Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Nueva's application to the FCC for a license to construct and operate a Lower Power FM Radio (LPFM) station in Philadelphia. Because Nueva's interpretation of a Blog Post authored by the Chief of the Media Bureau, which was intended to give guidance to applicants, was not correct, the court affirmed the Commission's denial of the application for review without reaching Nueva's claim that the Blog Post was binding upon the Commission. In this case, the Commission's interpretation of the Blog Post was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also held that Nueva forfeited its argument that it did not have fair notice of the Commission's interpretation of the Blog Post. View "Nueva Esperanza, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Over the last 10 years, the Federal Communications Commission has established rules governing how local governments may regulate cable companies. In 2007, the FCC barred franchising authorities from imposing unreasonable demands on franchise applicants or requiring new cable operators to provide non-cable services. The FCC also read narrowly the phrase “requirements or charges incidental to the awarding . . . of [a] franchise” (47 U.S.C. 542(g)(2)(D)), with the effect of limiting the monetary fees that local franchising authorities can collect. A petition for review was denied. Meanwhile, the FCC sought comment on expanding the application of the First Order’s rules—which applied only to new applicants for a cable franchise—to incumbent providers. In its Second Order, the FCC expanded the First Order’s application as proposed. Local franchising authorities again objected. The FCC finally rejected objections after seven years; the FCC clarified that the Second Order applied to only local (rather than state) franchising processes and published a “Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis.” Local governments sought review, arguing that the FCC misinterpreted the Communications Act, and failed to explain the bases for its decisions. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition in part; while “franchise fee” (section 542(g)(1)) can include noncash exactions, the orders were arbitrary to the extent they treat “in-kind” cable-related exactions as “franchise fees” under section 541(g)(1). The FCC’s orders offer no valid basis for its application of the mixed-use rule to bar local franchising authorities from regulating the provision of non-telecommunications services by incumbent cable providers. View "Montgomery County. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the FCC's order reversing a decades-old, rebuttable presumption that determined whether state and local franchising authorities may regulate cable rates. Under its new Order, the Commission presumes there is Competing Provider Effective Competition and places the burden upon the franchising authority that wants to regulate basic cable rates to prove there is not effective competition in its area. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review and held that the Commission's use of a rebuttable presumption to comply with the statutory requirement that it make a finding on the state of competition in each franchise area was a permissible construction of the statutory requirement that the Commission find effective competition before terminating rate regulation; the Commission reasonably interpreted the Communications Act to allow, after a finding of effective competition, termination of existing certifications without having to wait for a petition of the kind referenced in 47 U.S.C. 543(a)(5); and the court rejected arguments regarding the STELA Reauthorization Act. The court also held that the Commission's rule was not arbitrary nor capricious. View "National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors v. FCC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's order that set permanent rate caps and ancillary fee caps for interstate inmate calling services (ICS) calls. After the presidential inauguration in January 2017, counsel for the FCC advised the court that, due to a change in the composition of the Commission, "a majority of the current Commission does not believe that the agency has the authority to cap intrastate rates" under section 276 of the Communications Act of 1934. Consequently, the DC Circuit granted in part and denied in part the petitions for review, remanding for further proceedings. The court also dismissed two claims as moot. The court held that the order's proposed caps on intrastate rates exceed the FCC's statutory authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Act; the use of industry-averaged cost data as proposed in the Order was arbitrary and capricious because it lacked justification in the record and was not supported by reasoned decisionmaking; the order's imposition of video visitation reporting requirements was beyond the statutory authority of the Commission; and the order's proposed wholesale exclusion of site commission payments from the FCC's cost calculus was devoid of reasoned decisionmaking and thus arbitrary and capricious. View "Global Tel*Link v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff segTEL, Inc. was a telecommunications company that owned and/or operated a fiber optic cable network throughout New Hampshire, including within the City of Nashua. It did not own any poles or conduits within the City, and did not have its own license from the City authorizing its occupation of the City’s rights of way. Instead, pursuant to pole attachment agreements with the utility providers, the plaintiff remitted a fee to the utility providers in exchange for the right to place its fiber optic cables on their poles and conduits. These pole attachment agreements did not require the plaintiff to pay property taxes assessed by the City. Having become aware of plaintiff’s use of the utility providers’ poles and conduits, the City in 2014 assessed plaintiff property taxes of $1,507.94 for its use of the City’s rights of way. Plaintiff applied for an abatement, which the City denied. Thereafter, plaintiff brought this action in superior court, seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the City was not entitled to impose the tax; and (2) to strike the City’s 2014 tax assessment. The trial court granted summary judgment to plaintiff, ruling that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] has not entered into an agreement in which it consented to be taxed,” the City could not lawfully tax the plaintiff for its use and occupation of the City’s rights of way. The City appealed, and finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Segtel, Inc. v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

The Montana Public Service Commission, which requires that certain regulated telecommunications companies publicly disclose the salary information of their executive or managerial employees earning more than $100,000 per year, denied the motions for protective orders filed by Southern Montana Telephone Company and Lincoln Telephone Company to keep the salary information confidential. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission’s “rubric,” by which the Commission judged companies’ motions for protective orders of employee compensation information, constituted a de facto rule within the meaning of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) and that the Commission was obligated to comply with MAPA’s rulemaking procedures before implementing the rubric. View "Southern Montana Lincoln Telephone Co. v. Montana Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Neustar petitioned for review of the FCC's orders naming another company, Telcordia, to replace it as the Local Number Portability Administrator (LNPA). The DC Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear Neustar's petition; the Order did not qualify as a rule, and there was no requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking when selecting the LNPA; neither the FCC's neutrality determination nor its cost analysis was arbitrary and capricious; and the FCC's Best and Final Offers (BAFO) determination was not arbitrary and capricious. Because the court found no error in the FCC's decision, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Neustar, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff DirecTV, Inc. appealed a superior court decision denying a petition for property tax abatement for the tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009. The property at issue was located in New Hampton and used by DirecTV as a satellite uplink facility. On appeal, DirecTV argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) ruled that satellite antennas and batteries used to provide backup power constituted fixtures; and (2) determined the value of the property. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded after review that the antennas and batteries were not fixtures, and therefore, taxable as real estate. The Court reversed the superior court on that issue, vacated its decision on the valuation of the property, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DirecTV, Inc. v. Town of New Hampton" on Justia Law

A City of Berkeley ordinance required cell phone retailers to inform prospective cell phone purchasers that carrying a cell phone in certain ways may cause them to exceed Federal Communications Commission guidelines for exposure to radio-frequency radiation. CTIA, a trade association, challenged the ordinance on two grounds: (1) the ordinance violated the First Amendment; and (2) the ordinance was preempted. CTIA requested a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the ordinance. The district court denied CTIA’s request, and CTIA filed an interlocutory appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. View "CTIA Witeless Ass'n v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

The Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C. 227(b) bans most unsolicited fax advertisements, but allows unsolicited fax advertisements in certain commercial circumstances. The FCC issued a rule in 2006 that requires businesses to include opt-out notices not just on unsolicited fax advertisements, but also on solicited fax advertisements. Petitioners, businesses that send solicited fax advertisements, contend that the FCC's new rule exceeds the FCC's authority under the Act. The court held that the Act's requirement that businesses include an opt-out notice on unsolicited fax advertisements does not authorize the FCC to require businesses to include an opt-out notice on solicited fax advertisements. Therefore, the court held that the FCC's 2006 Solicited Fax Rule is unlawful to the extent that it requires opt-out notices on solicited faxes. The court vacated the order in this case because it interpreted and applied that 2006 Rule, remanding for further proceedings. View "Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. FCC" on Justia Law