Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Sorenson Communications, Inc. challenged the 2010-2011 rates set by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC or Commission) to compensate Video Relay Service providers, including Sorenson. Video Relay Service (VRS) is a type of telecommunication relay service (TRS), "which enables a person with a hearing disability to remotely communicate with a hearing person by means of a video link and a communications assistant." FCC regulations provide certain minimum standards that VRS providers must meet. Among these requirements, VRS providers must operate every day, twenty-four hours a day, and must answer 80 percent of all calls within 120 seconds. TRS customers do not pay to access the service. Instead, TRS providers are compensated by the TRS Fund at a rate determined by the FCC. The TRS Fund is financed by interstate telecommunications providers on the basis of interstate enduser telecommunications revenues. Until 2007, the Commission set VRS rates annually, which resulted in significant variation in compensation each year. In 2007, the FCC adopted a three-tiered rate structure for compensating VRS providers, with rates that declined as the number of minutes per month increased. Sorenson asked the FCC to stay its 2010 Order which retained the tiered structure of the 2007 order, but reduced rates on all tiers. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit denied Sorenson's petition for review because the Commission’s order was consistent with its statutory mandate and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of a religious organization, demonstrated around the stadium at which the 2006 "Gay Games" were held, but were prohibited from demonstrating and preaching on the sidewalk. They stopped demonstrating on the sidewalk outside a major tourist attraction (Navy Pier) under threat of arrest. One plaintiff, who refused to move from his spot on a public sidewalk outside one of the game venues, was arrested for disorderly conduct. The district court ruled in favor of the city defendants on claims under the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration, and common law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the First Amendment claim dealing with a policy requiring a permit for even small-group demonstrations outside Navy Pier. The constitutionality of that policy must be evaluated in light of the unique features of the location. The city's legitimate concerns justify its actions with respect to the other locations.View "Marcavage v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, citizens of Illinois, brought a class action on behalf of licensed drivers in several states against West Publishing, asserting claims under the Driver’' Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2722. They contend that West acquires personal information contained in motor vehicle records of millions of drivers, directly or indirectly, from state DMVs for resale in violation of the Act. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.While the Act does create a federal private right of action for people who claim that their personal information has been disclosed in violation of the Act, it does not prohibit West Publishing from reselling the plaintiffs' personal information to those with uses permitted by the Act. View "Graczyk v. West Publ'g Co." on Justia Law

Pleased with the results of their first collaboration, the author and musician co-authored and recorded a second song. The relationship collapsed and the musician signed as a recording artist with unrelated recording and management companies. Accusations and altercations followed, and the author filed suit, alleging a "novel" claim of copyright infringement against the musician and others for preventing the author from commercially exploiting the two songs through threats contained in cease-and-desist letters and requests to music retailers that the songs not be offered for sale. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim of copyright infringement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the copyright infringement claim, but reversed dismissal of a declaratory judgment claim. The author's allegation that the musician transferred an interest in the first song, which she did not own, is not the same thing as creating an improper copy of the song and such transfer does not constitute infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 106. The cease-and-desist letters on which the declaratory judgment action was based essentially challenge the authorship and ownership of the songs, implicating federal law, so its dismissal as a state law claim was improper. View "Severe Records, LLC, v. Rich" on Justia Law

Recording companies sought statutory damages and injunctive relief under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101, claiming willful infringement of copyrights of music recordings by using file-sharing software to download and distribute recordings without authorization. The jury found that the infringement was willful and awarded statutory damages of $22,500 for each infringed recording, an award within the statutory range of $750 to $150,000 per infringement. The judge reduced the damages by a factor of ten, reasoning that the award was excessive in violation of defendant's due process rights. The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability, but reinstated the original damage award. The district court erred in considering the constitutional issue without first addressing defendant's motion for remittitur. The court noted a number of issues concerning application of the Copyright Act that "Congress may wish to examine." View "United Statesl v. Tenenbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state prison system, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after prison officials concluded that the March 2007 edition posed an unacceptable risk to inmate rehabilitation and prison security and refused to distribute the issue to inmates. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary judgment in their favors. A second case was filed by a prisoner, against DOC employees, after they confiscated medical records and legal documents regarding other inmates, as well as copies of an article he published in the newsletter. The district court dismissed the claims on their merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions. The publisher did not establish that confiscation of the newsletter was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. DOC's policy, restricting prisoners' access to third-party mail did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights. View "Van Den Bosch v. Raemisch" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-profit company that blocks unwanted bulk e-mail, maintains a list of internet protocol addresses of spam distributors, which internet service providers use to block e-mails originating from those addresses. Plaintiff, a now-defunct internet marketing company, sued for tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and defamation. The district court granted default judgment and awarded $11,715,000 in damages. When defendant changed strategy, the Seventh Circuit affirmed default judgment but vacated the award. On remand, the court awarded a total of $27,002. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in the nominal amount of three dollars. The district court properly struck most of plaintiff's evidence, either as an appropriate discovery sanction or for proper procedural reasons. The evidence did not support an award of $27,000 in actual damages because plaintiff based its damage calculations on lost revenues rather than lost profits. View "e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs provide in-home care through Medicaid-waiver programs run by the Illinois Department of Human Services; some work through a Rehabilitation Program and others through a Disabilities Program. In 2003, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was amended to designate personal care attendants and personal assistants working under the Home Services Program as state employees for purposes of collective bargaining. 20 ILCS 2405/3. Rehabilitation Program assistants designated a union, which negotiated an agreement that includes a "fair share" provision, requiring assistants who are not members to pay their proportionate share of costs of collective bargaining. Disabilities Program assistants voted against unionization. Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs claim that fair share fees violate the First Amendment by compelling association with, and speech through, the union. Disabilities Program plaintiffs argue that they are harmed by the threat of fair share fees. The district court dismissed both. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and remanded for dismissal of the Disabilities plaintiffs' case without prejudice because it was unripe. Because of the significant control the state exercises over all aspects of personal assistants' jobs, the assistants are employees of the state. The state's interests in collective bargaining are such that fair share fees withstand First Amendment scrutiny in a facial challenge to the imposition of the fees. View "Harris v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that defendants placed 33 unsolicited telemarketing calls to his home over a three-month period in 2008, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.02. Thirty calls were made after he asked to be put on defendant's do-not-call registry. He also alleged invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction over private TCPA and plaintiff alleged damages exceeding $75,000, as required for diversity jurisdiction over state-law claims. View "Charvat v. NMP, LLC," on Justia Law

Plaintiff Qwest Corporation (Qwest) and Defendants Colorado Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), individual commissioners, and Cbeyond Communications, LLC (Cbeyond) (together, defendants), cross-appealed the district court’s decision construing 47 C.F.R. 51.5, a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation relating to local telephone service providers. In order to facilitate competition in the local telephone service market, federal law requires incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), such as Qwest, to lease certain parts of their telecommunications networks to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), such as Cbeyond. ILECs are relieved of this obligation if, among other circumstances, the number of “business lines” in a local exchange reaches a certain threshold because, in the FCC’s view, a sufficient number of business lines shows that it would be economic for CLECs to invest in their own infrastructure. The term “business line” and the method of counting business lines are defined in the regulation. The parties disagree as to which types of a particular network element—UNE loops—are included in the business line count. The district court held that UNE loops serving non-business customers are included in the business line count and that non-switched UNE loops are not included in the business line count. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the portion of the district court ruling that the business line count includes nonbusiness UNE loops; the Court reversed the district court's decision that the business line count does not include non-switched UNE loops. View "Qwest Corporation v. Colorado Public Utilities Comm, et al" on Justia Law