Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against Google under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, after the antennas and software installed in Google's Street View cars collected basic identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks, as well as gathered and stored "payload data" that was sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections. On appeal, Google challenged the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss based on the Wiretap Act's exemption for electronic communication that was readily accessible to the general public. The court held that the phrase "radio communication" in section 2510(16) excluded payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. Consequently, the definition of "readily accessible to the general public [] with respect to a radio communication" in section 2510(16) did not apply to the exemption for an "electronic communication" that was "readily accessible to the general public" under section 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g)(i). The court also held that payload data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network was not "readily accessible to the general public" under the ordinary meaning of the phrase as it was used in section 2511(2)(g)(i). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Joffe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant, both women, met in 2005 through a chatroom connected with a television series. Defendant, in Illinois, used her own name and aliases to communicate with plaintiff, in Los Angeles. One alias was that of a man, and a romantic relationship developed through the Internet, telephone, and mail. Defendant disguised her female identity using a voice-altering device. Plaintiff purchased airline tickets for a meeting in Denver, but her new “boyfriend” cancelled the plans. Plaintiff was informed that he had attempted suicide. In 2006 the two planned to live together in Colorado, but defendant subsequently informed plaintiff, using another alias, that the man had died of cancer. The deception continued for seven more months until plaintiff’s real friends confronted defendant and obtained a videotaped admission as to what had occurred. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and seeking damages for the cost of a therapist, lost earnings, and emotional distress, was dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that claims made in the previous complaint, but not incorporated into the third amended complaint, had been abandoned. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation does not apply to a personal relationship with no commercial component.View "Bonhomme v. St. James" on Justia Law

The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 17 U.S.C. 106(4), including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate ... the [copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times,” section 101. Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet. Aereo’s server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by an antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder and streams the show to the subscriber, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast. The owners of program copyrights unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to “perform” their copyrighted works “publicly.” The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Aereo performs the works within the meaning of section 101 and does not merely supply equipment that allows others to do so. The Court noted that the Act was amended in 1976 to make the law applicable to community antenna television (CATV) providers by clarifying that an entity that acts like a CATV system “performs,” even when it only enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals. Aereo’s activities are similar; it sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast. That Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program is not critical. Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers watch a program. The Court stated that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it “transmit[s] ... a performance” to them, regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes and whether it makes an individual personal copy for each viewer. Aero subscribers are “the public” under the Act: a large number of people, unrelated and unknown to each other. View "Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law

The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 17 U.S.C. 106(4), including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate ... the [copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times,” section 101. Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet. Aereo’s server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by an antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder and streams the show to the subscriber, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast. The owners of program copyrights unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to “perform” their copyrighted works “publicly.” The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Aereo performs the works within the meaning of section 101 and does not merely supply equipment that allows others to do so. The Court noted that the Act was amended in 1976 to make the law applicable to community antenna television (CATV) providers by clarifying that an entity that acts like a CATV system “performs,” even when it only enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals. Aereo’s activities are similar; it sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast. That Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program is not critical. Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers watch a program. The Court stated that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it “transmit[s] ... a performance” to them, regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes and whether it makes an individual personal copy for each viewer. Aero subscribers are “the public” under the Act: a large number of people, unrelated and unknown to each other. View "Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law

Grand Resort, which has operated in the Great Smoky Mountains since 1982, claims that TripAdvisor’s publication of a survey that concluded that Grand Resort was the dirtiest hotel in America caused irreparable damage to its business and that TripAdvisor used a flawed rating system that distorted actual performance and perspective. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the “dirtiest hotels” list is protected opinion; it reflects TripAdvisor’s users’ subjective opinions and is not capable of being defamatory. The court rejected a motion to amend to add claims of trade libel-injurious falsehood and tortious interference with prospective business relationships to the claims of false light-invasion of privacy and of defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that amendment of the complaint would be futile. View "Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC" on Justia Law

Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig‟s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can’t fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there.” The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock’s statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law

Seitz and Welter were partners in Wasco, a property management company. Greg was also a police officer. Elgin’s police chief confronted Greg with the emails showing that Greg had used the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) to research cars parked in front of Wasco properties. Illinois limits use of LEADS to criminal justice purposes. The chief notified Gregg of a misconduct investigation regarding his use of LEADS. The city allegedly received its information after Tamara, Greg’s then wife and a fellow police officer, and Beeter accessed Greg’s email account and conveyed print-outs to the corporation counsel under cover of anonymity. Greg and Seitz sued Tamara and Beeter, alleging violations of the Federal Wiretap Act (FWA), the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state law claims. They sued Elgin under the FWA. The district court dismissed the complaint against the city, concluding that the FWA, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1) prohibits “persons” from intercepting communications, but does not extend its definition of “person” to municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A 1986 amendment permits suit against governmental units by adding “entity” to the text, but only for substantive provisions that identify an “entity” as a potential violator of that provision. View "Seitz v. City of Elgin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order dismissing her putative class claims against Yahoo!, alleging that Yahoo! violated the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701-2712, when it disclosed some of her noncontent subscriber information to the government pursuant to allegedly invalid subpoenas. Plaintiff further argued that even if the subpoenas were valid, Yahoo! failed to comply with their terms when it produced the requested documents prior to the deadline set in the subpoenas. The court held that the good faith defense under 18 U.S.C. 2707(e) was met when the defendant complies with a subpoena that appeared valid on its face, in the absence of any indication of irregularity sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the subpoena may be invalid or contrary to applicable law. In this case, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's SCA claims because Yahoo! was statutorily immune from suit because it produced the requested documents in good faith reliance on grand jury subpoenas. Yahoo!'s early compliance with the subpoenas did not vitiate Yahoo's immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sams v. Yahoo! Inc." on Justia Law

Allegedly in retaliation for Modrowski’s unwillingness to skimp on building repairs, defendants fired him, withheld $11,000 in wages, had Modrowski jailed, and locked Modrowski out of his personal Yahoo email account. Modrowski sued, challenging the refusal to relinquish control over his email account. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, but Modrowski discovered that years’ worth of personal correspondence had vanished. Modrowski claimed violation of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701), the Federal Wire Tapping Act (18 U.S.C. 2511), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed the first two claims because Modrowski acknowledged that he voluntarily linked his personal account with the defendants’ business account. The district court dismissed without prejudice the Computer Fraud Act claim for failure to allege an injury of at least $5,000. When Modrowski returned his first amended complaint, defendants moved for summary judgment. The window for fact discovery had closed and neither party had sought an extension. Modrowski responded by attacking perceived deficiencies of the defendants’ motion. Noting Modrowski’s failure to offer “any evidence in response to defendants’ motion, let alone evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact,” it granted defendants’ motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Modrowski v. Pigatto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an active genealogist and animal rights activist, claimed that her name had commercial value and that search engines generated revenue as a result of internet searches of her name. She specifically alleges that various features of Google’s search engine violate her right of publicity by using her name to trigger sponsored links, ads, and related searches to medications, including Levitra, Cialis, and Viagra, all of which are trademarks of nationally advertised oral treatments for male erectile dysfunction. The district court dismissed her suit alleging common law misappropriation and violation of the state right-of-privacy law, Wis. Stat. 995.50(2)(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the public interest and incidental use exceptions. View "Stayart v. Google Inc." on Justia Law