Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Soon after Tara Grinstead went missing from Irwin County in October 2005, her disappearance attracted significant media attention. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies investigated her disappearance for more than eleven years, and throughout the course of that investigation, news organizations continued to show an interest, reporting from time to time on her disappearance and developments in the investigation. When Ryan Duke was arrested in 2017 and charged with Grinstead’s murder, his arrest was the subject of extensive media coverage. Media coverage was most intense in Irwin County and surrounding areas of central and south Georgia. To a lesser extent, the record showed that Duke’s arrest also was covered by television stations and newspapers in Atlanta, as well as some national news organizations. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a gag order instituted in this case, which restrained the lawyers, the defendant and the lawyers in a related case, court personnel, and current and retired law enforcement personnel from making extrajudicial, public statements on certain subjects related to the murder case for so long as it remained pending. The Supreme Court held gag orders like this one may be constitutionally permissible in exceptional circumstances, but the record here did not reveal circumstances sufficiently exceptional to warrant such a restraint. For that reason, the Supreme Court vacated the gag order. View "WXIA-TV v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In the underlying operative complaint, plaintiff Dalia Rojas pleaded two causes of action against defendants HSBC Card Services Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together HSBC) based on HSBC's alleged violations of Rojas's right to privacy under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (Privacy Act). Rojas alleged that HSBC intentionally recorded certain of her confidential telephone conversations in violation of: section 632(a), which prohibited one party to a telephone call from intentionally recording a confidential communication without the knowledge or consent of the other party; and section 632.7(a), which prohibited the intentional recording of a communication using a cellular or cordless telephone. Rojas appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HSBC. The Court of Appeal agreed with Rojas that, because HSBC did not meet its initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c (p)(2), the trial court erred in granting HSBC's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, that judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions to enter an order denying HSBC's motion. View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services" on Justia Law

In the underlying operative complaint, plaintiff Dalia Rojas pleaded two causes of action against defendants HSBC Card Services Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together HSBC) based on HSBC's alleged violations of Rojas's right to privacy under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (Privacy Act). Rojas alleged that HSBC intentionally recorded certain of her confidential telephone conversations in violation of: section 632(a), which prohibited one party to a telephone call from intentionally recording a confidential communication without the knowledge or consent of the other party; and section 632.7(a), which prohibited the intentional recording of a communication using a cellular or cordless telephone. Rojas appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HSBC. The Court of Appeal agreed with Rojas that, because HSBC did not meet its initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c (p)(2), the trial court erred in granting HSBC's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, that judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions to enter an order denying HSBC's motion. View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services" on Justia Law

Believing nonpublic content of the victim's Facebook account might provide exculpatory evidence helpful in preparing for trial, real-party-in-interest Lance Touchstone served petitioner Facebook with a subpoena for the subscriber records and contents of the victim's Facebook account, including timeline posts, messages, phone calls, photos, videos, location information and user-input information from account inception to the present date. Touchtone was awaiting trial for attempted murder. On the public portion of his Facebook page, the victim posted updates of court hearings in this case, asking his friends to attend the preliminary hearing. In public posts the victim also discussed his personal use of guns and drugs, and described his desire to rob and kill people. Facebook filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the ground the Stored Communications Act (SCA) prohibited disclosure of the victim's account contents. In an accompanying declaration, counsel for Facebook stated that Touchstone could obtain the requested contents directly from the victim or by working with the prosecutor to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to quash and ordered Facebook to produce the contents of the victim's account for in camera inspection by a certain date. Facebook seeks a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to quash the subpoena and to enter a new order granting the motion to quash. Facebook contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to quash and ordering production of documents for in camera inspection because the SCA prohibits Facebook from disclosing the content of its users' accounts in response to a subpoena. Facebook further contends that compelling it to disclose the contents of the victim's account is not necessary to preserve Touchstone's constitutional right to a fair trial because Touchstone can obtain the contents directly from the victim or through the prosecutor via a search warrant. The Court of Appeal granted Facebook’s application and granted a writ of mandate, vacating the trial court’s order and effectively quashing the subpoena duces tecum. View "Facebook v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

North Carolina law made it a felony for a registered sex offender “to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 14–202.5(a), (e). The state has prosecuted over 1,000 people under that law. Petitioner was indicted after posting a statement on his personal Facebook profile about a positive traffic court experience. State courts upheld the law. The Supreme Court reversed. The statute impermissibly restricts lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment. Today, one of the most important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social media. Even if the statute is content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision is not “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” While social media will be exploited by criminals and sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime, the assertion of a valid governmental interest “cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections.” The statute “enacts a prohibition unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens…. With one broad stroke, North Carolina bars access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.” The state did not establish that this sweeping law is necessary to keep convicted sex offenders away from vulnerable victims. View "Packingham v. North Carolina" on Justia Law

Roby Lowery Stapleton was murdered in 1963. Her murder remains unsolved. In 2013, through the Keech Law Firm, Stapleton’s family made a formal written request to the Department of Arkansas State Police (ASP) for a copy of the case file and other materials relating to ASP’s investigation into Stapleton’s murder. ASP denied the request. Keech then filed a complaint against ASP asking the circuit court to compel disclosure under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) . ASP maintained that the material was exempt under FOIA because it was the subject of an open and ongoing investigation into Stapleton’s murder. The court ordered ASP to turn over the file, concluding that the case was not an “open and ongoing” law enforcement investigation and, therefore, the claimed exemption did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court’s finding that this investigation was not open and ongoing was not clearly erroneous; and (2) this case falls squarely within the purpose of FOIA. View "Department of Arkansas State Police v. Keech Law Firm P.A." on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the search that led to his arrest on the ground that the probable cause for the search was provided by the warrantless use of a drug-sniffing dog in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress and found Defendant guilty of felony possession with intent to distribute. After Defendant’s conviction became legal, the United States Supreme Court decided Florida v. Jardines, which announced that use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch constitutes a search within the meaning of the of the Fourth Amendment. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging that Jardines confirmed that the search of his home was invalid and that Jardines was retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that Jardines introduced a new rule and was not retroactive. The court also denied a plenary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jardines does not apply retroactively to convictions such as Defendant’s because it announced a new rule of constitutional law; and (2) the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for a plenary hearing. View "Oprisko v. Director" on Justia Law

Relators filed this original action in mandamus seeking the release of video from a camera worn by an officer who shot a motorist after a traffic stop. Relators asserted that Respondent, the prosecuting attorney, violated the Public Records Act by failing either to make the body-camera video available for inspection and copying or to prove that it was exempt from disclosure. The prosecutor released the video two days after the complaint was filed. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of mandamus as to certain relators because the relators failed to request the record from the prosecutor’s office and denied the writ as to other relators because the body-camera video had already been produced. Because the video was produced within a reasonable amount of time, the request for statutory damages and attorney fees was also denied. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters" on Justia Law

In 2014, a Norman restaurant's surveillance video captured an incident depicting Joe Mixon striking a woman. The Norman Police Department (Department) was called to the location, investigated, and obtained and reviewed the surveillance video. On Friday, August 15, 2014, a Department detective filed an affidavit of probable cause seeking an arrest warrant for Mixon. The detective stated probable cause existed based on interviews completed by other officers, injuries sustained by the victim, and the surveillance video of the incident which he described in detail. The same day, the Cleveland County District Attorney filed a criminal information, referencing the same incident number as the probable cause affidavit and alleging that Mixon committed the misdemeanor crime of Acts Resulting in Gross Injury when he struck the female. Mixon voluntarily appeared in district court to answer the charge and was arraigned. At the same time, the district court ordered Mixon to be processed by the Cleveland County Sheriff's Department and to remain in custody pending his posting a bond. KWTV News 9, a member of the Oklahoma Association of Broadcasters (Association), requested a copy of the surveillance video from Department and District Attorney, referencing the Open Records Act. The Norman City Attorney emailed KWTV News 9 that, barring changes, such as the judge ordering the video sealed, he did "not know of a reason why [Department] would not be willing to make copies of the Mixon video available for public inspection and copying after November 1." Without furnishing copies of the video, the Department allowed KWTV News 9 and other media to view the video. Association was not present at this viewing. Mixon entered an Alford Plea to the criminal charge. The same day, Association made a request under the Act for a copy of the surveillance video from the City and the Department and KWTV News 9 renewed its request. District Attorney responded, informing Association that it no longer had the video as it had given the video to the victim. City told KWTV News 9 that Department had delivered a copy of the video to the City Attorney, who placed it in a litigation file. The Association filed petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the Association was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and entitled to a writ of mandamus. The video was ordered to be a part of the court record and preserved by the attorneys. The Defendants had to allow the Association a copy of the surveillance video. View "Oklahoma Assoc. of Broadcasters, Inc. v. City of Norman" on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis had trouble at work, leaving early and crying at his desk. Morrissey, an employee Elonis supervised, claimed sexual harassment. Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph, showing Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck, captioned “I wish.” Elonis was fired. Days later, Elonis began posting statements about “sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “smothered your ass … dumped your body” that their son “should dress up as matricide” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying.” Following issuance of a protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the jury instruction regarding Elonis’s mental state insufficient. On remand, the Third Circuit again affirmed Elonis’s conviction, finding the error harmless. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Elonis posted the messages with either the purpose of threatening his ex-wife, or with knowledge that she would interpret the posts as threats. No rational juror could conclude otherwise. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law