Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The school district and chief of police sent an e-mail to officials and citizens instructing them "if you see this person in or around the district schools, please contact the police." Plaintiff claimed that the email used his real name and stated that he had been known to hang around schools, had not approached any kids, and that his mental status was unknown. It contained his picture, home address, the make, model, and license plate number of his vehicle, and his driver's license number. His suit, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged deprivation of freedom of movement, illegal seizure of personal records, violation of right to privacy, conspiracy, and failure to train, supervise and discipline agents. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously and, after a deadline for filing in his own name passed, dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court provided two independently sufficient reasons for dismissal: refusal to prosecute in compliance with court orders and consideration of factors concluding that plaintiff would not suffer substantial harm that might sufficiently outweigh the public interest in an open trial. View "Doe v. Megless" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Inmates filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the Indiana Department of Corrections violated their First Amendment Rights by prohibiting them from advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials from websites and publications that allow persons to advertise for pen-pals. The prohibition was enacted in response to an investigation of the link between pen-pal correspondence and inmate fraud. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the IDOC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs conceded that preventing prisoners from developing relationships with outsiders in order to defraud them by inducing financial contributions is a legitimate governmental objective. The prohibitions are reasonably related to that objective; viable alternative means of communication are available. View "Woods v. Comm'r of Ind. Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

Defendant, a technology company that sold data centers, appealed the district court's judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, a company that purchased defendant's fiber management systems and intelligent fiber systems, in plaintiff's suit for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held that because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had no intent to perform under the "best efforts" provision of the contract and failed to present any evidence of damages on its other claim, the judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded to the district court to enter judgment in favor of defendant. Accordingly, the court did not reach the other issues raised by defendant on appeal. View "Kevin M. Ehringer Enter., Inc. v. McData Serv. Corp." on Justia Law

In a 2004 decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the Federal Communications Commission‘s authority to regulate media ownership but remanded aspects of the Commission‘s 2003 Order that were not adequately supported by the record, including numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership rule, rule on cross-ownership of media within local markets, and repeal of the failed station solicitation rule. A 2008 FCC rule retained radio/television cross-ownership rule, local television and radio ownership rules in existence prior to the 2003 order, a failed station solicitation rule, and set out a series of other measures to address broadcast ownership diversity, in a separate order. The Third Circuit affirmed the order, excepting the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, for which the Commission failed to meet the notice and comment requirements of the APA, and remanded provisions of the diversity ordered that relied on a revenue-based "eligible entity" definition. The court also remanded the FCC decision to defer consideration of other proposed definitions (such as for a socially and economically disadvantaged business), so that it may adequately justify or modify its approach to advancing broadcast ownership by minorities and women. View "Prometheus Radio Project v. Fed.Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") "ISP Remand Order", which imposed a new compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic, i.e., internet service provider-bound traffic. Plaintiff, which was a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC"), maintained that the ISP Remand Order applied when the carrier originating the call and the carrier terminating the call were both CLECs. Defendant and the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") contended that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied only to traffic between a CLEC and an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"). CPUC agreed with defendant's limited reading of the reach of the compensation regime, finding it inapplicable to the ISP-bound traffic originating with plaintiff and terminated by defendant, and so it assessed against plaintiff charges consistent with defendant's state-filed tariff. Plaintiff then sued defendant and the CPUC in federal district court, alleging that the ISP Remand Order preempted their attempts to assess plaintiff charges for ISP-bound traffic based on state-filed tariffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and CPUC, agreeing with their argument that the ISP Remand Order did not apply to CLEC-CLEC traffic. The court agreed with plaintiff and with the analysis contained in an amicus brief filed upon its request by the FCC, that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied to ISP-bound traffic exchanged between two CLECs. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "AT&T Communications of CA, Inc., et al. v. Pac-West Telecomm, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 2006 the photographer took a picture of radio personalities for use in a magazine. An employee of the radio station scanned the picture, cutting off credit lines, and posted it on the internet. After the photographer's attorney contacted the station, the personalities made disparaging remarks about the photographer on the air. The photographer alleged violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 1201, the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101, and defamation under New Jersey law. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A cause of action under the DMCA may arise whenever the types of information listed in the statute and conveyed in connection with copies of a work, including in digital form, is falsified or removed, regardless of the form in which that information is conveyed. The fact that the photographer's name appeared in a printed gutter credit near the image rather than in an "automated copyright protection or management system" does not remove it from the protection of the Act. The trial court erred in finding "fair use" in the station's commercial use of a commercial photographer's copyrighted image. The photographer was given inadequate opportunity for discovery on the defamation claim. View "Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp" on Justia Law

The student was suspended for using a home computer to create an internet profile of her middle school principal, including sexual content and vulgar language. The site did not include the principal's name, but did include his picture from the school website. Other students were not able to view the site from school computers and the student made an effort to limit viewers to a few of her friends. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school on First Amendment claims (42. U.S.C. 1983). The Third Circuit reversed in part. The school violated the student's rights in suspending her for for off-campus speech that caused no substantial disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption in school. There was no disruption beyond "general rumblings" and a few minutes of talk in class; the profile was outrageous and there was no evidence that anyone took it seriously. The court rejected the parent's Fourteenth Amendment claim of interference with their "liberty" interest in raising their child. The court affirmed that the school handbook and computer use policy were not overbroad and vague. View "J.S. v. Blue Mtn. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This action arose under section 628 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, where the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") issued an order adopting rules to close the so-called terrestrial loophole. Petitioners contended that the FCC lacked statutory authority to regulate the withholding of terrestrial programing. The court held that given section 628's broad language and purpose, the court saw nothing in the statute that unambiguously precluded the FCC from extending its program access rules to terrestrially delivered programming. Nor could the court see any merit in petitioners' contention that the FCC's rules violated the First Amendment or in their various Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., challenges, with one exception. The court held however, that the FCC did act arbitrarily and capriciously by deciding to treat certain conduct involving terrestrial programing withholding as categorically "unfair" for purposes of section 628. Accordingly, the court vacated only that portion of the FCC's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cablevision System Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al." on Justia Law

The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, required incumbent local exchange carriers ("LECs"), providers of local telephone service, to share their physical networks with competitive LECs at cost-based rates. This suit arose when, in the wake of the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") Triennial Review Remand Order, respondent notified competitive LECs that it would no longer provide entrance facilities at cost-based rates for either backhauling or interconnection, but would instead charge higher rates. At issue was whether an incumbent provider of local telephone services must make certain transmission facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates. The court held that the FCC had advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, i.e., that to satisfy its duty under 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2), an incumbent LEC must make its existing entrance facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates if the facilities were to be used for interconnection, and the Court deferred to the FCC's views. View "Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.; Isiogu, et al. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co." on Justia Law