Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The Communications Act of 1934 requires state or local governments to act on siting applications for wireless facilities “within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed.” 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). The FCC issued a Declaratory Ruling concluding that the phrase “reasonable period of time” is presumptively (but rebuttably) 90 days to process an application to place a new antenna on an existing tower and 150 days to process all other applications. The cities of Arlington and San Antonio challenged the Ruling. The Fifth Circuit found the statute ambiguous and upheld the FCC’s determination that section 201(b)’s broad grant of regulatory authority empowered it to administer section 332(c)(7)(B). The Supreme Court affirmed. Courts must apply the Chevron framework to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency’s statutory authority (i.e., its jurisdiction). The Court rejected a contention that Chevron deference was not appropriate because the FCC asserted jurisdiction over matters of traditional state and local concern. The statute explicitly supplants state authority. There is no case in which a general conferral of rule-making or adjudicative authority has been held insufficient to support Chevron deference for an exercise of that authority within the agency’s substantive field. A general conferral of rule-making authority validates rules for all the matters the agency is charged with administering. It is sufficient that the preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the Communications Act through rule-making and adjudication, and the interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. View "Arlington v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Michigan legislature enacted laws that barred sexually oriented businesses from displaying signs on the premises that contained more than “words or numbers,” Mich. Comp. Laws 125.2833; and imposed similar restrictions on off-site billboards, Mich. Comp. Laws 252.318a. In response to a First Amendment challenge, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement. The state stipulated to a final judgment declaring both laws facially unconstitutional and permanently enjoining enforcement. Two months later, Platinum, represented by the same attorney who had won the first lawsuits, sued the same defendants, challenging the same laws on the same free speech grounds. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The legal possibility that “this Governor or this Attorney General will enforce these laws in the face of these injunctions is: zero.” Platinum Sports has no cognizable theory of injury. View "Platinum Sports Ltd. v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 2012 Public Act 53 provides: “A public school employer’s use of public school resources to assist a labor organization in collecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees is a prohibited contribution to the administration of a labor organization,” so that unions must collect their own membership dues from public-school employees, rather than have the schools collect those dues via payroll deductions. The Act does not bar public employers other than schools from collecting membership dues for unions who represent their employees. Unions and union members challenged the Act under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, quoting the Supreme Court: “The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech’; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” The court further reasoned that there is a legitimate interest in support of the Act’s classification; the legislature could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers. View "Bailey v. Callaghan" on Justia Law

Appellants, an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC), appealed the district court's judgment under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 251-261. At issue was whether the TCA obligated ILECs to provide a connection service known as transit traffic service at negotiated rates or at lower regulated rates to new entrants seeking to exchange traffic with each other through the ILECs' facilities. The court affirmed the district court's determination that appellant was obligated to provide appellees with transit service under the TCA at regulated rates. Further, the court affirmed the district court's reversal of an order requiring appellant to apply regulated rates to all of its contracts for the provision of transit traffic service. View "Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Comcast" on Justia Law

Sprint entered into interconnection agreements with incumbent local exchange carriers (CenturyLink Plaintiffs) providing for the mutual exchange of telecommunications traffic pursuant to the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. When Sprint began to withhold payments under the agreement, CenturyLink brought a breach of contract claim in federal district court. The court held that the 1996 Act did not require a State commission to interpret and enforce an interconnection agreement (ICA) in the first instance; neither the text of the 1996 Act nor prudential considerations compelled federal deference to State commissions in the first instance; the district court judge's ownership of shares in plaintiff did not constitute a financial interest in plaintiff for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 455(b); the district court did not violate the recusal statute and therefore did not abuse his discretion in deciding that neither recusal nor vacatur was appropriate; when viewed in conjunction with the ambiguity in the ICA's coverage of voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traffic over Feature Group D (FGD) trunks, the parties' course of dealing reinforced the court's conclusion that the district court did not err in entering judgment for plaintiff on its breach of contract claim; and, in the face of ambiguity, the court construed the relevant provisions of the North Carolina ICA against Sprint and in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Central Telephone Co. v. Sprint Communications Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, K-Tech sued DirecTV for patent infringement against DirecTV. On the same day, K-Tech filed a similar action against TWC. The complaints named four patents identifying systems and methods for modifying a major channel number, a minor channel number, and/or a carrier frequency to identify a television program. The district court dismissed both complaints and K-Tech’s amended complaints, for failure to state a claim. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the district court applied the incorrect standard in evaluating the adequacy of K-Tech’s complaints. District courts must evaluate complaints alleging direct infringement by reference to Form 18 of the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. K-Tech’s amended complaints satisfied those standards. DirecTV and TWC know what K-Tech’s patents claim, and they know what K-Tech asserts their systems do, and why. K-Tech has alleged that DirecTV and TWC must and do modify or “translate” digital signals they receive, and it has alleged that they do so using K-Tech’s patented methods and systems. View "K-Tech Telecomm., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order dismissing her putative class claims against Yahoo!, alleging that Yahoo! violated the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701-2712, when it disclosed some of her noncontent subscriber information to the government pursuant to allegedly invalid subpoenas. Plaintiff further argued that even if the subpoenas were valid, Yahoo! failed to comply with their terms when it produced the requested documents prior to the deadline set in the subpoenas. The court held that the good faith defense under 18 U.S.C. 2707(e) was met when the defendant complies with a subpoena that appeared valid on its face, in the absence of any indication of irregularity sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the subpoena may be invalid or contrary to applicable law. In this case, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's SCA claims because Yahoo! was statutorily immune from suit because it produced the requested documents in good faith reliance on grand jury subpoenas. Yahoo!'s early compliance with the subpoenas did not vitiate Yahoo's immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sams v. Yahoo! Inc." on Justia Law

Allegedly in retaliation for Modrowski’s unwillingness to skimp on building repairs, defendants fired him, withheld $11,000 in wages, had Modrowski jailed, and locked Modrowski out of his personal Yahoo email account. Modrowski sued, challenging the refusal to relinquish control over his email account. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, but Modrowski discovered that years’ worth of personal correspondence had vanished. Modrowski claimed violation of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701), the Federal Wire Tapping Act (18 U.S.C. 2511), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed the first two claims because Modrowski acknowledged that he voluntarily linked his personal account with the defendants’ business account. The district court dismissed without prejudice the Computer Fraud Act claim for failure to allege an injury of at least $5,000. When Modrowski returned his first amended complaint, defendants moved for summary judgment. The window for fact discovery had closed and neither party had sought an extension. Modrowski responded by attacking perceived deficiencies of the defendants’ motion. Noting Modrowski’s failure to offer “any evidence in response to defendants’ motion, let alone evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact,” it granted defendants’ motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Modrowski v. Pigatto" on Justia Law

Southern Walk, a homeowners association, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment against OpenBand, the corporation with which it had contracted in 2001 for wire-based video services. Southern Walk alleged that the 2007 Exclusivity Order issued by the FCC rendered "null and void" OpenBand's exclusive rights under the 2001 contracts to provide such wire-based video services to Southern Walk homeowners. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court to the extent that it held that Southern Walk failed to allege facts supporting standing in this case, but vacated that judgment to the extent that it dismissed the case with prejudice, and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. The court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees to OpenBand. View "Southern Walk at Broadlands v. Openband at Broadlands, LLC" on Justia Law

The homeowners association sued OpenBand, a group of interlocking entities that provided cable services to Lansdowne real estate development. The homeowners alleged that OpenBand entered into a series of contracts that conferred upon Open Band the exclusive right to provide video services to the the development, in violation of an order of the FCC prohibiting such exclusivity arrangements. Because the contract prohibited competing cable providers from accessing the Lansdowne development in patent violation of the FCC's Order, the court affirmed the district court's judgment declaring the challenged provisions null and void and permanently enjoining their enforcement. View "Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Assoc. v. Openband at Lansdowne, LLC" on Justia Law