Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Two individuals brought a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that a telecommunications company, through a controlled shell entity, fraudulently obtained nearly $113 million in bidding credits during a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum license auction. The core claim was that the shell entity misrepresented its independence and concealed its relationship with the larger company, which, if disclosed, would have disqualified it from receiving small business credits. The relators asserted that the shell entity never operated as a genuine business and had an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses to the larger company after a regulatory waiting period.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia twice dismissed the case, first without prejudice and then with prejudice, finding that the public-disclosure bar of the False Claims Act applied. The court concluded that the alleged fraud had already been publicly disclosed through the shell entity’s FCC filings, and that the relators’ complaint did not materially add to the information already available.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that, even assuming the prior FCC filings constituted public disclosures of substantially the same fraud, the relators qualified as “original sources” because their allegations materially added to the publicly disclosed information. Specifically, the relators provided new evidence that the shell entity never functioned as an independent business and plausibly alleged an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses, both of which were not revealed in the public filings. The court found that these additions were significant enough to potentially influence the government’s decision to pursue the case. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. U.S. Cellular Corp." on Justia Law

Sprint Corporation and T-Mobile USA, Inc., both wireless carriers, operated programs that sold customer location information (CLI) to third-party aggregators, who then resold the data to other service providers. Although the carriers’ contracts required these third parties to obtain customer consent before accessing CLI, in practice, the carriers did not verify compliance, and several third parties accessed the data without proper consent. After public reports revealed abuses—including unauthorized access by law enforcement and bounty hunters—the carriers terminated some third-party access but continued their programs for months without implementing effective new safeguards.The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) investigated and issued Notices of Apparent Liability (NALs) to both carriers, alleging violations of the Communications Act’s duty to protect the confidentiality of customer proprietary network information (CPNI), which includes CLI. The FCC found that the carriers’ reliance on contractual promises, without independent verification or effective monitoring, was unreasonable. The FCC also concluded that the carriers failed to promptly address their inadequate safeguards after learning of the breaches. The FCC assessed penalties totaling $92 million, calculating separate violations for each third-party relationship that allowed unauthorized access after the carriers were on notice of the problems.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the carriers’ petitions challenging the FCC’s orders. The court held that CLI is CPNI under the Communications Act, that the carriers’ safeguards were inadequate, and that the FCC’s interpretation of the statute was the most natural reading, providing fair notice. The court also found the penalty calculations reasonable and rejected the carriers’ constitutional arguments, including their Seventh Amendment claim, because they had the statutory right to a jury trial but waived it by paying the penalties and seeking direct appellate review. The court denied the petitions for review. View "Sprint Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding a rule requiring broadcasters to disclose if any programming was paid for by a foreign governmental entity. The FCC's 2021 Rule mandated such disclosures and included specific diligence steps for broadcasters to follow. NAB challenged the rule, leading to a court decision that vacated part of the rule requiring broadcasters to search federal databases.The FCC then issued a revised rule in 2024, which retained the core disclosure requirements but modified the diligence steps. The new rule exempted commercial ads and political candidate ads from the disclosure requirement but included paid public service announcements (PSAs) and issue advertisements. NAB challenged the 2024 Rule, arguing it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the First Amendment, and exceeded the FCC's statutory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2024 Rule complied with the APA's notice-and-comment requirements and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the rule did not violate the First Amendment, as it was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in preventing foreign influence in U.S. broadcasting. The court further determined that the FCC did not exceed its statutory authority with the reasonable diligence requirements, as the rule did not directly regulate lessees but required broadcasters to seek information from them.Ultimately, the court denied NAB's petition for review, upholding the FCC's 2024 Rule. View "National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Stored Communications Act, which allows the government to subpoena electronic communication service providers for user records and seek court orders to prohibit disclosure of such subpoenas. The government requested and obtained a court order allowing it to prohibit disclosure of any subpoena related to a particular investigation for one year, provided the government determined that disclosure would risk one of the harms specified in the Act. The government then served a subpoena on X Corp. with the nondisclosure order attached. X Corp. moved to vacate the nondisclosure order, arguing it did not comply with the Act. The district court denied X Corp.'s motion.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued the nondisclosure order and denied X Corp.'s motion to vacate it. X Corp. appealed the decision, arguing that the order did not comply with the Stored Communications Act and violated the First Amendment. The district court relied on ex parte evidence in its decision, which X Corp. also challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the nondisclosure order did not conform to the Stored Communications Act because the court did not find "reason to believe" that disclosure of the subpoena would risk a statutory harm. The court emphasized that the statute requires the court, not the government, to make this determination. The appellate court did not address X Corp.'s First Amendment argument or the issue of the district court's reliance on ex parte evidence, as the statutory ruling was sufficient to resolve the case. View "In re Sealed Case" on Justia Law

Radio Communications Corporation (RCC), a telecommunications and media company, petitioned for review of a final order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implementing the Low Power Protection Act (LPPA). The LPPA allows low power television (LPTV) stations to apply for an upgrade to a Class A license if they meet certain criteria, including operating in a Designated Market Area (DMA) with not more than 95,000 television households. The FCC's order adopted this limitation and used Nielsen’s Local TV Report to determine a station’s DMA.RCC operates an LPTV station, W24EZ-D, in Connecticut, which is licensed to serve Allingtown, a neighborhood of West Haven with fewer than 15,000 television households. However, the station is part of the Hartford-New Haven DMA, which has approximately one million television households. RCC challenged the FCC's order, arguing that the size limitation should apply to a station’s community of license, not its DMA. RCC also raised other statutory and constitutional arguments, including claims that the order contravenes section 307(b) of the Communications Act, violates the Commerce Clause, improperly delegates legislative authority to Nielsen, and restricts programming content in violation of the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's order adheres to the best reading of the LPPA, which clearly limits Class A license eligibility to LPTV stations operating in a DMA with not more than 95,000 television households. The court found that the FCC properly defined DMA according to Nielsen’s data, as authorized by Congress, and that the statute does not reference "community of license." The court also rejected RCC's constitutional arguments, finding that the FCC's interpretation did not violate the Commerce Clause or the nondelegation doctrine. Consequently, the court denied RCC's petition for review. View "Radio Communications Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law

The case involves a False Claims Act (FCA) suit alleging that U.S. Cellular and other entities committed fraud in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) wireless spectrum auctions. The alleged fraud involved using sham small businesses to obtain and retain bidding discounts worth millions of dollars. The district court dismissed the qui tam action because a previous lawsuit had raised substantially the same allegations, triggering the FCA’s public disclosure bar, and the relators bringing the action were not original sources of the information.Previously, the law firm Lampert, O’Connor & Johnston, P.C., filed a qui tam action in 2008 alleging that the same defendants conspired to register sham designated entities to obtain and hold discounted spectrum licenses for U.S. Cellular’s use. The government investigated but declined to intervene, and the law firm voluntarily dismissed the action. In 2015, Sara Leibman and Mark O’Connor filed a new complaint in federal court in Oklahoma, asserting FCA claims against the same defendants. The case was transferred to the District of Columbia, where the district court found the complaint asserted substantially the same allegations as the 2008 action, triggering the public disclosure bar, and dismissed the action.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the relators’ allegations were substantially the same as those in the 2008 qui tam action, thus triggering the FCA’s public disclosure bar. The court also found that the relators did not qualify as original sources of the information because their contributions did not materially add to the publicly disclosed allegations. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the qui tam action. View "USA v. USCC Wireless Investment, Inc." on Justia Law

Neustar petitioned for review of the FCC's orders naming another company, Telcordia, to replace it as the Local Number Portability Administrator (LNPA). The DC Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear Neustar's petition; the Order did not qualify as a rule, and there was no requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking when selecting the LNPA; neither the FCC's neutrality determination nor its cost analysis was arbitrary and capricious; and the FCC's Best and Final Offers (BAFO) determination was not arbitrary and capricious. Because the court found no error in the FCC's decision, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Neustar, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C. 227(b) bans most unsolicited fax advertisements, but allows unsolicited fax advertisements in certain commercial circumstances. The FCC issued a rule in 2006 that requires businesses to include opt-out notices not just on unsolicited fax advertisements, but also on solicited fax advertisements. Petitioners, businesses that send solicited fax advertisements, contend that the FCC's new rule exceeds the FCC's authority under the Act. The court held that the Act's requirement that businesses include an opt-out notice on unsolicited fax advertisements does not authorize the FCC to require businesses to include an opt-out notice on solicited fax advertisements. Therefore, the court held that the FCC's 2006 Solicited Fax Rule is unlawful to the extent that it requires opt-out notices on solicited faxes. The court vacated the order in this case because it interpreted and applied that 2006 Rule, remanding for further proceedings. View "Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. FCC" on Justia Law

NARUC challenged the FCC's order authorizing interconnected Voice-over-Internet-Protocol service providers (I-VoIPs) to obtain North American Numbering Plan telephone numbers directly from the Numbering Administrators rather than through intermediary local phone service numbering partners. NARUC argued that the Commission has effectively classified I-VoIP service as a Title II telecommunications service, or acted arbitrarily by delaying a classification decision or by extending Title II rights and obligations to I-VoIPs in the absence of classification. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition, concluding that NARUC failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact, and thus failed to establish Article III standing to challenge the Order. View "National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC" on Justia Law

In this case, the court addresses the fees that local exchange carriers (LECs) can charge inter-exchange carriers (IXCs) for certain services they provide, in coordination with providers of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), for the completion of “inter-exchange” calls. The FCC concluded that the disputed services are end-office switching services. Petitioner AT&T says that they are tandem switching services. In 2011, the Commission made a broad effort to update its system for regulating intercarrier compensation (the Transformation Order). The Commission, in In re Connect America Fund, ruled that the disputed services are indeed end-office access under subsection (3) of 47 C.F.R. 51.903(d). AT&T challenges the Declaratory Ruling. The court found that the Declaratory Ruling does not disclose the Commission’s reasoning with the requisite clarity to enable it to sustain such a conclusion. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the order to the Commission for further explanation. The court need not reach AT&T's second challenge. View "AT&T Corp. v. FCC" on Justia Law