Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

After Air Wisconsin stopped flying aircraft that Hoeper was certified to fly, Hoeper failed three attempts to gain new certification. Air Wisconsin gave him one final chance. He performed poorly during required training and responded angrily, tossing his headset, using profanity, and making accusations against the instructor. Airline officials discussed the outburst, Hoeper’s impending termination; the history of assaults by disgruntled employees; and the chance that Hoeper, a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), permitted “to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 44921(f)(1) might be armed. An airline executive notified the TSA that Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed,” that the airline was “concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm,” and that an “[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today.” The TSA removed Hoeper (returning home from training) from his plane, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. Hoeper sued for defamation. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. 44941(a), provides airlines and employees immunity for reporting suspicious behavior except where such disclosure is “made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading” or “made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.” The jury found for Hoeper. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. ATSA immunity, patterned after the Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” standard, may not be denied to materially true statements, even if made recklessly; a falsehood cannot be material absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response. Any falsehoods in the statement to the TSA were not material. A reasonable TSA officer, knowing that Hoeper was an FFDO, upset about losing his job, would have wanted to investigate whether he was armed. While Hoeper had not actually been fired at that time, everyone knew that termination was imminent. It would be inconsistent with the ATSA’s text and purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because the manager who placed the call could have chosen a slightly better phrase to articulate the airline’s concern. View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

After Air Wisconsin stopped flying aircraft that Hoeper was certified to fly, Hoeper failed three attempts to gain new certification. Air Wisconsin gave him one final chance. He performed poorly during required training and responded angrily, tossing his headset, using profanity, and making accusations against the instructor. Airline officials discussed the outburst, Hoeper’s impending termination; the history of assaults by disgruntled employees; and the chance that Hoeper, a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), permitted “to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 44921(f)(1) might be armed. An airline executive notified the TSA that Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed,” that the airline was “concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm,” and that an “[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today.” The TSA removed Hoeper (returning home from training) from his plane, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. Hoeper sued for defamation. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. 44941(a), provides airlines and employees immunity for reporting suspicious behavior except where such disclosure is “made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading” or “made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.” The jury found for Hoeper. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. ATSA immunity, patterned after the Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” standard, may not be denied to materially true statements, even if made recklessly; a falsehood cannot be material absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response. Any falsehoods in the statement to the TSA were not material. A reasonable TSA officer, knowing that Hoeper was an FFDO, upset about losing his job, would have wanted to investigate whether he was armed. While Hoeper had not actually been fired at that time, everyone knew that termination was imminent. It would be inconsistent with the ATSA’s text and purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because the manager who placed the call could have chosen a slightly better phrase to articulate the airline’s concern. View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

Peele worked for the Portage Police Department as a detective. In 2007 he supported Charnetzky’s Democratic primary campaign to become mayor. Charnetzky lost. Peele spoke to a local reporter and criticized Sheriff Lain for endorsing the opponent, apparently stating that Sheriff Lain “won’t get any support here.” The day after the comments were published, Peele was reassigned to the more deskbound position of “Station Duty Officer.” Peele sued, claiming that he was demoted and constructively discharged without due process; retaliation for his support of Charnetzky; and defamation. The defendants counterclaimed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to retaliation, noting that the district court did not address conspiracy, immunity, or the city’s liability. View "Peele v. Burch" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 2012 Public Act 53 provides: “A public school employer’s use of public school resources to assist a labor organization in collecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees is a prohibited contribution to the administration of a labor organization,” so that unions must collect their own membership dues from public-school employees, rather than have the schools collect those dues via payroll deductions. The Act does not bar public employers other than schools from collecting membership dues for unions who represent their employees. Unions and union members challenged the Act under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, quoting the Supreme Court: “The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech’; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” The court further reasoned that there is a legitimate interest in support of the Act’s classification; the legislature could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers. View "Bailey v. Callaghan" on Justia Law

Allegedly in retaliation for Modrowski’s unwillingness to skimp on building repairs, defendants fired him, withheld $11,000 in wages, had Modrowski jailed, and locked Modrowski out of his personal Yahoo email account. Modrowski sued, challenging the refusal to relinquish control over his email account. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, but Modrowski discovered that years’ worth of personal correspondence had vanished. Modrowski claimed violation of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701), the Federal Wire Tapping Act (18 U.S.C. 2511), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed the first two claims because Modrowski acknowledged that he voluntarily linked his personal account with the defendants’ business account. The district court dismissed without prejudice the Computer Fraud Act claim for failure to allege an injury of at least $5,000. When Modrowski returned his first amended complaint, defendants moved for summary judgment. The window for fact discovery had closed and neither party had sought an extension. Modrowski responded by attacking perceived deficiencies of the defendants’ motion. Noting Modrowski’s failure to offer “any evidence in response to defendants’ motion, let alone evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact,” it granted defendants’ motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Modrowski v. Pigatto" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC’s service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC’s plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press “1” during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson’s extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to “exercise independent judgment” in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dixon, an African-American woman and then-interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo, wrote an op-ed column in the Toledo Free Press rebuking comparisons drawn between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Shortly thereafter, Dixon was fired. Claiming violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Dixon filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speech of a high-level Human Resources official who writes publicly against the very policies that her government employer charges her with creating, promoting, and enforcing is not protected speech. View "Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo" on Justia Law

Hanners, then a Master Sergeant with the Illinois State Police, used his work computer to send an email to 16 fellow employees, including pictures and descriptions of "fictitious Barbie Dolls," depicting stereotypical area residents. After investigation, an EEO officer concluded that, although the email related to race, sexual orientation, parental status, pregnancy, family responsibilities, and the characteristics of gender, no person receiving it reported being offended. The EEO officer recommended discipline for Hanners and three employees who had forwarded the email. The disciplinary review board recommended, and the director imposed a 30-day suspension. Hanners's promotion rating was reduced. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hanner did not establish that individuals outside the protected class (Caucasians) received systematically better disciplinary treatment or identify any instance where defendants engaged in behavior or made comments suggesting discriminatory attitude against Caucasians generally or against him because he is Caucasian.View "Hanners v. Trent" on Justia Law

The company operates stores. The union was concerned about use of nonunion contractors who did not pay prevailing wages for construction and remodeling of stores. Unsatisfied with the company's response, the union urged a consumer boycott. Union representatives distributed handbills that were "extremely unflattering" outside the stores. Some pictured a rat to represent the company. The company ejected the representatives from the property. The NLRB issued a complaint alleging violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), for discriminatory practice in prohibiting the union from handbilling while permitting nonunion solicitations and distributions. An ALJ found that as a nonexclusive easement holder at 23 of the stores, the company did not have a state property right to exclude handbillers, and had violated the Act. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted the Board's petition for enforcement. View "Roundy's, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law