Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Lonnie Howard appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to delivery of methamphetamine. On two occasions, a confidential police informant bought methamphetamine tablets from Kayla Bruning. On both occasions, Defendant drove Bruning to pick up the tablets from a supplier and drove her to the site where the informant bought the tablets. After sentencing, Howard made a motion in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea. Howard argued he had not touched the drugs or money, and he was actually innocent of delivery. Howard argued the factual basis offered by the State did not support his guilty plea to "delivery." The State argued Defendant admitted to driving the vehicle that transported the methamphetamine, knew he was transporting methamphetamine in his vehicle to sell to another individual, and was present while the informant bought the methamphetamine in his vehicle. The district court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, noting that the definition of "delivery" included "constructive delivery" and "attempted delivery." Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "North Dakota v. Howard" on Justia Law

Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig‟s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can’t fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there.” The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock’s statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law

Former Superior Court Judge Kendall enforced an oral plea agreement that the prosecution had attempted to withdraw; Kendall believed that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus. Kendall published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision and recusing himself from the case due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Justices cited Kendall for criminal contempt and found him guilty because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the administration of justice and because his recusal was a pretextual effort to avoid complying with the writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the contempt conviction, finding that the First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing ongoing proceedings. Kendall’s opinion did not pose such a threat. There was insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual. View "In Re: Kendall" on Justia Law

Indiana Code 35-42-4-12 prohibits certain individuals required to register as sex offenders (Ind. Code 11-8-8) from knowingly using a social networking web site, an instant messaging, or chat room program that the offender knows allows access or use by a person who is less than 18 years of age. Violation constitutes a Class A misdemeanor; subsequent violations constitute Class D felonies. The law does not differentiate based on the age of victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, or the time since the predicate offense. It provides a defense if the individual did not know the website allowed minors or upon discovering it does, immediately ceased use, and exempts persons convicted of consensual “Romeo and Juliet relationships” where the victim and perpetrator are close in age. In 2000, Doe was convicted of child exploitation. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds on behalf of a class of similarly-situated sex offenders. The district court rejected the challenge. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the law unconstitutional. Though content neutral, it is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest. It broadly prohibits substantial protected speech rather than specifically targeting the evil of improper communications to minors.View "Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct at a 2005 antiwar demonstration. The plaintiffs brought claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, Fourteenth Amendment class-of-one equal protection violations, and state law malicious prosecution. They also brought facial challenges against Chicago’s disorderly conduct ordinance, as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity. The facial attack on the ordinance was rendered moot by an earlier decision, which partially invalidated the subsection on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ arrests under a now-invalid ordinance may have affected their free speech rights, but that they did not bring an as-applied challenge to redress such an injury. View "Thayer v. Chiczewski" on Justia Law

A class of persons required to register on the state’s online sex and violent offender database sued the Indiana Department of Correction, alleging that failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in the registry violates due process. In response, the DOC created a new policy to give notice to current prisoners about their pending registry listings and an opportunity to challenge the information. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the new policy was sufficient to comply with due process. The new procedures still fail to provide any process at all for an entire class of registrants: those who are not incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. State judicial post-deprivation remedies cited by the DOC are insufficient to meet the requirements of due process. Although registrants can challenge registry errors in the course of criminal prosecutions for failure to comply with registration requirements, due process does not require a person to risk additional criminal conviction as the price of correcting an erroneous listing, especially where a simple procedural fix is available much earlier. View "Schepers v. Comm'r of IN Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Tangled in a prolonged legal dispute over visitation rights to see his daughter, Jeffries wrote a song, “Daughter’s Love,” which contains passages about relationships between fathers and daughters, but also includes complaints about his ex-wife, ranting gripes about lawyers and the legal system, and threats to kill the judge if he doesn’t “do the right thing” at an upcoming custody hearing. Jeffries created a video of himself performing the song on a guitar painted with an American flag and posted the music video on YouTube. He shared it with friends, family and the media. In the video, Jeffries says “This song’s for you, judge.” Agents charged Jeffries with violating a federal law that prohibits “transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to . . . injure the person of another” 18 U.S.C. 875(c). A jury convicted Jeffries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All that the First Amendment requires in the context of a section 875(c) prosecution is that the threat be real; there was sufficient evidence to convict. View "United States v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin inmate checked out two books from the prison library, and purchased, with the prison’s permission, a copy of To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton (the founder of the Black Panthers). Plaintiff copied on a sheet of paper the Panthers’ “Ten-Point Program,” which appears in all three books. He put the sheet in the footlocker in his cell. A guard discovered the sheet in a random search of the cell. Plaintiff was found guilty, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, of possession of “gang literature” in violation of Wis. Admin. Code DOC 303.20(3). He was given 90 days of confinement in segregation. The prison also destroyed the sheet of paper on which he’d copied the Ten-Point Program. The district court rejected his free speech and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the free speech claim, but vacated with respect to due process. “Freedom of speech is not absolute, and the curtailment challenged in this case is slight and the justification adequate, though not ample.” The court made no findings that would enable an inference that plaintiff’s 90-day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty. View "Toston v. Thurmer" on Justia Law

Sypher alleged that University of Louisville’s head basketball coach, Pitino raped her; Pitino testified that they had consensual sex. Sypher learned that she was pregnant and contacted Pitino. Sypher alleges that Pitino raped her a second time. Eventually, Pitino, arranged for an abortion. Goetzinger, a friend of Sypher’s, testified that Sypher asked Goetzinger to call Pitino to request $200,000 to $400,000. Goetzinger testified that he made three anonymous calls to Pitino’s cell phone. Eventually, Sypher admitted her involvement to FBI agents. Sypher was convicted of willfully causing another to transmit threatening communications in interstate commerce with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 875(d); making threatening communications with intent to extort, under 875(d); mailing threatening communications with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 876(d); making false statements to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and retaliating against an individual for providing truthful information about a crime to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments of ineffective assistance by counsel and that the district court erred by denying a change of venue; creating a web page for public access to trial materials; releasing completed juror questionnaires before seating a jury; denying post-trial access to documentary and other evidence; and denying her motion for recusal. View "United States v. Sypher" on Justia Law

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts. View "Milligan v. United States" on Justia Law