Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

A class of persons required to register on the state’s online sex and violent offender database sued the Indiana Department of Correction, alleging that failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in the registry violates due process. In response, the DOC created a new policy to give notice to current prisoners about their pending registry listings and an opportunity to challenge the information. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the new policy was sufficient to comply with due process. The new procedures still fail to provide any process at all for an entire class of registrants: those who are not incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. State judicial post-deprivation remedies cited by the DOC are insufficient to meet the requirements of due process. Although registrants can challenge registry errors in the course of criminal prosecutions for failure to comply with registration requirements, due process does not require a person to risk additional criminal conviction as the price of correcting an erroneous listing, especially where a simple procedural fix is available much earlier. View "Schepers v. Comm'r of IN Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Tangled in a prolonged legal dispute over visitation rights to see his daughter, Jeffries wrote a song, “Daughter’s Love,” which contains passages about relationships between fathers and daughters, but also includes complaints about his ex-wife, ranting gripes about lawyers and the legal system, and threats to kill the judge if he doesn’t “do the right thing” at an upcoming custody hearing. Jeffries created a video of himself performing the song on a guitar painted with an American flag and posted the music video on YouTube. He shared it with friends, family and the media. In the video, Jeffries says “This song’s for you, judge.” Agents charged Jeffries with violating a federal law that prohibits “transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to . . . injure the person of another” 18 U.S.C. 875(c). A jury convicted Jeffries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All that the First Amendment requires in the context of a section 875(c) prosecution is that the threat be real; there was sufficient evidence to convict. View "United States v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin inmate checked out two books from the prison library, and purchased, with the prison’s permission, a copy of To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton (the founder of the Black Panthers). Plaintiff copied on a sheet of paper the Panthers’ “Ten-Point Program,” which appears in all three books. He put the sheet in the footlocker in his cell. A guard discovered the sheet in a random search of the cell. Plaintiff was found guilty, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, of possession of “gang literature” in violation of Wis. Admin. Code DOC 303.20(3). He was given 90 days of confinement in segregation. The prison also destroyed the sheet of paper on which he’d copied the Ten-Point Program. The district court rejected his free speech and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the free speech claim, but vacated with respect to due process. “Freedom of speech is not absolute, and the curtailment challenged in this case is slight and the justification adequate, though not ample.” The court made no findings that would enable an inference that plaintiff’s 90-day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty. View "Toston v. Thurmer" on Justia Law

Sypher alleged that University of Louisville’s head basketball coach, Pitino raped her; Pitino testified that they had consensual sex. Sypher learned that she was pregnant and contacted Pitino. Sypher alleges that Pitino raped her a second time. Eventually, Pitino, arranged for an abortion. Goetzinger, a friend of Sypher’s, testified that Sypher asked Goetzinger to call Pitino to request $200,000 to $400,000. Goetzinger testified that he made three anonymous calls to Pitino’s cell phone. Eventually, Sypher admitted her involvement to FBI agents. Sypher was convicted of willfully causing another to transmit threatening communications in interstate commerce with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 875(d); making threatening communications with intent to extort, under 875(d); mailing threatening communications with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 876(d); making false statements to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and retaliating against an individual for providing truthful information about a crime to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments of ineffective assistance by counsel and that the district court erred by denying a change of venue; creating a web page for public access to trial materials; releasing completed juror questionnaires before seating a jury; denying post-trial access to documentary and other evidence; and denying her motion for recusal. View "United States v. Sypher" on Justia Law

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts. View "Milligan v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant hacked the email account of then-Alaska governor and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin. After forensic examinations revealed that he took action to remove information from his computer relating to the incident, he was indicted on several counts, including identity theft, but only convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. Section 1519, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, prohibits knowing destruction or alteration of any record with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence investigation of any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal department or agency or in relation to or in contemplation of any such matter or case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant's posts indicated "contemplation" of a federal investigation.View "United States v. Kernell" on Justia Law

A police sergeant arrested plaintiff without a warrant for running a contest which allegedly violated Minnesota gambling laws. The sergeant later obtained a search warrant and seized several items from the house where plaintiff was running the contest. A reporter broadcasted a news story about the contest and plaintiff's arrest on a local CBS television station. Plaintiff subsequently sued the sergeant and the city of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for civil rights violations for the arrest and search, and the reporter and CBS for defamation. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion for defendants. The court held that because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any of the sergeant's actions violated a constitutional right, he could not deprive the sergeant of qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment was appropriate. Summary judgment was also proper as to the city because municipalities could not be held liable under Section 1983 where plaintiff had not argued on appeal that any municipal policy or custom led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights. The court also held that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure and it was not reckless disregard for the truth to conclude that plaintiff could face future incarceration related to the contests. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for spoliation sanctions. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stepnes v. Ritschel, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of interstate stalking, cyberstalking, and mailing a threatening communication (18 U.S.C. 2261A(1)-(2), 876(c)), based on communications with his estranged wife and minor child, was sentenced to 137 months. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a change of venue or transfer. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Defendant waived challenge to the indictment under FRCP 12(e); he did not show good cause for failing to raise the challenge before trial. The court acted within its discretion in allowing evidence of prior bad acts and imposing the sentence. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought a preliminary injunction against ClearOne Communications, Inc. based on suspicions of irregular accounting practices and securities law violations. During a hearing on the preliminary injunction, Defendant and former CEO Susie Strohm was asked if she was involved in a particular sale by ClearOne that was the focus of the SEC’s case. She said she was not and approximated that she learned of the sale either before or after the end of ClearOne’s fiscal year. Based on this testimony, Defendant was later convicted of one count of perjury. She argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that her conviction should be reversed because (1) the questioning at issue was ambiguous, (2) her testimony was literally true, and (3) even if false, her testimony was not material to the court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit disagreed on all three points. The Court found the questions were not ambiguous and there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate Defendant knowingly made false statements. Also, Defendant's testimony was material to the preliminary injunction hearing because it related to a transaction the SEC believed demonstrated ClearOne’s accounting irregularities. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Strohm" on Justia Law

After agents traced an Internet site containing child pornography to a computer shop, they obtained a warrant and searched hard drives of the owner's personal computers, where they found files containing pornography. The owner was convicted of knowing possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and sentenced to 84 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that his own computer contained the files, even if he did not download them himself, and that they were obtained by Internet file sharing. View "United States v. Salva-Morales" on Justia Law