Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Cable One, Inc., which offers cable television and internet access, began offering Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service to its residential customers in Sioux City. In 2008 and 2009, the Iowa Department of Revenue determined that Cable One should be assessed based on the value of its telephone operating property in the state. Cable One appealed, arguing that it was not a telephone company subject to taxation under Iowa Code chapter 433 because VoIP is not the equivalent of telephone service. An administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals entered summary judgment in favor of Cable One, concluding that the company did not fit the “historical context of a ‘telephone company.’” The Iowa State Board of Tax Review agreed with the ALJ that Cable One was not subject to assessment under chapter 433. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) wiring that was originally installed for cable television purposes but is now also used to provide VoIP service is a “telephone line”; and (2) therefore, Cable One, which operates these lines, is subject to central assessment for property tax purposes as a telephone company. View "Kay-Decker v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review" on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In 2006, Virgin asked the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (the Board) to refund $286,807 it claimed it had overpaid before the CMRS service charge statutes were amended in July 2006. The Board did not promptly respond and so Virgin made no CMRS payment to the Board until it had recaptured from post-July 2006 collections the $286,807 it claimed it had erroneously overpaid. In 2008, the Board filed suit to recover the disputed amount. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that as a “CMRS provider,” Virgin had a statutory duty to collect the CMRS service charge from its customers during the pre-July 2006 time frame and remit them to the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Virgin was indebted to the Board in the sum of $286,807, not $547,945; and (2) the Board was entitled to attorneys fees. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a cable television services system operated by Charter within Glendale and the free public, educational, and governmental-affairs (PEG) requirements in connection with such services. Both parties appealed from the trial court's orders. The court held that federal law precluded Charter from obtaining a declaration of a right of offset against future franchise payments to Glendale for past overpayments of PEG fees to Glendale; Glendale did not breach any obligation in connection with its refusal to approve Charter's request to realign channel numbers for PEG programming that was broadcast on Charter's cable television system in Glendale; Charter had no further obligation to provide free video programming and cable modem services to Glendale; the trial court did not err in concluding that Charter had not conveyed to Glendale a permanent right to possess or use the fiber capacity for government intranet communications; and Charter established that Glendale improperly and contrary to law used PEG fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order judgment. View "City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Sorenson, a leading provider of video relay service (VRS), petitioned for review of the FCC's 2013 Rate Order as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a). The court found no fault with the new rates because the 2013 Rate Order is not arbitrary and capricious for ignoring costs incurred unnecessarily, even when the consequence for the provider that incurred those costs might be ruinous. However, Sorenson has demonstrated that additional consideration by the FCC is necessary in regards to providing service under the more demanding speed-of-answer requirement that the agency adopted as part of the 2013 Rate Order. Therefore, the court vacated the new speed-of-answer requirement and remanded that portion of the Order. In regard to tiered rates, the court held that the FCC adequately justified the 500,000- and 1,000,000-minute cut-offs. The court deferred to the FCC's decision concerning the tiered structure because the task of balancing the goals of setting rates to reflect economies of scale and transitioning the industry from rate regulation to competitive bidding is fairly within the discretion of the agency. View "Sorenson Communications, Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Telrite Corporation was designated as an eligible telecommunications carrier and a Nebraska eligible telecommunications carrier by the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC). The designation allowed Telrite to participate in the “Lifeline” program and receive subsidies from federal and state funds for the provision of telecommunications service to low-income households. Soon after receiving its designations, Telrite held its first enrollment event in Omaha. Telrite, however, used the wrong enrollment form at the event. Consequently, the PSC revoked Telrite’s ETC designation and ordered Telrite to cease and desist from offering services as a Lifeline provider in Nebraska. The Supreme Court reversed the order, holding that the penalty ordered by the PSC was excessive. Remanded. View "Telrite Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

ATC filed suit challenging the City's denial of its Conditional Use Permit (CUP) applications for three of its San Diego telecommunications facilities. ATC raised claims under, among other provisions, the California Permit Streamlining Act (PSA), Cal. Gov't Code 65956(b); the Federal Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332; California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5; and the Equal Protection Clause. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ATC on the PSA claim because the court concluded that the CUP applications were not deemed approved before the City denied them. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the TCA claim where the City evaluated the CUP applications under the proper provision of the Land Development Code and supported its decision to deny them with substantial evidence; the City did not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services because ATC and the City are not "similarly situated" providers; and ATC has failed to show effective prohibition because it has not demonstrated that its proposals were the least intrusive means of filling a significant gap in coverage. ATC could not prevail on California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5 because it does not have a fundamental vested right to the continued use of the Verus, Border, and Mission Valley Facilities. There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the City's decision to deny the CUP applications was rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in minimizing the aesthetic impact of wireless facilities and in providing public communications services. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Educational Rate Program, a subsidy program authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is implemented by the FCC, which established USAC, a private non-profit corporation, to administer the Program. USAC provides subsidies to eligible school districts for the cost of telecommunication services. FCC regulations require that providers offer schools the “lowest corresponding price” (LCP) for their services: the “lowest price that a service provider charges to non-residential customers who are similarly situated to a particular school, library, or library consortium for similar services.” Heath operates a business that audits telecommunications bills and was retained by Wisconsin school districts. Heath found that certain schools paid much higher rates than others for the same services. As a result, many districts did not receive the benefit of LCP and the government paid subsidies greater than they should have been. Heath informed Wisconsin Bell of the discrepancy, but it refused to provide the more favorable pricing. Heath also learned of an even lower price charged to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA). Heath filed a qui tam lawsuit. The government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the public disclosure bar applied and that Heath was not saved by the original source exception, because the DOA pricing was on its website. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the claim was not based on the DOA website information and that Heath was not an opportunist plaintiff who did not contribute significant information. View "Heath v. WI Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker’s appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker’s official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that “[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie” when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky’s privacy and equal protection claims.View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law

This petition involves Bermuda's efforts to secure rights from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to operate a satellite at the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Bermuda partnered with EchoStar to deploy and maintain its satellite at this orbital location. Meanwhile, the Netherlands also sought rights from the ITU to operate a satellite at a nearby orbital location. Petitioner, Spectrum Five, a developer and operator of satellites working in partnership with the Netherlands, filed an objection to the FCC to EchoStar's request to move its satellite from 76.8 degrees W.L. to 96.2 degrees W.L. The FCC granted EchoStar's request and determined that Bermuda secured rights to the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Spectrum Five petitioned for review of the Commission's order, claiming principally that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court dismissed the petition for lack of Article III standing because Spectrum Five failed to demonstrate a significant likelihood that a decision of this court would redress its alleged injury. View "Spectrum Five LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Council Tree Investors, Inc. requested nullification of the FCC's auction of the 700-MHz wireless spectrum conducted in early 2008 pursuant to a Waiver Order. Council Tree filed a Petition for Reconsideration of the Waiver Order in 2007, as well as a Supplement to the Waiver Reconsideration Petition in 2011. In its Waiver Reconsideration Order, the FCC dismissed the Waiver Reconsideration Petition as moot and dismissed the Supplement as untimely. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision. View "Council Tree Investors, Inc., et al v. FCC" on Justia Law