or more, was arbitrary and capricious because the FCC failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. Further, the FCC's requirement that IP CTS phones "have a default setting of captions off, so that all IP CTS users must affirmatively turn on captioning," was unsupported by the evidence and, rather, contradicted by it. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review. View "Sorenson Communications Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Daoud, an 18-year-old American citizen, had an email conversation with undercover FBI employees posing as terrorists who responded to messages that he had posted online. Daoud planned “violent jihad” and discussed his interest in committing attacks in the U.S, using bomb-making instructions that he had read in Inspire magazine, an English-language organ of Al Qaeda, and online. Daoud selected a Chicago bar as the target of a bomb that the agent would supply. The agent told him the bomb would destroy the building and would kill “hundreds” of people. Daoud replied: “that’s the point.” On September 14, 2012, Daoud parked a Jeep containing the fake bomb in front of the bar. In an alley, in the presence of the agent, he tried to detonate the fake bomb and was arrested. In jail, he tried to solicit someone to murder the undercover agent with whom he had dealt. The government notified Daoud, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801, that it intended to present evidence derived from electronic surveillance conducted under the Act. His attorney sought access to the classified materials submitted in support of the government’s FISA warrant applications. The government supplied a heavily redacted, unclassified response and a classified version, accessible only to the court with a statement that disclosure “would harm the national security.” The harm was detailed in a classified affidavit signed by the FBI’s Acting Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. The district judge ordered the materials sought by defense counsel turned over. In an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that in addition to having the requisite security clearance the seeker of such information must establish need to know. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law

Qwest appealed from the district court's order entered on remand from the court's decision in Qwest Corp. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 684 F3d 721 (8th Cir. 2012). In Qwest, the court held that the district court erred in upholding an order from the commission which asserted that the commission had authority under state law to regulate rates for certain telecommunication network elements that Qwest provided to its competitors voluntarily or as required under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 271. The court held in Qwest that the commission's order was preempted by its entirety and the court reversed the district court's original judgment with respect to both the elements Qwest provided pursuant to section 271. The court reversed the judgment of the district court again and remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the whole April 23, 2010 order of the commission as preempted by federal law and to enjoin the commission from enforcing the order in its entirety.View "Qwest Corp. v. MN Public Utilities Comm., et al." on Justia Law