Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Broadband Voice, LLC, d/b/a Fuse.Cloud, LLC (Fuse), appealed a Mississippi circuit court's dismissal of its complaint with prejudice. Fuse entered into four contracts with Jefferson County for telephone and internet installation and services. In January 2020, an entirely new board of supervisors took office. The County notified Fuse on November 3, 2020, that it would be terminating the contracts entered into by the 2019 board of supervisors. The termination was to take effect on November 16, 2020. Fuse notified the new board of supervisors that an early-termination fee of $116,984.02 would be imposed if the County terminated the contracts. Fuse disconnected the County’s service before the November 16, 2020 termination date, and sued when the County refused to pay the fee. On August 23, 2021, the circuit court dismissed Fuse’s complaint with prejudice, finding that there were no triable issues. Fuse argued on appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court that it was entitled to $116,984.02 in early-termination fees from the four contracts. Finding that the early-termination-fee provision was negotiated by the prior board, and that prior board could not limit the ability of a subsequent board to terminate that provision or any other provision of the four contracts, the Supreme Court held the early-termination fee was not enforceable. The circuit court's dismissal was affirmed. View "Broadband Voice, LLC d/b/a Fuse.Cloud, LLC v. Jefferson County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

In September 2022, the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission sent letters to Fischer, who is running for the Kentucky Supreme Court, and Winter, who is running for the Court of Appeals, stating that unidentified individuals had filed complaints, alleging they had “engaged in political or campaign activity inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary," including references to the Republican Party and “pledges, promises or commitments in connection with cases, controversies, or issues likely to come before the Court—specifically the issue of abortion.” The candidates requested additional information, identifying statements that might have prompted the complaints and explaining why the First Amendment protected the statements. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, raising facial and as-applied challenges to Kentucky's Judicial Conduct Rules. They sought an emergency injunction pending appeal, justifying their request based on “the passage of 12 days without a ruling in the middle of an election cycle,” and the “specter of … self-censorship.”That day, the district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction on standing grounds. The Sixth Circuit granted a preliminary injunction, protecting specific campaign statements. The candidates have standing and have demonstrated a likely constitutional violation. There is a credible threat of enforcement of the Rules. The candidates have guessed which of their statements might have violated the rules; the First Amendment protects each. “When a judicial commission sends vague and threatening letters to candidates on the eve of election, it puts the candidates to a choice between self-censorship and uncertain sanctions.” View "Fischer v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus compelling the city of Cleveland to disclose use-of-force (UOF) reports on the grounds that UOF reports are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, as confidential law-enforcement investigatory records (CLEIR), holding that the court of appeals erred.UOF reports are prepared whenever a Cleveland police officer uses force in the course of the officer's duties. Appellants brought this mandamus action against Cleveland seeking disclosure of the reports. The court of appeals denied the requested writ, holding that the reports were exempt as CLEIR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleveland did not meet its burden to prove that the exception at issue applied to the specific information contained in the reports. View "State ex rel. Standifer v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court partially denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus and purportedly denying his request for attorney's fees and costs, holding that the circuit court misapplied a definition of "personnel information."In his mandamus petition, Appellant requested documents related to employment disputes in the Town of South Hill, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The circuit court denied the petition in part after applying definitions of "personnel record" from a previous version of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) instead of "personnel information." The court further refused to award attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the personnel information exemption under VFOIA. View "Hawkins v. Town of South Hill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed three rulings by the trial court in a pending criminal case in these consolidated appeals, holding that the trial court erred in barring public access to a pretrial bail hearing, by keeping certain motions and exhibits under seal, and by finding that the City of Newport News lacked standing to oppose any public access to sealed documents that the City had previously produced in response to a subpoena.The underlying case involved a murder indictment and ancillary charges against a Newport News police officer. Two newspaper publishers and a reporter filed an appeal challenging rulings barring access to the pretrial bail hearing and keeping motions and exhibits under seal. The City challenged the ruling that the City lacked standing to oppose public access to the sealed documents it produced in response to the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed all three holdings, holding that the trial court erred as to all three rulings. View "Daily Press, LLC v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Colerain Township prohibited the public from posting “inappropriate” or “offensive” comments on the police department’s Facebook page and prohibited the public from making “disrespectful” comments at its board of trustees meetings. Davis was active in criticizing the board and the department, through oral comments at board meetings and written comments on the Facebook page. Davis sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Township had violated the First Amendment. She alleged that the prohibitions discriminated against speech based on the speaker’s viewpoint and that the (alleged) removal of her video from the Facebook page amounted to retaliation. The parties agreed that the comments section of the Facebook page and the public-participation portion of board meetings were “limited public forums.” The district court rejected Davis’s challenges to the Facebook Rule, finding the categorical ban on posting videos viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. It upheld the Meeting Rule, finding that the board had not applied it to Davis in a discriminatory way. It rejected overbreadth and vagueness challenges.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Davis’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. Davis did not raise her free-speech claims in an Article III case or controversy. She failed to show that the Facebook rule has injured her in the past or is likely to do so in the future. The Township has repealed the meeting rule. View "Davis v. Colerain Township, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part writs of mandamus and prohibition against Ronald P. Forsthoefel, a judge on the Ashland County Common Pleas Court, barring Judge Forsthoefel from enforcing his order sealing the documents filed in an underlying dissolution case and ordering him to vacate his sealing order and to conduct a proper review of the documents.The Cincinnati Enquirer requested a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Forsthoefel to vacate his order sealing documents in the dissolution case and to permit public access to the documents and also sought a writ of prohibition barring the judge from enforcing his sealing order. The Supreme Court granted the requested writs in part, holding (1) the Enquirer was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Forsthoefel to vacate his sealing order and to conduct a proper review of the documents subject to the sealing order; and (2) the Enquirer was entitled to a writ of prohibition because it had shown entitlement to a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Forsthoefel" on Justia Law

After its collective bargaining agreement with Macy’s expired, the parties were unable to agree on a new agreement. Local 39 called a strike and began picketing at Macy’s store. Macy’s filed suit, alleging that Local 39 had engaged in continuing and escalating unlawful misconduct at the store and sought injunctions preventing Local 39 from picketing at the store’s entrances, blocking ingress or egress, disturbing the public, threatening public safety, or damaging property. Macy’s also asked for damages.Local 39 filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, motion, arguing that the complaint alleged acts in furtherance of its right to free speech on a public issue and that Macy’s could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits because the complaint did not satisfy Labor Code section 1138’s heightened standard of proof for claims arising out of labor disputes. The trial court granted Local 39’s motion in part. The court of appeal held that the trial court should have granted its first anti-SLAPP motion in full and ordered the entire complaint stricken. A labor organization cannot be held responsible or liable for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, "except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of those acts.” Macy’s did not provide such proof. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 39 v. Macy's, Inc." on Justia Law

Broadband Voice, LLC, d/b/a Fuse.Cloud, LLC (Fuse), appealed a circuit court's dismissal of its complaint with prejudice. Fuse argued that it was entitled to $116,984.02 in early-termination fees from the four contracts it had with Jefferson County (the County). Fuse also argued that the trial court erred, inter alia, by denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the early-termination provision in Fuse’s contract with the County was unenforceable, the Mississippi Supreme Court found trial court did not err by denying Fuse’s motion for judgment on the pleadings or by dismissing Fuse’s complaint with prejudice. View "Broadband Voice, LLC v. Jefferson County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

A public body has five-10 business days to respond to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/3(d), (e)). In 2014, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) received FOIA requests from local newspapers for information relating to citizen complaints filed against Chicago police officers since 1967. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) sought to enjoin the release of files that were more than four years old; its collective bargaining agreement required the destruction of records of alleged police misconduct at that age. The court granted the FOP an injunction prohibiting the release of files that were more than four years old as of the date of the newspapers’ FOIA request. . Meanwhile, Green, who was convicted in 1986 of offenses arising from a quadruple homicide, became aware that files he wants could be destroyed. He hopes to prove his innocence by exposing police misconduct. Green sent CPD a FOIA request. CPD did not respond.The Illinois Supreme Court held that unless the FOIA exemption states otherwise, the circuit court should review the withholding of information under the circumstances that existed when the public body made its decision. If the information becomes releasable later, a requester may refile his request. When CPD constructively denied Green’s request, an injunction barred CPD from releasing responsive files that were more than four years old. The subsequent invalidation of the injunction was immaterial. View "Green v. Chicago Police Department" on Justia Law