Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Section 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. 56, requires the Federal Communications Commission to periodically examine its broadcast ownership rules to limit consolidation in the industry. After the Third Circuit reviewed the Commission’s 2002 and 2006 reviews of its ownership rules, “the process broke down.” The 2010 and 2014 reviews are not complete. In 2016, the Third Circuit held that the Commission has unreasonably delayed action on its definition of an “eligible entity,” a term it has attempted to use as a lynchpin for initiatives to promote minority and female broadcast ownership, and ordered mediation. The court speculated that it might be necessary to invalidate FCC rules in the future if the Commission does not act quickly to carry out its legislative mandate. The court vacated a rule based on Commission’s 2014 determination that parties were evading its limits on the number of television stations that an entity can own through the influence exerted by advertising contracts known as joint sales agreements. The rule was procedurally invalid because it was adopted even though the Quadrennial Review cycle was severely backlogged. View "Howard Stirk Holdings LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law

An Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) is a U.S. communication service between land and vessels in navigable waterways, existing on specific broadcast frequencies. Advances in technology have greatly expanded the potential uses of AMTSs. Under the original site-based system, small geographic regions were defined by location and the waterway served and the FCC provided licenses at no cost to the first applicant. In 2000, the FCC stopped issuing site-based licenses and began issuing licenses by competitive bidding; it divided the U.S. into 10 regions and, at public auctions, sold “geographic” licenses for two blocks of AMTS frequencies in each region. Although geographic licensees may generally place stations anywhere within their region, they may not interfere with the functioning of existing site-based stations, so the location of a site-based station creates a gap in a geographic licensee’s coverage area. Plaintiffs obtained geographic licenses in areas overlaying pre-existing site-based licenses. Site-based operators refused to provide plaintiffs with the operating contours for their site-based locations within plaintiffs’ geographic locations. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FCA claims and a determination that no antitrust conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs did not identify particular actions that were determined by the FCC to be unreasonable or unjust and, therefore, do not possess a private right of action. View "Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

The members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) and Core Communications, Inc., appealed a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T Corp. Core billed AT&T for terminating phone calls from AT&T’s customers to Core’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers from 2004 to 2009. When AT&T refused to pay, Core filed a complaint with the PPUC, which ruled in Core’s favor. AT&T then filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction on the ground that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic because such traffic is the exclusive province of the Federal Communications Commission. After review of the matter, the Third Circuit found that the FCC’s jurisdiction over local ISP-bound traffic was not exclusive and the PPUC orders did not conflict with federal law. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded this case for entry of judgment in favor of Core and the members of the PPUC. View "AT&T Corp v. Core Communications Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that defendants, who run internet advertising businesses, placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ web browsers in contravention of their browsers’ cookie blockers and defendant Google’s own public statements. Essentially they claimed that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet history information when, in the course of requesting webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited website, the plaintiffs’ browsers sent that information directly to the defendants’ servers. They cited the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510; the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C 2701; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030; and, against Google, violation of the privacy right conferred by the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the state Unfair Competition Law, the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims, stating that fraud or deceit does not amount to wiretapping; the alleged conduct implicated no protected “facility” under the Stored Communications Act; and the plaintiffs alleged no damages under the Fraud Act. The court vacated dismissal of the state law claims against Google. View "In Re: Google Inc Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig." on Justia Law

Leyse filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, after receiving a prerecorded telemarketing call on the landline he shares with his roommate. Leyse was not the intended recipient of the call— his roommate was. The district court dismissed for lack of statutory standing. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Leyse has statutory standing. His status as a regular user of the phone line and occupant of the residence that was called brings him within the language of the Act and the zone of interests it protects. View "Leyse v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law