Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Luvdarts sued mobile wireless carriers, who own multimedia messaging networks (MMS networks), for copyright infringement. At issue was whether the carriers could be held liable for copyright infringement that allegedly occurred on their networks. Because Luvdarts failed to allege adequately that the carriers had the necessary right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct, the district court properly determined that they could not prevail on their claim of vicarious copyright infringement. Because Luvdarts failed to allege adequately that the carriers had the necessary specific knowledge of infringement, it could not prevail on its claim of contributory copyright infringement. Accordingly, Luvdarts failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and the district court properly dismissed its complaint with prejudice. View "Luvdarts LLC, et al v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

In 2006 a teenager accused Gakuba of kidnapping and raping him. State charges are pending Gakuba sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that investigating police barged into his Rockford hotel room without a warrant and seized his wallet and other items after obtaining Gakuba’s video rental records from Hollywood Video to corroborate the accuser’s story that he had spent time watching videos in Gakuba’s room. He also sought damages under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court dismissed without prejudice, granting Gakuba leave to amend his complaint if the indictment concluded in his favor. The court advised Gakuba that certain claims would be barred on immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Gakuba’s claims of damages resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course of his criminal case. Monetary relief is not available to him in his defense of criminal charges and his claims may become time-barred by the time the state prosecution has concluded, so the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Gakuba’s civil-rights claims. The court noted that Hollywood Video employees knowingly disclosed his rental information to the police without a warrant. View "Gakuba v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Wiley, an academic publisher, often assigns to its foreign subsidiary (WileyAsia) rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley’s English language textbooks abroad. WileyAsia’s books state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the U.S. When Kirtsaeng moved to the U.S., he asked friends to buy foreign edition English-language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him. He sold the books at a profit. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation and resale was an infringement of Wiley’s 17 U.S.C. 106(3) exclusive rights to distribute its copyrighted work and section 602’s import prohibition. Kirtsaeng cited section 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine, which provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” The district court held that the defense did not apply to goods manufactured abroad. The jury found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley’s American copyrights and assessed damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that section 109(a)’s “lawfully made under this title” language indicated that the “first sale” doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The Supreme Court reversed; the “first sale” doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. Section 109(a) says nothing about geography. A geographical interpretation of the first-sale doctrine could re¬quire libraries to obtain permission before circulating the many books in their collections that were printed overseas; potential practical problems are too serious, extensive, and likely to come about to be dismissed as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. View "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

K.A., a fifth-grade student, attempted to distribute, before the start of class, an invitation to a children’s Christmas party at her church. Students were normally allowed to distribute invitations to birthday parties, Halloween parties, and similar events during non-instructional time. The teacher told K.A. that the principal would have to approve the flyer. The principal later notified K.A.’s father that the superintendent had not approved the flyer, based on a policy concerning events not related to the school. Her father filed suit, alleging that the school district had violated K.A.’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court, applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and finding no evidence that distribution of the invitations would threaten a “substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere with the rights of others,” granted preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the original policy and subsequent revisions were broader than allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into a narrow exception. View "K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

Judge Kendall contends that the Daily News and Blackburn defamed him while reporting on his decision to grant bail to Castillo, who subsequently murdered a child; his decision to use house arrest for Williams, who was subsequently involved in a police standoff; and his decision to retire. After a jury verdict awarded $240,000, the trial court awarded the defendants judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Virgin Island Supreme court affirmed after denying Kendall’s motion for recusal based on its previous contempt proceedings against him. The Third Circuit affirmed without reaching the issue of recusal. Judge Kendall could not establish actual malice as necessary in a public-figure libel action. View "Kendall v. Daily News Publ'g Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an active genealogist and animal rights activist, claimed that her name had commercial value and that search engines generated revenue as a result of internet searches of her name. She specifically alleges that various features of Google’s search engine violate her right of publicity by using her name to trigger sponsored links, ads, and related searches to medications, including Levitra, Cialis, and Viagra, all of which are trademarks of nationally advertised oral treatments for male erectile dysfunction. The district court dismissed her suit alleging common law misappropriation and violation of the state right-of-privacy law, Wis. Stat. 995.50(2)(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the public interest and incidental use exceptions. View "Stayart v. Google Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the FCC's three revisions to the interpretation of Section 224 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 224. Section 224 provided a variety of advantages to certain types of firms seeking to attach their wires, cable, or other network equipment to utility poles. The FCC's Order allowed incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share the benefits of some of Section 224's provisions; reformulated the ceiling on the rate that pole-owning utilities could charge "telecommunications carriers" seeking to make pole attachments; and moved back the date as of which compensatory damages started to accrue in favor of parties filing successful complaints against utilities. The court upheld the FCC's view that ILECs were "providers of telecommunications services" for purposes of section 224(a)(4). Because the FCC's methodology was consistent with the unspecified cost terms contained in section 224(e), and the FCC's justifications were reasonable, the telecom rate revision warranted judicial deference. Petitioners' arguments regarding the refund period had no serious statutory basis. The court considered petitioners' many subsidiary arguments and found them all to be without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "American Electric Power Serv. Corp., et al v. FCC, et al" on Justia Law

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 U.S.C. 1881a,2008 amendments, permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. They normally must first obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approval; 1881a surveillance is subject to statutory conditions, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. United States persons who claim to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance sought a declaration that 1881a is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction. The district court found that they lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they showed an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that their communications will be intercepted in the future and that they suffer present injuries from costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, which require an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient. Plaintiffs’ standing theory rests on a speculative chain of possibilities. The Court stated that it is "reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-makers will exercise their judgment." Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. View "Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA" on Justia Law

KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC’s service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC’s plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press “1” during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson’s extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to “exercise independent judgment” in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law