Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit in district court in Vermont against the Diocese and its former priest, alleging that the priest transported plaintiff from New York to Vermont for the purpose of sexually abusing him, and did sexually abuse him. The Diocese, a New York special act corporation with its principal office in Albany, subsequently petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court in Vermont to dismiss the case against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the Diocese's petition, concluding that this was an extraordinary case warranting mandamus relief where the court considered (a) the irreparable harm caused by a needless foray into prior abuse investigations within the Diocese, exposing victims and their families to grueling inquires that would not be undertaken in the absence of the district court's erroneous ruling, (b) the clarity of the district court's error and futility of remand, and (c) the opportunity in this case to shed light on the Supreme Court's most recent expressions on general jurisdiction, especially as applied to religious and other charitable organizations, constituted "exceptional circumstances" that warrant the issuance of the writ. View "In Re: Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, NY" on Justia Law

GLAAD filed a putative class action alleging that CNN violated California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51 et seq., and California's Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., by intentionally excluding deaf and hard of hearing visitors from accessing the videos on CNN.com. CNN filed a motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16 et seq., arguing that GLAAD's claims arose from conduct in furtherance of CNN's free speech rights and that GLAAD failed to establish a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court concluded that CNN's conduct was in furtherance of its free speech rights on a matter of public interest; where, as here, an action directly targeted the way a content provider chose to deliver, present, or publish news content on matters of public interest, that action was based on conduct in furtherance of free speech rights and must withstand scrutiny under California's anti-SLAPP statute; GLAAD failed to establish a probability of success on the merits of its Unruh Act claims because it has not shown intentional discrimination based on disability as required under California law; at this juncture, none of CNN's constitutional challenges posed a barrier to GLAAD's pursuit of its DPA claims; GLAAD's DPA claims were not foreclosed by the doctrines of field preemption and conflict preemption; GLAAD's DPA claims have the requisite minimal merit to survive CNN's free speech challenge and dormant Commerce Clause challenge; and the court certified to the California Supreme Court the remaining dispositive question of state law regarding GLAAD's DPA claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying CNN's motion to dismiss. View "Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness v. CNN" on Justia Law

The Indiana War Memorials Commission requires a permit for even small gatherings at the Soldiers and Sailors Monument at Monument Circle in Indianapolis and at several other monuments. Smith and his young son were expelled from Monument Circle for protesting, without a permit, a proposed United Nations arms treaty. Smith sought an injunction against the policy’s enforcement. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the U.S. has signed, but has not ratified the treaty and that the permit policy has changed since the district court denied the motion. The new policy retains the problematic features of the old, so Smith’s appeal is not moot. Smith seems likely to succeed in showing that the 14‐person limit on demonstrations without a permit, and a provision that, if a gathering has been advertised or the public has been invited, a permit is required even if the group ultimately is made up of fewer than 15 people, are not narrowly tailored. View "Smith v. Exec. Dir. of IN War Mem'ls Comm'n" on Justia Law

Indianapolis requires adult bookstores to remain closed between midnight and 10 a.m. every day and all day Sunday. Other retail businesses are not subject to the restrictions. Indianapolis contended that closure would curtail secondary effects, but the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim. The district court then held a trial and accepted the city’s claim of fewer armed robberies at or near adult bookstores. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of an injunction prohibiting enforcement. The city did not use a multivariate regression to control for other potentially important variables, such as the presence of late‑night taverns. The difference in the number of armed robberies is not statistically significant. The data did not show that robberies are more likely at adult bookstores than at other late-night retail outlets, such as liquor stores and convenience stores, which are not subject to the hours imposed on bookstores. The secondary-effects approach endorsed by the Supreme Court permits governments to protect persons who want nothing to do with adult uses from harms created by adult businesses; the Supreme Court has not endorsed an approach under which governments can close adult bookstores to reduce crime directed against businesses that accept the risk of being robbed, or persons who voluntarily frequent their premises. View "Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Scott alleged that Westlake repeatedly called her cell phone using an automated dialer in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and sought, for herself and a putative class, statutory damages of $500 for each negligent violation and $1500 for each intentional violation, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. Before she moved for class certification, Westlake sent Scott’s attorney an offer to pay Scott $1500 (the statutory maximum) “for each and every dialer-generated telephone call made to plaintiff.” Westlake agreed to pay costs and to entry of an injunction. The message concluded by warning Scott that, in Westlake’s opinion, its offer rendered her case moot. The next day, Scott moved for class certification and declined the offer, stating that there was “a significant controversy” concerning how many dialer-generated calls Westlake had placed to her phone, so the offer was inadequate and did not render her case moot. The district court dismissed, finding that Westlake had offered Scott everything she sought, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction, but retained jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the offer and directed the parties to conduct discovery to determine how many calls Scott received from Westlake. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the case is not moot. View "Scott v. Westlake Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Lay, a real estate company, hired a business to send advertising faxes on its behalf by “blast fax,” which sends advertisements to thousands of fax machines cheaply. As a result, Lay became the defendant in a class action filed by Locklear under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The matter settled. A monetary judgment was entered against Lay to be paid only from Lay’s insurance policies. The Act in question provides for $500 in damages for each violation, and, with a putative class of 3,478 in the underlying action, the total damage amount reached $1,737,500, plus costs. Lay’s insurer, Standard, successfully sought a declaration of noncoverage. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the damage provision of the Act allows for punitive damages, which are uninsurable under Illinois law as a matter of public policy. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, reasoning that the Act is a remedial statute, even though it provides for $500 in liquidated damages per violation. The ban on insurability does not apply.View "Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lay" on Justia Law

In 2008, the legislature enacted legislation to establish the Idaho Education Network (IEN), which was to be a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance learning in every public school in the state. Syringa Networks, LLC (Syringa), an Idaho telecommunications company, entered into a “teaming agreement” with ENA Services, LLC (ENA). Pursuant to their agreement, ENA submitted a proposal in response to a request-for-proposals (RFP) with the Department of Administration, although the cover letter stated that both ENA and Syringa were responding jointly to the proposal. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, and Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., also submitted responsive proposals. The proposals were then scored based upon specific criteria; the ENA and Qwest proposals received the highest scores. The Department issued a letter of intent to award contracts to Qwest and ENA. One month later, it issued amendments to the two purchase orders to alter the scope of work that each would perform. Qwest became "the general contractor for all IEN technical network services" (providing the “backbone”) and ENA became "the Service Provider." The effect of these amendments was to make Qwest the exclusive provider of the backbone, which was what Syringa intended to provide as a subcontractor of ENA. Syringa filed this lawsuit against the Department, its director, the chief technology officer, ENA and Qwest. The district court ultimately dismissed Syringa’s lawsuit against all of the Defendants on their respective motions for summary judgment. Syringa then appealed the grants of summary judgment, and the State Defendants cross-appealed the refusal to award them attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three seeking to set aside the State's contract with Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes. Furthermore, the Court reversed Qwest’s award of attorney fees against Syringa. We remand to the trial court the determination of whether any of the State Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees against Syringa for proceedings in the district court. The Court awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal to ENA. Because the State Defendants and Syringa both prevailed only in part on appeal, the Court did not award them either costs or attorney fees on appeal.View "Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept of Admin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned whether the Vermont Public Service Board had jurisdiction to regulate interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services provided in Vermont. The Board concluded that fixed VoIP was a "telecommunications service" under Vermont law and Vermont regulation of VoIP was not preempted by federal law because intrastate calls could be separately identified. The Board deferred consideration of what type of regulation to impose to a separate phase of the proceeding. On appeal, Comcast Phone of Vermont, LLC argued that the Board erred in not addressing whether interconnected fixed VoIP was an information service or telecommunications service under federal law because, according to Comcast, VoIP is an information service and therefore any regulation is preempted by federal law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Board must reach this question and remanded the matter for further proceedings.View "Investigation into Regulation of Voice Over Internet Protocol" on Justia Law

The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that denied their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Appeal of Union Tel. Co.," the petitioners specifically argued that federal law did not preempt these requirements. The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempted RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, II. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that section 253(a) preempted state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." View "Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Following the death of a college student in Shippensburg, Hearst Television, Inc., d/b/a WGAL-TV and its reporter, Daniel O'Donnell (Requester), filed a Right to Know Law (RTKL) request with Michael Norris, the Coroner of Cumberland County (Coroner), seeking the student's manner of death. The Coroner rejected the request, and the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (OOR) upheld the Coroner's decision. On appeal, the trial court and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Section 1236.1(c) of the Coroner's Act and the under the RTKL, the record indicating the manner of death was immediately available to Requester.View "Hearst Television Inc. v. Norris" on Justia Law