Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint against government officials and a group of telecommunications companies. Plaintiffs challenged section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, as an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Section 802 allowed the U.S. Attorney General to certify that a telecommunications company provided assistance at the behest of the government in connection with investigation of terrorism, thereby triggering immunity on the theory that application of section 802 required dismissal of plaintiffs' case and negated the cause of action under various federal statutes. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction where plaintiffs demanded no monetary damages. Consequently, the court need not reach the merits of the Takings Clause claim. View "McMurray, et al. v. Verizon Communications Inc., et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from claims that major telecommunications carriers assisted the government with intelligence gathering following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs challenged the legality of the telecommunications companies' participation in the surveillance program. At issue was the constitutionality of section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, which allowed for immunity for the telecommunications companies. The court concluded that the statute was constitutional and did not violate Articles I and III of the Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss was affirmed as to the challenged section 802 claims. View "Hepting, et al. v. AT&T Corp., et al." on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant CCCOK, Inc. filed a complaint at the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) against Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P.(SWBT). CCCOK sought an order directing SWBT to pay it over two-million dollars in compensation for SWBT's alleged breach of a contract between them. The OCC rejected CCCOK’s claim, concluding that CCCOK was not entitled to compensation under the "clear and unambiguous" language of the Parties' contract. The federal district court affirmed the OCC's ruling. CCCOK appealed. On appeal, CCCOK contended that the OCC's ruling was arbitrary and capricious because it: (1) disregarded the terms of the parties' contract; (2) contradicted record evidence; and (3) violated CCCOK's rights under state and federal law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the OCC's ruling was not arbitrary and capricious and it affirmed the district court's decision. View "CCCOK Inc. v. Southwestern Bell, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved the FCC's Universal Service Program, which provided subsidies to ensure that low-income consumers, schools, health care providers, and libraries have access to advanced telecommunications services and that rates and services in rural areas were "reasonably comparable" to rates and services in urban areas pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 254. At issue was the FCC's order declining to increase subsidies under the rural rates and services component of the Universal Services Program. Here, the FCC explained that "reasonable comparability" between rural and urban areas had been largely accomplished and that expansion of the high-cost support fund would "jeopardize other statutory mandates," such as extending services to schools, hospitals, and libraries, and "ensuring affordable rates in all parts of the country." Because of this, and because the FCC had promised to address state-specific issues, like those presented by Vermont and Maine, through the waiver process, its decision to leave the high-cost support mechanism unchanged was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Thus, the court denied the petition for review. View "Vermont Public Service Board, et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a licensing order of the FCC affirming a decision of the Wireless Bureau denying reconsideration of licensing actions taken by the Wireless Bureau's Mobility Division. The Mobility Division granted Thomas Kurian's request to withdraw a radio spectrum assignment application and dismissed petitioner's notification of consummation of that same assignment. Petitioner argued that the FCC's order should be reversed because the FCC and Kurian engaged in unlawful ex parte communications; the FCC failed to give proper public notice of its decisions to grant Kurian's withdrawal request; and the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rendering the order. The court held that petitioner waived its ex parte and public notice arguments, and the FCC acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in rendering its order affirming the Wireless Bureau's order. View "Environmentel, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

In 2008 the Third Circuit ruled that the Federal Communications Commission's imposition of a $550,000 fine on CBS was arbitrary. The fine was based on a 2004 incident: the exposure, for nine-sixteenths of one second, of Janet Jackson's bare right breast during the live halftime performance of Super Bowl XXXVIII. The Supreme Court remanded for consideration under its 2009 ruling in F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., which concerned the FCC's decision to abandon its "fleeting words" safe harbor for expletives that are not repeated. On remand, the Third Circuit readopted its earlier holding that the penalty on CBS amounted to an unannounced policy change.The evidence weighed against the FCC contention that its restrained enforcement policy for fleeting material extended only to fleeting words and not to fleeting images. View "CBS Corp. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

Sorenson Communications, Inc. challenged the 2010-2011 rates set by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC or Commission) to compensate Video Relay Service providers, including Sorenson. Video Relay Service (VRS) is a type of telecommunication relay service (TRS), "which enables a person with a hearing disability to remotely communicate with a hearing person by means of a video link and a communications assistant." FCC regulations provide certain minimum standards that VRS providers must meet. Among these requirements, VRS providers must operate every day, twenty-four hours a day, and must answer 80 percent of all calls within 120 seconds. TRS customers do not pay to access the service. Instead, TRS providers are compensated by the TRS Fund at a rate determined by the FCC. The TRS Fund is financed by interstate telecommunications providers on the basis of interstate enduser telecommunications revenues. Until 2007, the Commission set VRS rates annually, which resulted in significant variation in compensation each year. In 2007, the FCC adopted a three-tiered rate structure for compensating VRS providers, with rates that declined as the number of minutes per month increased. Sorenson asked the FCC to stay its 2010 Order which retained the tiered structure of the 2007 order, but reduced rates on all tiers. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit denied Sorenson's petition for review because the Commission’s order was consistent with its statutory mandate and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In a 2004 decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the Federal Communications Commission‘s authority to regulate media ownership but remanded aspects of the Commission‘s 2003 Order that were not adequately supported by the record, including numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership rule, rule on cross-ownership of media within local markets, and repeal of the failed station solicitation rule. A 2008 FCC rule retained radio/television cross-ownership rule, local television and radio ownership rules in existence prior to the 2003 order, a failed station solicitation rule, and set out a series of other measures to address broadcast ownership diversity, in a separate order. The Third Circuit affirmed the order, excepting the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, for which the Commission failed to meet the notice and comment requirements of the APA, and remanded provisions of the diversity ordered that relied on a revenue-based "eligible entity" definition. The court also remanded the FCC decision to defer consideration of other proposed definitions (such as for a socially and economically disadvantaged business), so that it may adequately justify or modify its approach to advancing broadcast ownership by minorities and women. View "Prometheus Radio Project v. Fed.Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") "ISP Remand Order", which imposed a new compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic, i.e., internet service provider-bound traffic. Plaintiff, which was a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC"), maintained that the ISP Remand Order applied when the carrier originating the call and the carrier terminating the call were both CLECs. Defendant and the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") contended that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied only to traffic between a CLEC and an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"). CPUC agreed with defendant's limited reading of the reach of the compensation regime, finding it inapplicable to the ISP-bound traffic originating with plaintiff and terminated by defendant, and so it assessed against plaintiff charges consistent with defendant's state-filed tariff. Plaintiff then sued defendant and the CPUC in federal district court, alleging that the ISP Remand Order preempted their attempts to assess plaintiff charges for ISP-bound traffic based on state-filed tariffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and CPUC, agreeing with their argument that the ISP Remand Order did not apply to CLEC-CLEC traffic. The court agreed with plaintiff and with the analysis contained in an amicus brief filed upon its request by the FCC, that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied to ISP-bound traffic exchanged between two CLECs. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "AT&T Communications of CA, Inc., et al. v. Pac-West Telecomm, Inc., et al." on Justia Law