Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

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In 2009, AT&T sought to introduce a video service in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, relying on authority provided by its perpetual, Commonwealth-wide, telephone franchise granted in 1886. The city sued, claiming the telephone franchise did not allow AT&T to offer such services over its telephone wires. After Hopkinsville and AT&T settled, Mediacom, an incumbent cable provider in Hopkinsville, intervened and asserted that AT&T was required under the Kentucky Constitution and local law to obtain a new cable franchise. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Before resolving the legal question, the district court must determine whether the video service is more analogous to a one-way television service, or a two-way telephone service. View "Mediacom SE LLC v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc." on Justia Law

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T-Mobile filed a complaint in the district court against the Board, asserting that the Board's denials of T-Mobile's applications to construct a wireless service facility on an existing transmission pole violated certain provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B), which placed limitations on a local governing body's decisional authority regarding the placement and modification of personal wireless service facilities. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and T-Mobile appealed. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that T-Mobile failed to establish that the Board effectively prohibited personal wireless services, as proscribed by subsection (B)(i)(II), or unreasonably discriminated against T-Mobile, as proscribed by subsection (B)(i)(I). Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Board. View "T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. Fairfax County Board" on Justia Law

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Several company operators filed a complaint against petitioner with the FCC, which ruled that petitioner's increased pole attachment rates violated the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. 224(d), and the FCC's implementing regulations. Petitioner now sought review of that order, arguing that the Act failed to provide for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and that the FCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious, or was otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. The court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel a fatal bar to petitioner's assertion of the constitutional issue, and its remaining arguments unavailing. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

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The Festival is an annual event at a 200-acre public park. Two private organizations rent the park. The city provides a number of facilities and services and the park remains open to the public. The organizations rent booth space to exhibitors; the application prohibits sales or solicitation outside the booth. Plaintiffs are Christians who attended the Festival to speak on their religious beliefs and carry sandwich board signs. After lengthy discussions, with Festival workers and police, plaintiffs decided to avoid arrest and leave. They sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and nominal damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. City officials engaged in state action by supporting and actively enforcing the solicitation policy. The policy was content-neutral, but not narrowly-tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. View "Bays v. City of Fairborn" on Justia Law

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CMES was performing excavation work in Stone Mountain, Georgia when it severed an underground fiber-optic cable, owned by MCI, which caused an outage. MCI subsequently filed suit against CMES, seeking loss-of-use damages measured by the theoretical rental value of substitute equipment for the duration of the outage. On appeal, MCI challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment defeating its claim for loss-of-use damages. Because this case involved an unsettled question of Georgia law, the court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia: "Under Georgia law, may a telecommunications service provider whose cable is severed recover loss-of-use damages measured by the rental value of substitute cable when it has not rented such cable or otherwise incurred any monetary loss apart from the cost of repair?" View "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. CMES, Inc." on Justia Law

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Having lost his bid for a Maine Senate seat, plaintiff sued Republican party leadership for defamation libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and publicly placing him in a false light. The complaint referred to flyers, brochures, and radio and TV ads days before the election that conjured up imaginary wrongs that he had supposedly done as a selectman for the town of Blue Hill, primarily concerning discontinuance of fireworks on the Fourth of July. The complaint referred to "actual malice." The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that false statements were made negligently, not with actual malice. Defamation law "does not require that combatants for public office act like war-time neutrals, treating everyone evenhandedly and always taking the high road. Quite the contrary. Provided that they do not act with actual malice, they can badmouth their opponents, hammering them with unfair and one-sided attacks" View "Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm." on Justia Law

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Among other provisions, the ordinance prohibited door-to-door canvassing and soliciting between 6 P.M. and 9 A.M. The district court struck licensing requirements as unconstitutional, invalidated a requirement that those going door-to-door honor a "do-not-solicit" list, but upheld the requirement that would-be canvassers obtain a copy of the list before going door to door. The court upheld the 6 P.M. curfew and held that that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a provision allowing the city manager to extend the curfew upon good cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff, an environmental advocacy organization, had standing to challenge the curfew. The curfew was unconstitutional as applied. The curfew is not narrowly tailored to serve city's interests in protecting residential privacy, allocating public safety resources, and preventing crime. View "Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood" on Justia Law

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HTC sought a declaration that it did not infringe a valid and enforceable claim of the 830 patent, which covers a handover in a cellular telephone network to reduce the chance of interrupted service for a user in transit. IPCom counterclaimed, alleging infringement. The district court concluded that two claims in the 830 patent were invalid. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the district court misconstrued the claims, which cover only an apparatus, not an apparatus and method steps. The specification adequately discloses a processor and transceiver for use in performing the functions recited in the claims.View "HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG" on Justia Law

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Defendant hacked the email account of then-Alaska governor and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin. After forensic examinations revealed that he took action to remove information from his computer relating to the incident, he was indicted on several counts, including identity theft, but only convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. Section 1519, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, prohibits knowing destruction or alteration of any record with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence investigation of any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal department or agency or in relation to or in contemplation of any such matter or case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant's posts indicated "contemplation" of a federal investigation.View "United States v. Kernell" on Justia Law

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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent local exchange carriers to lease to new competitive LECs, unbundled, at cost, facilities and services (elements) that the FCC deems necessary to provide local telephone service, 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(3), (d)(2). Section 271 requires "Bell operating" companies that seek to provide long-distance service, such as AT&T, to make available a competitive checklist of services to facilitate competition in the local phone service market. In response to regulatory developments, Kentucky competitive LECs asked the state commission to require AT&T to continue de-listed elements. The commission agreed. A district court enjoined enforcement and ordered the commission to calculate the amount a competitive LEC owed AT&T for services obtained at the unlawfully imposed rate. The commission issued another order requiring AT&T to provide de-listed elements at a regulated rate. The court entered another injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding conclusions that the commission may not require continued unbundling of de-listed elements; that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide to competitive LECs equipment known as a line splitter; and that FCC regulations do not require AT&T to provide unbundled access to high-speed fiber-optic loops in new service areas. LECs, upon request, must package unbundled network elements provided under section 251 with elements mandated only by section 271View "Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. KY Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law