Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

DISH, a direct broadcast satellite provider, challenged two orders of the Commission because they imposed "encoding rules," which limited the means of encoding that cable and satellite service providers could employ to prevent unauthorized access to their broadcasts. The court held that the FCC's decision to apply these encoding rules exceeded the agency's statutory authority. Consequently, the court need not reach DISH's alternate contention that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "EchoStar Satellite, LLC v. FCC, et al" on Justia Law

PG sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of 25 Pa. Stat. 3060(d), a portion of the Pennsylvania Election Code mandating that all persons, except election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and police officers, when permitted by the provisions of this act, must remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place during the progress of the voting. PG claimed that the statute infringed on its First Amendment “right to access and gather news at polling places” and that selective enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. There is no protected First Amendment right of access to a polling place for news-gathering purposes and there was no evidence of “invidious intent” or intentional discrimination. View "PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele" on Justia Law

The Chicago-area law firms (Anderson) represent plaintiffs in class action lawsuits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act-Junk Fax Prevention Act, which authorizes $500 in damages for faxing an unsolicited advertisement, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3). This award triples upon a showing of willfulness, and each transmission is a separate violation. Advertisers would pay a fee, and B2B would send an ad to hundreds of fax numbers without obtaining permission from the recipients. When Anderson learned that defendants in four cases under the Act had contracted with B2B, B2B records became the focus of discovery. Despite obtaining all information necessary to certify classes in the four cases, Anderson continued pushing for B2B, and, at a deposition at which B2B was represented by Ruben, obtained the names of other B2B clients, and sent solicitation letters. Anderson attempted to give Ruben $ 5000. Defendants in new cases learned that Anderson had promised B2B confidentiality and unsuccessfully challenged class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that when an ethical breach neither prejudices an attorney’s client nor undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings, state bar authorities are generally better positioned to address the matter through disciplinary proceedings, rather than the courts through substantive sanction in the underlying lawsuit. View "Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001 Fox sought to register a mark having a literal element, consisting of the words COCK SUCKER, and a design element, consisting of a drawing of a crowing rooster. Since 1979, Fox has used this mark to sell rooster-shaped chocolate lollipops, which she “displays . . .in retail outlets in small replicas of egg farm collecting baskets to emphasize the country farmyard motif.” The consumers targeted by Fox’s business are, primarily, fans of teams that have gamecocks as mascots. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed refusal by the examiner to register her mark, citing 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that a mark that creates a double entendre falls within the proscription of the section where, as here, one of its meanings is clearly vulgar. The section’s prohibition on registration of “immoral ... or scandalous matter” includes a mark that is “vulgar.”View "In re: Fox" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dixon, an African-American woman and then-interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo, wrote an op-ed column in the Toledo Free Press rebuking comparisons drawn between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Shortly thereafter, Dixon was fired. Claiming violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Dixon filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speech of a high-level Human Resources official who writes publicly against the very policies that her government employer charges her with creating, promoting, and enforcing is not protected speech. View "Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo" on Justia Law

Relying on section 331(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 331(a), appellant filed an application to reallocate VHF channels from Nevada and Wyoming to New Jersey and Delaware. The FCC denied the application, interpreting section 331(a) to require reallocations of channels only between neighboring locations. Because the Commission's decision conflicted with the statute's text and purpose and because appellant could move its channels without creating signal interference, the court reversed. View "PMCM TV, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contended that the district court's interpretation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701, was erroneous. Plaintiff alleged that the statute applied and protected all text and data stored on her personal cell phone which defendants accessed without plaintiff's permission. The Act prohibited accessing without authorization a facility through which an electronic communications service was provided and thereby obtain access to electronic communication while it was in electronic storage. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the text messages and photos stored on plaintiff's cell phone were not in "electronic storage" as defined by the Act and were thus outside the scope of the statute. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to recuse the district court judge. View "Garcia v. City of Laredo, Texas, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gayen Hancock, David Cross, Montez Mutzig, and James Bollinger sought to represent a class of customers dissatisfied with "U-verse," a digital telecommunications service offered by Defendants AT&T and several of its subsidiaries. The Oklahoma federal district court dismissed their claims based on forum selection and arbitration clauses in the U-verse terms of service. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims. Finding no error in the district court's interpretation of the terms of service, and finding no abuse of the court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. View "Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants contested a summary judgment holding that the Mississippi Caller ID Anti-Spoofing Act (ASA), Miss. Code Ann. 77-3-805, violated the Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs provide nationwide third-party spoofing services to individuals and entities. In light of the carefully-drafted language in section 227(e)(1) of the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 (TCIA), 47 U.S.C. 227(e)(1), and legislative history, and in spite of the presumption against preemption that attached to a state's exercise of its police power, there was an inherent federal objective in the TCIA to protect non-harmful spoofing. The ASA's proscription of non-harmful spoofing frustrated this federal objective and was, therefore, conflict preempted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Teltech Systems, Inc., et al v. Bryant, et al" on Justia Law

Recognizing the growing importance of mobile data in a wireless market in which smartphones are increasingly common, the FCC adopted a rule requiring mobile-data providers to offer roaming agreements to other such providers on "commercially reasonable" terms. Verizon challenged the data roaming rule on multiple grounds. The court held that Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq., plainly empowered the FCC to promulgate the data roaming rule. And although the rule bears some marks of common carriage, the court deferred to the FCC's determination that the rule imposed no common carrier obligations on mobile-internet providers. In response to Verizon's remaining arguments, the court concluded that the rule did not effect an unconstitutional taking and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Cellco Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law