Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Election Law
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Aspiring Ohio state court judges must run for office and must follow the Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Code limits candidates’ campaign-related speech to help maintain an “independent, fair, and impartial judiciary,” free of “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” After the Sixth Circuit struck parts of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, Ohio narrowed its Code. As amended, all judicial candidates—incumbents and challengers—are subject to restrictions on direct, personal monetary solicitation; bans on public political party speeches and endorsements of other candidates; and a prohibition on receiving campaign money earlier than 120-days before the primary. Platt, an attorney who wishes to run for Ohio judicial office, wanted to publicly endorse other candidates, directly solicit campaign funds in person, and to receive campaign contributions without the time limitations. Platt sued to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the rules as applied to non-sitting judicial candidates. The district court denied Platt’s request, holding that Platt failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and that the requested injunction would cause substantial harm to sitting judicial candidates who would still be subject to the restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Grievances & Discipline" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

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Since 2001, Callaghan has worked part-time at the South Portland Library. Edwards works for the Parks and Recreation Department about four hours per week. Both are subject to a personnel policy, which, following 2010-2011 amendments, provides that city employees may not seek or accept nomination or election to any South Portland elective office; use the influence of their employment for or against any candidate for city elective office; circulate petitions or campaign literature for any city elective office; solicit or receive subscriptions, contributions or political service from any person for or against any candidate for any city elective office; or use city property to assist or advocate for or against any candidate. Callaghan has served on the School Board since 2007. When Callaghan sought reelection in 2011, the City Clerk stated that the personnel policy amendments prevented placement of her name on the ballot. Edwards had served on the Board for 18 years. In 2010, Edwards expressed interest in filling a vacancy on the Board. After the City Clerk questioned whether Edwards could be appointed given his city employment, Edwards did not pursue the appointment. Edwards and Callaghan filed a complaint, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the policy was an unconstitutional restraint on political speech. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for the employees and an injunction barring enforcement of a prohibition on any city employee seeking election to or serving on the School Board or, on their own time, from circulating petitions or campaign literature and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service for or against candidates in School Board elections. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed as to the employees, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it invalidates the policy as to employees who were not parties.View "Callaghan v. City of South Portland" on Justia Law

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A former congressman filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA violated an Ohio law that criminalizes some false statements made during a political campaign. SBA had stated that his vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was a vote in favor of “taxpayer funded abortion.” After he lost his re-election bid the complaint was dismissed. SBA pursued a separate challenge on First Amendment grounds. COAST also challenged the law, arguing that it had planned to disseminate a similar message but refrained because of the suit against SBA. The district court consolidated the suits and dismissed them as nonjusticiable, concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury to establish standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently imminent injury under Article III. An “injury in fact” must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Challenging a law before enforcement requires alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution.” The plaintiffs alleged a credible threat of enforcement. Their intended future conduct is arguably proscribed by the statute. The statute sweeps broadly; the Elections Commission already found probable cause to believe that SBA violated the law when it made statements similar to those they plan to make in the future. SBA’s insistence that its previous statements were true did not preclude finding probable cause. The threat of future enforcement is substantial. There is a history of past enforcement; a complaint may be filed by “any person,” not just a prosecutor or agency. Commission proceedings impose a burden on electoral speech. The target of a complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources in the crucial days before an election. Those proceedings are backed by the additional threat of criminal prosecution. The Court found the “prudential factors” of fitness and hardship “easily satisfied.” View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, impose base limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and aggregate limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, McCutcheon contributed to 16 federal candidates, complying with all base limits. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to additional candidates and political committees and that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future. McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee challenged the aggregate limits under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding that those limits are invalid. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” test applies, the analysis depends on the fit between stated governmental objectives and the means selected to achieve the objectives. The aggregate limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test. Contributing to a candidate is an exercise of the right to participate in the electoral process through political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is not a “modest restraint.” To require a person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes penalizes that individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his First Amendment rights. The proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The justices noted the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence and that the Court must “err on the side of protecting political speech.” Given regulations already in effect, fear that an individual might make massive unearmarked contributions to entities likely to support particular candidate is speculative. Experience suggests that most contributions are retained and spent by their recipients; the government provided no reason to believe that candidates or committees would dramatically shift their priorities if aggregate limits were lifted. Multiple alternatives could serve the interest in preventing circumvention without “unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights, such as targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and committees, tighter earmarking rules, and disclosure. View "McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n" on Justia Law

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Montana state law provides that a "corporation may not make ... an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party." Mont. Code 13–35–227(1). The Montana Supreme Court rejected a claim that the statute violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Montana decision, based on its 2010 decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court struck down a similar federal law, holding that "political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation." Dissenting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan stated that "Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere since the Court’s decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do so." View "Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock" on Justia Law

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A former congressman filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA violated an Ohio law that criminalizes some false statements made during a political campaign. SBA had stated that his vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was a vote in favor of “taxpayer funded abortion.” After he lost his re-election bid the complaint was dismissed. SBA pursued a separate challenge on First Amendment grounds. COAST also challenged the law, arguing that it had planned to disseminate a similar message but refrained because of the suit against SBA. The district court consolidated the suits and dismissed them as nonjusticiable, concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury to establish standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently imminent injury under Article III. An “injury in fact” must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Challenging a law before enforcement requires alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution.” The plaintiffs alleged a credible threat of enforcement. Their intended future conduct is arguably proscribed by the statute. The statute sweeps broadly; the Elections Commission already found probable cause to believe that SBA violated the law when it made statements similar to those they plan to make in the future. SBA’s insistence that its previous statements were true did not preclude finding probable cause. The threat of future enforcement is substantial. There is a history of past enforcement; a complaint may be filed by “any person,” not just a prosecutor or agency. Commission proceedings impose a burden on electoral speech. The target of a complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources in the crucial days before an election. Those proceedings are backed by the additional threat of criminal prosecution. The Court found the “prudential factors” of fitness and hardship “easily satisfied.” View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, impose base limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and aggregate limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, McCutcheon contributed to 16 federal candidates, complying with all base limits. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to additional candidates and political committees and that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future. McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee challenged the aggregate limits under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding that those limits are invalid. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” test applies, the analysis depends on the fit between stated governmental objectives and the means selected to achieve the objectives. The aggregate limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test. Contributing to a candidate is an exercise of the right to participate in the electoral process through political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is not a “modest restraint.” To require a person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes penalizes that individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his First Amendment rights. The proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The justices noted the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence and that the Court must “err on the side of protecting political speech.” Given regulations already in effect, fear that an individual might make massive unearmarked contributions to entities likely to support particular candidate is speculative. Experience suggests that most contributions are retained and spent by their recipients; the government provided no reason to believe that candidates or committees would dramatically shift their priorities if aggregate limits were lifted. Multiple alternatives could serve the interest in preventing circumvention without “unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights, such as targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and committees, tighter earmarking rules, and disclosure. View "McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

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PG sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of 25 Pa. Stat. 3060(d), a portion of the Pennsylvania Election Code mandating that all persons, except election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and police officers, when permitted by the provisions of this act, must remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place during the progress of the voting. PG claimed that the statute infringed on its First Amendment “right to access and gather news at polling places” and that selective enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. There is no protected First Amendment right of access to a polling place for news-gathering purposes and there was no evidence of “invidious intent” or intentional discrimination. View "PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele" on Justia Law

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The Center broadcasts advertisements, maintains a website, publishes a weekly e-mail newsletter, produces a bi-weekly radio show, and engages in other forms of mass media communications. Its tax exempt status under section 501(c)(4) is incompatible with partisan political activity, so the Center cannot endorse candidates. During election seasons, the Center runs advertisements that refer to the positions of candidates or to ballot issues and call for actions such as contacting candidates. The Center claims that it feared that Illinois’s new campaign finance laws (10 ILCS 5/9) would require it to register as a “political committee” and to disclose election-related expenditures and significant contributors and that its donors require assurances that their identities will not be disclosed. The Center argued that the law was vague and overbroad. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Illinois law is modeled on federal law. The Center did not establish that the statute “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech,” or that its “deterrent effect on legitimate expression is ... real and substantial.”View "Ctr, for Individual Freedom v. Madigan" on Justia Law