Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Claimant Jerry Benoit worked for Turner Industries for twenty-seven years. For ten of those years he worked as a general laborer for a Lake Charles Citgo refinery, where Turner was contracted to perform general maintenance. Claimant's duties included cleaning chemical discharges and oily waste which collected in the drainage ditches, sewers, and processing units at the refinery. In the course of this work, he was exposed to any number of potentially dangerous or carcinogenic chemicals, including high levels of benzene. In July 2006, Claimant fell ill. He was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (AML), known to be linked to high levels of benzene exposure. Despite the medical evidence linking Claimant's cancer to the chemicals he was exposed to at work, his claim for medical benefits was denied. The eventual medical bills totaled over $625,000. Medicaid paid for $203,124.68. The remaining $422,043.59 was "written off" by the medical care providers. Turner paid nothing. Claimant's family filed suit in 2007. The Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC) awarded Claimant total medical expenses and attorney fees. Turner appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the OWC judgment in its entirety. Upon review of the correctness of the OWC award of medical expenses, the Supreme Court concluded the OWC erred in awarding the "written off" medical expenses: "Claimant would receive an improper windfall if he was allowed to recover for medical expenses which have been reduced by health care providers as a result of their contractual arrangements with Medicaid." The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Benoit v. Turner Industries Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired as a public school basketball coach in 1999, and made athletic director in 2003, was fired as coach in 2008, following a campaign based on his allegedly abusive and bullying style of coaching. He filed suit for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy to intentionally interfere with prospective business advantage, and slander per se. The trial court dismissed as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILCS 110/15. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of the Act is to protect citizens who are attempting to speak freely or petition government from retaliatory meritless lawsuits, intended to chill exercise of constitutional rights and impose burdensome expenses. The special summary dismissal under the Act, without discovery, allows attorney fees. For SLAPP protections to apply, plaintiff's claim must be solely based on the movant's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. The Act is not intended to apply to tortious acts and does not create a new privilege concerning defamation. It is possible that defendants could spread lies about plaintiff while at the same time genuinely petitioning government for redress, but such a situation cannot support dismissal as a SLAPP.View "Sandholm v. Kuecker" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between the Alabama Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") Board (CMRS Board) and T-Mobile South, LLC and PowerTel Memphis, Inc. (collectively, T-Mobile) two providers of wireless telephone services, regarding emergency "911" service charges for purchasers of prepaid wireless service. From May 2003 through May 2005, T-Mobile paid the 911 service charge on behalf of its prepaid CMRS connections. In June 2005, T-Mobile ceased paying the 911 service charge for its prepaid connections. but resumed paying the service charge in 2007. T-Mobile never collected the service charge from any of its prepaid customers. T-Mobile requested a refund of CMRS service charges it had paid the CMRS Board from May 2003 through May 2005. The CMRS Board denied the request. T-Mobile then filed a declaratory judgment action against the CMRS Board and the members of the CMRS Board individually and in their official capacities, seeking a judgment declaring that the service charge did not apply to prepaid wireless service. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court subsequently denied. The trial court eventually entered an order denying T-Mobile's summary judgment motion and granting the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legislature's intent was to impose the service charge on all CMRS connections, including those provided by T-Mobile to its prepaid customers. And under Alabama law, T-Mobile was not excused from paying the service charges. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. Bonet" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Diana Mey filed a class action complaint alleging that Defendants, several companies, violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by leaving an automated voicemail message at her residence in response to a classified advertisement that Plaintiff's son placed on an internet website. The circuit court ruled that the automated call placed in response to the advertisement did not violate the TCPA and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) applied the correct standard of review when assessing a W.V. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; (2) properly ruled that the automated call was not a telephone solicitation and did not contain an unsolicited advertisement under the TCPA; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to W.V. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) after being informed that the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) issued a citation against Defendants; and (4) did not err in concluding that Defendants were not required to obtain Plaintiff's prior express consent before responding to the classified advertisement.View "Mey v. Pep Boys" on Justia Law

Petitioner Helen Immelt sounded a car horn at length in front of a neighbor’s house in the early morning hours. She was arrested for violating a Snohomish County noise ordinance that included amongst its prohibited noise disturbances horn honking for a purpose other than public safety, or originating from an officially sanctioned parade or other public event. She challenged the horn ordinance as overbroad and in violation of free speech protections. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance was overbroad, and reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "Washington v. Immelt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of appeals in "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" (641 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2011)): "[i]s the proposed jury instruction in this case, which state[d] that '(a) Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act,' a correct statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the severing of an underground cable located on property owned by one of the alleged trespass[e]rs, and the property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep it, as an existing cable, underneath the property?" MCI alleged that co-Defendant James Joubert negligently excavated with a backhoe in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act. MCI alleged Defendant Wayne Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. The underground cable at issue was buried under land owned by Hagan. After a trial in the federal district court, a jury found for Hagan and Joubert. MCI appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Upon review of the issue presented by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: the proposed jury instruction in this case was not a correct statement of Louisiana law. View "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" on Justia Law

Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. AT&T claimed the trial court erred by ruling that AT&T had not been assigned Plaintiff Pike Porter’s cell phone contract before sending him unsolicited text messages and erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue. AT&T also argued that even if Plaintiff's claims arose before AT&T purchased his contract, the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that AT&T cannot enforce the binding arbitration agreement in Plaintiff's original cell phone contract. The court also noted that the arbitration agreement could not bind Plaintiff "with regard to events between him and AT&T that took place at a time when his only contract was with Unicel, not AT&T." AT&T highlighted four pieces of evidence it submitted along with its motion to amend and reconsider as "undisputed" proof that it purchased Plaintiff's contract in December 2008. Upon review of AT&T's evidence, the Supreme Court concluded the document did not establish that Plaintiff's contract was one of the 100,000 to 150,000 contracts sold, nor did it suggest that "certain Unicel assets" included all of the wireless contracts Unicel held in Vermont. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of Plaintiff.View "Porter v. AT&T Mobility, LLC" on Justia Law

Six weeks after the Regulatory Commission of Alaska approved the 2007 Access Charge Rates long distance telephone companies pay to local telephone companies, an association of local telephone companies realized that five of the rates the Regulatory Commission approved were based upon an erroneous spreadsheet the association included in its rate filings. The association requested that the Regulatory Commission correct the rates. The Regulatory Commission corrected the rates prospectively, but concluded retrospective application was barred by the Supreme Court's case law on retroactive ratemaking. The superior court agreed that retrospective application of the adjusted rates was impermissible, and the association appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in "Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc." (prohibiting retroactive ratemaking in "second look" cases), but held that the Regulatory Commission has the authority to implement corrections of some procedural mistakes starting when notice of a mistake is given. The Court remanded to the Regulatory Commission to determine the type of error that occurred in this case and whether the error should be corrected retrospectively. View "Alaska Exchange Carriers Assn., Inc. v. Regulatory Comm'n of Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A reporter from the News Tribune newspaper sought access to the deposition of a material witness in a criminal trial. The deposition took place in a courtroom with the judge present. Without engaging in an inquiry into the factors pursuant to "Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa," the trial court closed the courtroom on the ground that depositions are not open to the public. The deposition was not introduced at trial and did not become part of the court's decision making process. The News Tribune sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the transcript and videotape of the deposition, arguing that it had the right to attend the deposition under the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment to the federal constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the state or federal constitution was violated by the trial court's ruling that the deposition proceeding was not open to the public: "The News Tribune's claim that the location and presence of the judge turned the deposition into a 'hearing' to which the open courts protections apply" was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court denied the News Tribune's application for a writ of mandamus.View "Tacoma News, Inc. v. Cayce" on Justia Law