Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was banned from the senior center because she repeatedly violated the code of conduct by yelling, making threats, and making frivolous complaints to police. She sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming violation of free-speech and due-process rights and that the code is facially unconstitutional. A magistrate judge granted summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the director and board of the center are not final policymakers for purposes of enforcing the code of conduct. Under state and local law, plaintiff could ask the city council to overturn the expulsion. She had been informed of her right to appeal and failure to do so precludes municipal liability to the extent that claimed constitutional violations stem from the ban. The court stated that it was not imposing a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 1983, but recognizing the council's role as policymaker. The board has authority to make rules for the center, so the code of conduct itself is city policy. The court rejected a facial challenge to the code, which consists of reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions and is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. View "Milestone v. City of Monroe" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant CCCOK, Inc. filed a complaint at the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) against Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P.(SWBT). CCCOK sought an order directing SWBT to pay it over two-million dollars in compensation for SWBT's alleged breach of a contract between them. The OCC rejected CCCOK’s claim, concluding that CCCOK was not entitled to compensation under the "clear and unambiguous" language of the Parties' contract. The federal district court affirmed the OCC's ruling. CCCOK appealed. On appeal, CCCOK contended that the OCC's ruling was arbitrary and capricious because it: (1) disregarded the terms of the parties' contract; (2) contradicted record evidence; and (3) violated CCCOK's rights under state and federal law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the OCC's ruling was not arbitrary and capricious and it affirmed the district court's decision. View "CCCOK Inc. v. Southwestern Bell, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved the FCC's Universal Service Program, which provided subsidies to ensure that low-income consumers, schools, health care providers, and libraries have access to advanced telecommunications services and that rates and services in rural areas were "reasonably comparable" to rates and services in urban areas pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 254. At issue was the FCC's order declining to increase subsidies under the rural rates and services component of the Universal Services Program. Here, the FCC explained that "reasonable comparability" between rural and urban areas had been largely accomplished and that expansion of the high-cost support fund would "jeopardize other statutory mandates," such as extending services to schools, hospitals, and libraries, and "ensuring affordable rates in all parts of the country." Because of this, and because the FCC had promised to address state-specific issues, like those presented by Vermont and Maine, through the waiver process, its decision to leave the high-cost support mechanism unchanged was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Thus, the court denied the petition for review. View "Vermont Public Service Board, et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a licensing order of the FCC affirming a decision of the Wireless Bureau denying reconsideration of licensing actions taken by the Wireless Bureau's Mobility Division. The Mobility Division granted Thomas Kurian's request to withdraw a radio spectrum assignment application and dismissed petitioner's notification of consummation of that same assignment. Petitioner argued that the FCC's order should be reversed because the FCC and Kurian engaged in unlawful ex parte communications; the FCC failed to give proper public notice of its decisions to grant Kurian's withdrawal request; and the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rendering the order. The court held that petitioner waived its ex parte and public notice arguments, and the FCC acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in rendering its order affirming the Wireless Bureau's order. View "Environmentel, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking to enjoin defendant from sending unsolicited text messages to cellphone users and damages. He estimated that more than 1,000 people had received these messages and requested damages fixed by the Act, $500 for each violation. The court could award three times that amount, up to $1,500 for each violation, if it determined that defendant acted "willfully and knowingly." Within a month, defendant sent a letter offering to settle the case by giving plaintiff and up to 10 other affected people $1,500 for each text message received, plus court costs, and offering to stop sending unsolicited text messages to mobile subscribers. Plaintiff did not respond. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the offer mooted the claim. To allow a case, not certified as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake would defy the limits on federal jurisdiction. View "Damasco v. Clearwire Corp." on Justia Law

PRTC, telecommunications local exchange carrier under the jurisdiction of the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico and the FCC, entered into an interconnection agreement with Sprint. In a dispute concerning compensation, the Board held that under the agreement''s change-of-law provision PRTC and Sprint were to reciprocally compensate each other for internet-service-provider bound traffic in accordance with an interim compensation order set forth by the FCC in its ISP Remand Order. The Board dismissed Sprint's claim that PRTC had overcharged for termination of transit traffic. The district court upheld the Board. The First Circuit reversed in part. The ISP Remand Order did not alter existing contractual obligations and, therefore, did not trigger the change-of-law provision. The court affirmed dismissal of the overbilling claim. View "PR Tel. Co., Inc. v. Sprintcom, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought a preliminary injunction against ClearOne Communications, Inc. based on suspicions of irregular accounting practices and securities law violations. During a hearing on the preliminary injunction, Defendant and former CEO Susie Strohm was asked if she was involved in a particular sale by ClearOne that was the focus of the SEC’s case. She said she was not and approximated that she learned of the sale either before or after the end of ClearOne’s fiscal year. Based on this testimony, Defendant was later convicted of one count of perjury. She argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that her conviction should be reversed because (1) the questioning at issue was ambiguous, (2) her testimony was literally true, and (3) even if false, her testimony was not material to the court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit disagreed on all three points. The Court found the questions were not ambiguous and there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate Defendant knowingly made false statements. Also, Defendant's testimony was material to the preliminary injunction hearing because it related to a transaction the SEC believed demonstrated ClearOne’s accounting irregularities. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Strohm" on Justia Law

In 2008 the Third Circuit ruled that the Federal Communications Commission's imposition of a $550,000 fine on CBS was arbitrary. The fine was based on a 2004 incident: the exposure, for nine-sixteenths of one second, of Janet Jackson's bare right breast during the live halftime performance of Super Bowl XXXVIII. The Supreme Court remanded for consideration under its 2009 ruling in F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., which concerned the FCC's decision to abandon its "fleeting words" safe harbor for expletives that are not repeated. On remand, the Third Circuit readopted its earlier holding that the penalty on CBS amounted to an unannounced policy change.The evidence weighed against the FCC contention that its restrained enforcement policy for fleeting material extended only to fleeting words and not to fleeting images. View "CBS Corp. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

After agents traced an Internet site containing child pornography to a computer shop, they obtained a warrant and searched hard drives of the owner's personal computers, where they found files containing pornography. The owner was convicted of knowing possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and sentenced to 84 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that his own computer contained the files, even if he did not download them himself, and that they were obtained by Internet file sharing. View "United States v. Salva-Morales" on Justia Law

During a radio call-in show, plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, called in response to critical comments regarding defendant's (county sheriff) involvement with an African-American community organization dedicated to reducing crime and indicating that defendant was not a good fit for his position. Defendant called in and retorted by describing plaintiff as a "slacker" and mentioning a disciplinary action taken in 2004 against plaintiff for "sexual harassment." In actuality, the disciplinary action was for violation of a department rule that prohibited offensive conduct or language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for disclosure of plaintiff's disciplinary history, a claim under Wisconsin's Open Records Law, and a claim under Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was no Records Act violation; there was no request to inspect a disciplinary record, no permission granted, and no balancing test undertaken. The information at issue is a matter of public record, so there was no Privacy Act violation. Rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim, the court noted that there was no threat, coercion, or intimidation. View "Hutchins v. Clarke" on Justia Law