Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a dispute between the Alabama Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") Board (CMRS Board) and T-Mobile South, LLC and PowerTel Memphis, Inc. (collectively, T-Mobile) two providers of wireless telephone services, regarding emergency "911" service charges for purchasers of prepaid wireless service. From May 2003 through May 2005, T-Mobile paid the 911 service charge on behalf of its prepaid CMRS connections. In June 2005, T-Mobile ceased paying the 911 service charge for its prepaid connections. but resumed paying the service charge in 2007. T-Mobile never collected the service charge from any of its prepaid customers. T-Mobile requested a refund of CMRS service charges it had paid the CMRS Board from May 2003 through May 2005. The CMRS Board denied the request. T-Mobile then filed a declaratory judgment action against the CMRS Board and the members of the CMRS Board individually and in their official capacities, seeking a judgment declaring that the service charge did not apply to prepaid wireless service. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court subsequently denied. The trial court eventually entered an order denying T-Mobile's summary judgment motion and granting the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legislature's intent was to impose the service charge on all CMRS connections, including those provided by T-Mobile to its prepaid customers. And under Alabama law, T-Mobile was not excused from paying the service charges. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. Bonet" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Diana Mey filed a class action complaint alleging that Defendants, several companies, violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by leaving an automated voicemail message at her residence in response to a classified advertisement that Plaintiff's son placed on an internet website. The circuit court ruled that the automated call placed in response to the advertisement did not violate the TCPA and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) applied the correct standard of review when assessing a W.V. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; (2) properly ruled that the automated call was not a telephone solicitation and did not contain an unsolicited advertisement under the TCPA; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to W.V. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) after being informed that the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) issued a citation against Defendants; and (4) did not err in concluding that Defendants were not required to obtain Plaintiff's prior express consent before responding to the classified advertisement.View "Mey v. Pep Boys" on Justia Law

Petitioner Helen Immelt sounded a car horn at length in front of a neighbor’s house in the early morning hours. She was arrested for violating a Snohomish County noise ordinance that included amongst its prohibited noise disturbances horn honking for a purpose other than public safety, or originating from an officially sanctioned parade or other public event. She challenged the horn ordinance as overbroad and in violation of free speech protections. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance was overbroad, and reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "Washington v. Immelt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of appeals in "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" (641 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2011)): "[i]s the proposed jury instruction in this case, which state[d] that '(a) Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act,' a correct statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the severing of an underground cable located on property owned by one of the alleged trespass[e]rs, and the property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep it, as an existing cable, underneath the property?" MCI alleged that co-Defendant James Joubert negligently excavated with a backhoe in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act. MCI alleged Defendant Wayne Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. The underground cable at issue was buried under land owned by Hagan. After a trial in the federal district court, a jury found for Hagan and Joubert. MCI appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Upon review of the issue presented by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: the proposed jury instruction in this case was not a correct statement of Louisiana law. View "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" on Justia Law

Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. AT&T claimed the trial court erred by ruling that AT&T had not been assigned Plaintiff Pike Porter’s cell phone contract before sending him unsolicited text messages and erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue. AT&T also argued that even if Plaintiff's claims arose before AT&T purchased his contract, the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that AT&T cannot enforce the binding arbitration agreement in Plaintiff's original cell phone contract. The court also noted that the arbitration agreement could not bind Plaintiff "with regard to events between him and AT&T that took place at a time when his only contract was with Unicel, not AT&T." AT&T highlighted four pieces of evidence it submitted along with its motion to amend and reconsider as "undisputed" proof that it purchased Plaintiff's contract in December 2008. Upon review of AT&T's evidence, the Supreme Court concluded the document did not establish that Plaintiff's contract was one of the 100,000 to 150,000 contracts sold, nor did it suggest that "certain Unicel assets" included all of the wireless contracts Unicel held in Vermont. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of Plaintiff.View "Porter v. AT&T Mobility, LLC" on Justia Law

Six weeks after the Regulatory Commission of Alaska approved the 2007 Access Charge Rates long distance telephone companies pay to local telephone companies, an association of local telephone companies realized that five of the rates the Regulatory Commission approved were based upon an erroneous spreadsheet the association included in its rate filings. The association requested that the Regulatory Commission correct the rates. The Regulatory Commission corrected the rates prospectively, but concluded retrospective application was barred by the Supreme Court's case law on retroactive ratemaking. The superior court agreed that retrospective application of the adjusted rates was impermissible, and the association appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in "Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc." (prohibiting retroactive ratemaking in "second look" cases), but held that the Regulatory Commission has the authority to implement corrections of some procedural mistakes starting when notice of a mistake is given. The Court remanded to the Regulatory Commission to determine the type of error that occurred in this case and whether the error should be corrected retrospectively. View "Alaska Exchange Carriers Assn., Inc. v. Regulatory Comm'n of Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A reporter from the News Tribune newspaper sought access to the deposition of a material witness in a criminal trial. The deposition took place in a courtroom with the judge present. Without engaging in an inquiry into the factors pursuant to "Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa," the trial court closed the courtroom on the ground that depositions are not open to the public. The deposition was not introduced at trial and did not become part of the court's decision making process. The News Tribune sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the transcript and videotape of the deposition, arguing that it had the right to attend the deposition under the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment to the federal constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the state or federal constitution was violated by the trial court's ruling that the deposition proceeding was not open to the public: "The News Tribune's claim that the location and presence of the judge turned the deposition into a 'hearing' to which the open courts protections apply" was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court denied the News Tribune's application for a writ of mandamus.View "Tacoma News, Inc. v. Cayce" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Publishing Company (The Oklahoman) and World Publishing Company (Tulsa World) (collectively, Publishers), filed open records requests with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of State Finance (OSF). Both the Oklahoman and Tulsa World sought to release of birth dates of all state employees. In addition, the Tulsa World requested employee identification numbers. The Oklahoma Public Employees Association (OPEA) filed two suits against OPM and OSF requesting declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to bar the release of employees' birth dates. The second suit also sought to bar employee identification numbers from disclosure. The district court consolidated the cases. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. Relying on an opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General, the trial court sustained OPEA's and OPM's motions. It ordered that the state agencies be given sixty days’ notice to report their decisions on whether disclosure of date of birth requests would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; whether public access could be denied to employee identification numbers; and that legislative staff records were exempt from disclosure under the Oklahoma Open Records Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Oklahoma law already contains a non-exclusive list of examples of information that if released, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of State employees' personal privacy. As guidance, the Court held that where a claim of invasion of privacy is made, courts should use a case-by-case balancing test to determine whether personal information is subject to release. If significant privacy interests are at stake while the public's interest in the disclosed information is minimal, release of that information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."View "Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Lonnie Howard appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to delivery of methamphetamine. On two occasions, a confidential police informant bought methamphetamine tablets from Kayla Bruning. On both occasions, Defendant drove Bruning to pick up the tablets from a supplier and drove her to the site where the informant bought the tablets. After sentencing, Howard made a motion in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea. Howard argued he had not touched the drugs or money, and he was actually innocent of delivery. Howard argued the factual basis offered by the State did not support his guilty plea to "delivery." The State argued Defendant admitted to driving the vehicle that transported the methamphetamine, knew he was transporting methamphetamine in his vehicle to sell to another individual, and was present while the informant bought the methamphetamine in his vehicle. The district court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, noting that the definition of "delivery" included "constructive delivery" and "attempted delivery." Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "North Dakota v. Howard" on Justia Law