Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the Lawrence County Sheriff's Office's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to this action brought by Relator, an inmate, and denied as moot Relator's claim for a writ of mandamus, holding that the mandamus claim was moot.Relator sought certain records from the Lawrence County Sheriff's Office, which determined that the request was too vague to grant. Relator then filed this action requesting, among other things, a writ of mandamus ordering the Sheriff to produce the requested records and seeking awards of statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. The Sheriff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Thereafter, Relator received the requested records. The Supreme Court held (1) the Sheriff was entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Relator's mandamus claim, which was moot; (2) Relator was entitled to $700 in statutory damages but was not entitled to attorney fees and court costs; and (3) Relator's remaining motions were moot. View "State ex rel. Woods v. Lawrence County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims of open records violations, holding that Iowa's Open Records Act, Iowa Code chapter 22, may permit Plaintiffs to pursue claims based on untimeliness and that the district court did not err in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss.In 2020 and 2021, Plaintiffs requested public records from Defendants. Plaintiffs brought this suit in December 2021, and in January 2022, Defendants provided responsive records. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the timeliness claims were moot. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) most of the claims concerning production of already-produced records were moot; and (2) with some qualifications, Plaintiffs could pursue claims that Defendants violated chapter 22 through delays in responding to Plaintiffs' open records requests. View "Belin v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ compelling the Mansfield Correctional Institution to produce records requested by Relator against the Mansfield Correctional Institution under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ.Relator requested information and records from the prison warden's office regarding three assaults committed against her son while he was incarcerated at the prison. After the prison asserted that all responsive records had been produced Relator brought this action. The Supreme Court granted the writ with respect to some of the requested records and granted a limited writ compelling the prison to produce additional requested records or to certify that no responsive records existed and denied Relator's motions to transfer this case to the court of claims, to strike the prison's merit brief, and other motions, holding (1) the prison failed to prove that certain withheld information fell squarely within an exception to the Act; (2) the prison did not carry its burden of proving that no other documents existed that were responsive to certain requests; and (3) Relator was not entitled to a writ of mandamus as to the remaining evidence. View "State ex rel. Sultaana v. Mansfield Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

The Lemasters run a Lawrence County, Kentucky towing business, which was on the county’s “rotation list” of companies to call when it needed to order a tow. Both as fire chief and in his towing business, Lemaster sparred with Carter, Lawrence County’s “judge-executive,” the elected head of its executive branch. Lemaster criticized Carter on Facebook. Five days later, the 911 Center sent an email to dispatchers; its subject identified Lemaster Towing and the Cherryville Fire Department. Its body stated in all caps: “Per Judge Carter do not tone them out on any fire calls[;] use nearest department[;] . . . Lemaster Towing is no longer on the rotation list[.]”The Lemasters sued Carter and Lawrence County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that Carter violated the First Amendment by removing Lemaster Towing from the rotation list in retaliation for Lemaster’s criticisms. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Monell claims against the county; Lemaster did not tie the actions to any county policy. The court reversed as to Carter. Carter conceded that his communications with dispatch employees could constitute an adverse action. The record would allow a rational jury to find that Lemaster’s Facebook post motivated Carter’s decision to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. View "Lemaster v. Lawrence County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

Altice USA, Inc. (Altice) challenged N.J.A.C. 14:18-3.8, a regulation requiring cable companies to refund or not charge customers who cancel cable service before the end of a billing cycle for cable service after the date of cancellation. Altice argued that N.J.A.C. 14:18-38’s proration requirement effectively regulated its “rates for the provision of cable service” and was therefore expressly preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(1) of the federal Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). Assuming it was correct, Altice contended that once its customers sign up for a monthly plan, they had to pay for a full final month of cable service even if they terminate service before the month ends. Alternatively, Altice asserted that even if the consumer protection regulation is not preempted, the BPU expressly waived compliance with that requirement. The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (the BPU) and Division of Rate Counsel disagreed, contending this consumer protection regulation was a valid exercise of the State’s police power, which they argued the Cable Act explicitly authorized. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Section 543(a)(1) of the Cable Act did not preempt the proration requirement in N.J.A.C. 14:18-3.8. The Court found the regulation did not regulate “rates for the provision of cable service,” but rather prevents cable companies from charging for cable service that customers have cancelled. The regulation does not set the “rate” that companies can charge. It simply protects cable users from paying for service they no longer want. The Appellate Division's judgment to the contrary was reversed and the The BPU's cease-and-desist order was reinstated. The matter was remanded for the appellate court to decide Altice's remaining argument that the BPU failed to follow proper procedures in this enforcement action. View "In the Matter of the Alleged Failure of Altice USA, Inc., to Comply with Certain Provisions of the New Jersey Cable Television Act and the New Jersey Administrative Code" on Justia Law

Two California hardware stores (Craftwood) are part of the Do It Best (DIB) hardware industry cooperative and wholesaler. Generac supplies goods to DIB for purchase by hardware retailers in the cooperative. Generac had an agreement with CMI, an independent sales and marketing representative, for assistance with promotion and marketing. CMI sent out faxes to DIB-member hardware stores advertising deals on Generac products, including three sent to Craftwood.The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, forbids using “any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement” except where the recipient gave “prior express invitation or permission.” Generac cited the agreement that Craftwood signed when it joined the DIB cooperative, which refers to the provision of advertising and includes Craftwood’s fax number. Craftwood also opted to purchase advertising materials to send to its customers.The district court granted Generac summary judgment, finding that the contract between Craftwood and DIB evinced an agreement by Craftwood to receive faxes, including from vendors. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding a material dispute of fact as to consent. The court noted the need to enforce the Act as written, although fax machines are now rare, and the common view that these suits are fueled primarily by plaintiffs’ attorneys looking for large fee awards that often come at the expense of small businesses. View "Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the denial of a records request made pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the petition.A reporter for Las Vegas Review-Journal, Inc. (LVRJ) made an NPRA request concerning an investigation into potential criminal activity by a law enforcement officer. After denying the request several times, the police department conducting the investigation, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) ultimately released heavily redacted portions of the investigative files. Metro sought relief, but the district court denied the petition on the grounds that the investigative files contained confidential and private information not subject to public release. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Metro failed to meet its burden to establish under the NPRA that the requested records were confidential in their entirety under either a statutory or caselaw exemption. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Congress enacted Sec. 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which established the Universal Service Fund (USF) and entrusted its administration to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC relies on a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (“USAC”), to aid it in its administration of the USF. USAC proposals are approved by the FCC either expressly or after fourteen days of agency inaction.USAC submitted its 2022 first quarter projections to the FCC on November 2, 2021. The FCC published these projections for notice andcomment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. On November 19, 2021, Petitioners submitted comments challenging the constitutionality of the USF and the FCC’s reliance on USAC. The FCC approved USAC’s proposal on December 27, 2021. In response, Petitioners filed this petition on January 5, 2022.On appeal, Petitioners assert that: (1) the Hobbs Act is not a jurisdictional bar to their constitutional claims; (2) Section 254 violates the nondelegation doctrine because Congress failed to supply the FCC with an intelligible principle; and (3) the FCC’s relationship with USAC violates the private nondelegation doctrine because the FCC does not adequately subordinate USAC in its administration of the USF.Finding that the Hobbs Act did not bar Petitioners' claims, the Fifth Circuit reached and rejected the claims on their merits. The Fifth Circuit held that Sec. 254 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine or the private non-delegation doctrine. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law

GEFT, a billboard company, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because Monroe County did not allow the installation of a digital billboard along I-69. Receiving a sign permit required compliance with size limits, height restrictions, setback requirements, a ban on changeable-copy (or digital) signs, and a prohibition on off-premises commercial signs, The ordinance provided exceptions to the permit requirement for government signs and certain noncommercial signs. If a proposed sign was ineligible for a permit, the applicant could apply for a use variance, which required specific findings.The district court granted GEFT summary judgment and enjoined the permitting scheme and the variance procedures. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first declining to extend the injunction to encompass the entire ordinance. Monroe County’s substantive sign standards do not need a permitting scheme to function. Indiana law provides that local government entities can enforce their own ordinances through civil penalties or injunctions. The court reinstated the variance procedure. That procedure is a “prior restraint” but is not unconstitutional; it does not involve consideration of content, permits ample alternatives for speech, including displays of messages on signs, and it does not give the Board of Zoning Appeals so much discretion that it violates the First Amendment. View "GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County Indiana" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has long monitored local telephone companies’ “access stimulation.” In 2011, the FCC issued rules to address this phenomenon, defining when carriers engage in access stimulation and restricting the rates that they could charge. After local carriers found loopholes in this regulatory system, the FCC revisited and updated these rules, issuing the Updating the Intercarrier Compensation Regime to Eliminate Access Arbitrage (“Access Arbitrage Order”), 34 FCC Rcd. 9035 (2019). Wide Voice, LLC (“Wide Voice”), rearranged its business model and call traffic path in coordination with closely related entities, HD Carrier and Free Conferencing. Wide Voice petitions for review of the FCC’s order, specifically arguing that the FCC unreasonably concluded that it violated Section 201(b) by restructuring its business operations to continue imposing charges that were otherwise prohibited.   The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The panel held that the FCC properly exercised its authority under § 201(b) to hold Wide Voice liable for circumventing its newly adopted rule in the Access Arbitrage Order when the company devised a workaround. Contrary to Wide Voice’s assertions, the FCC need not establish new rules prohibiting the evasion of its existing rules to find a Section 201(b) violation. The panel rejected Wide Voice’s contention that it restructured its business to comply with, rather than evade, the FCC’s new rules. Finally, the panel rejected Wide Voice’s contention that even if the FCC was permitted to find its conduct “unjust and unreasonable,” it did not have fair notice that its practices were unlawful, and therefore the FCC violated its right to due process. View "WIDE VOICE, LLC V. FCC, ET AL" on Justia Law