Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Entertainment & Sports Law
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Plaintiff Leah Manzari, famous under her professional name, Danni Ashe, for her groundbreaking work in monetizing online pornography, filed a defamation suit claiming that the Daily Mail Online, an online news outlet, used a photograph of her to convey the defamatory impression that she had tested positive for HIV. The Daily Mail filed an interlocutory appeal under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.15. The court agreed with the district court that, at this stage in the litigation, Manzari has presented sufficient evidence to move forward with her claim that the Daily Mail Online employees acted with actual malice when they published the article implying that Manzari was an HIV-positive sex worker. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Daily Mail's motion to strike the complaint. View "Manzari v. Associated Newspapers" on Justia Law

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Fans of the musical group Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informational center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-mandated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subsets. Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identification of Juggalos as a criminal gang. They filed suit against the Department of Justice and FBI under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SIxth Circuit reversed dismissal for lack of standing. The Juggalos sufficiently alleged that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 Report and, where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exists. View "Parsons v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

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In 2012 the Golans received two unsolicited, prerecorded messages on their home phone line. Each message, recorded by Mike Huckabee, stated: "Liberty. This is a public survey call. We may call back later." The Golans had not answered the phone; more than one million people did and received a much longer message. The Golans filed a putative class action, alleging that the phone calls were part of a telemarketing campaign to promote the film, Last Ounce of Courage, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Missouri Do Not Call Law. The district court dismissed with prejudice, concluding that the Golans did not have standing and were inadequate class representatives, being subject to a "unique defense" because they had heard only the brief message recording on their answering machine. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The calls were initiated and transmitted in order to promote Last Ounce of Courage and qualified as "telemarketing" even though the messages never referenced the film. Because the purpose of the calls was the critical issue, the Golans were not subject to a unique defense. Nor did they suffer a different injury than class members who heard the entire message. View "Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC" on Justia Law

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Petitioners, large entertainment companies, sought review of the Commission's order requiring the major cable companies who were applying for merger to submit certain proprietary documents for review and proposal to make them available for examination by other players in the cable industry on an expedited schedule. The court granted the petition for review and vacated the order, concluding that the Commission has failed to overcome its presumption against disclosure of confidential information by failing to explain why VPCI is a "necessary link in a chain of evidence that will resolve an issue before the Commission." The order amounts to a substantive and important departure from prior Commission policy, and the Commission has failed to explain the departure. View "CBS Corp. v. FCC" on Justia Law

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Time Warner Cable buys content from programmers, who require it to offer their channels as part of TW’s enhanced basic cable programming tier. TW paid the Lakers $3 billion for licensing rights to televise Lakers games for 20 years. Subscription rates rose by $5 a month as result. TW paid the Dodgers $8 billion for the licensing rights to televise games for 25 years, raising monthly rates by another $4. Subscribers filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the arrangement violated the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200) because: acquisition of licensing rights to the games made TW both programmer and distributor; surveys showed that more than 60 percent of the population would not pay separately to watch the games; there were no valid reasons for bundling sports stations into the enhanced basic cable tier instead of offering them separately; TW expanded the reach of this scheme by selling its rights to the games to other providers, requiring those providers to include the channels as part of their enhanced basic tiers; and the teams knew the increased costs would be passed on to unwilling subscribers and were intended beneficiaries of these arrangements. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal: regulations implementing federal communications statutes expressly preempt the suit. View "Fischer v. Time Warner Cable Inc." on Justia Law

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MVH and Holy Family Communications each applied to the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a noncommercial educational radio station in the vicinity of Buffalo, New York. To do so, the agency used its comparative selection criteria, which it had promulgated through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. By application of those criteria, the Commission found Holy Family had the superior application and awarded it the license. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the criterion upon which the outcome turned--the weight given to an applicant’s plan to broadcast to underserved populations-- either violated the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to distribute licenses fairly, or was arbitrary and capricious. That criterion is part of a reasonable framework for achieving goals consistent with the Commission’s statutory mandate, and because MVH offered no support for a waiver except that it came close to the threshold it needed to get the license. View "Mary V. Harris Found. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

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“Musical work” and the owner’s exclusive right to perform the work in public are protected by 17 U.S.C. 106(4). Broadcast of a musical work is a performance and requires a license from the copyright owner. Copyright Act amendments afford the copyright owner of a sound recording “the narrow but exclusive right ‘to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.’” The law requires “certain digital music services . . . to pay recording companies and recording artists when they transmit[] sound recordings” and provides for appointment of three Copyright Royalty Judges. If sound recording copyrights owners are unable to negotiate a royalty with digital music services, the Judges may set reasonable rates and terms. The Judges set royalty rates and defined terms for statutorily defined satellite digital audio radio services (SDARS) and preexisting subscription services (PSS). SoundExchange, which collects and distributes royalties to copyright owners, argued that the Judges set rates too low and erred in defining “Gross Revenues” and eligible deductions for SDARS. A PSS that provides music-only television channels appealed, arguing that PSS rates were set too high. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Judges of the Board acted within their broad discretion and on a sufficient record. View "Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd." on Justia Law

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When basketball legend Michael Jordan was inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2009, Sports Illustrated produced a special commemorative issue devoted exclusively to Jordan’s remarkable career. Jewel Foods was offered free advertising space in the issue for agreeing to stock the magazine in its 175 stores. Jewel submitted a full-page ad congratulating Jordan, which ran on the inside back cover of the commemorative issue. To Jordan the ad constituted a misappropriation of his identity for the supermarket chain’s commercial benefit. He sought $5 million in damages, alleging violations of the federal Lanham Act, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Illinois deceptive-practices statute, and the common law of unfair competition. The district court accepted Jewel’s First Amendment defense, that its ad was “noncommercial” speech with full First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Jewel’s ad prominently featured the “Jewel-Osco” logo and marketing slogan, which were creatively and conspicuously linked to Jordan in the text of the ad’s congratulatory message. The ad was a form of image advertising aimed at promoting the Jewel-Osco brand; it was commercial speech and subject to the laws cited by Jordan.View "Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc," on Justia Law

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GLAAD filed a putative class action alleging that CNN violated California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51 et seq., and California's Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., by intentionally excluding deaf and hard of hearing visitors from accessing the videos on CNN.com. CNN filed a motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16 et seq., arguing that GLAAD's claims arose from conduct in furtherance of CNN's free speech rights and that GLAAD failed to establish a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court concluded that CNN's conduct was in furtherance of its free speech rights on a matter of public interest; where, as here, an action directly targeted the way a content provider chose to deliver, present, or publish news content on matters of public interest, that action was based on conduct in furtherance of free speech rights and must withstand scrutiny under California's anti-SLAPP statute; GLAAD failed to establish a probability of success on the merits of its Unruh Act claims because it has not shown intentional discrimination based on disability as required under California law; at this juncture, none of CNN's constitutional challenges posed a barrier to GLAAD's pursuit of its DPA claims; GLAAD's DPA claims were not foreclosed by the doctrines of field preemption and conflict preemption; GLAAD's DPA claims have the requisite minimal merit to survive CNN's free speech challenge and dormant Commerce Clause challenge; and the court certified to the California Supreme Court the remaining dispositive question of state law regarding GLAAD's DPA claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying CNN's motion to dismiss. View "Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness v. CNN" on Justia Law

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The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 17 U.S.C. 106(4), including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate ... the [copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times,” section 101. Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet. Aereo’s server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by an antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder and streams the show to the subscriber, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast. The owners of program copyrights unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to “perform” their copyrighted works “publicly.” The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Aereo performs the works within the meaning of section 101 and does not merely supply equipment that allows others to do so. The Court noted that the Act was amended in 1976 to make the law applicable to community antenna television (CATV) providers by clarifying that an entity that acts like a CATV system “performs,” even when it only enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals. Aereo’s activities are similar; it sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast. That Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program is not critical. Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers watch a program. The Court stated that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it “transmit[s] ... a performance” to them, regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes and whether it makes an individual personal copy for each viewer. Aero subscribers are “the public” under the Act: a large number of people, unrelated and unknown to each other. View "Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law