Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with computer tampering in an unrelated case. The docket sheet, the judge’s half sheet, and the court call sheet for the arraignment date indicate that defendant was not in court and that the arraignment did not take place. Defendant’s efforts to have a court reporter change the transcript were unsuccessful. The court reporter referred defendant to her supervisor, Taylor. In a telephone conversation, Taylor explained that any dispute over the accuracy of a transcript should be presented to the judge. Defendant surreptitiously recorded three telephone conversations with Taylor and posted recordings and transcripts of the conversations on her website. Defendant eventually obtained a fraudulent court transcript. Defendant was charged with eavesdropping, (720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), and using or divulging information obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). Defendant claimed am exception for “reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against the person … and there is reason to believe that evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained.” The state argued that the exception did not apply because the reporter accused of creating a forged transcript was not a party to the recorded conversations. After a mistrial, the court found the statute facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding the statutes overbroad as criminalizing a range of innocent conduct. The eavesdropping statute does not distinguish between open and surreptitious recording and burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest in protecting conversational privacy. The language of the recording statute criminalizes the publication of any recording made on a cellphone or other such device, regardless of consent. View "People v. Melongo" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on several charges, including third-degree burglary, third-degree theft, and third-degree receiving stolen property. Defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court found that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy under State law and that the police should have obtained a warrant before tracking defendant via cell-tower information from T-Mobile. Nonetheless, the court admitted the evidence under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Defendant pled guilty to third-degree burglary and third-degree theft and was sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence and later allowed defendant to reopen his appeal to challenge the suppression ruling. The Appellate Division affirmed on different grounds, concluding that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information and that the police lawfully seized evidence in plain view. The panel did not consider the emergency aid doctrine. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition review of the validity of defendant's arrest based on law enforcement's use of information from defendant's cell phone provider about the general location of the cell phone and the application of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. The Court concluded that the New Jersey Constitution protects an individual's privacy interest in the location of his or her cell phone. Police must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone.View "New Jersey v. Earls" on Justia Law

Shannon pled guilty to possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)) and received a sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release. About 13 months after he began his supervised release, Shannon’s probation officer filed a petition alleging that Shannon violated conditions of his supervised release by having a web camera connected to his computer without prior permission and by accessing several websites, including those with “teengal” and “teenplanet” in their domain names. The government proceeded only with respect to the web camera because it could not determine the exact ages of the persons in the websites Shannon viewed, but expressed its concern that Shannon viewed sexually explicit websites where the models were intended to depict teenage girls and that Shannon had at one point wiped his hard drive clean. The district court revoked Shannon’s supervised release despite his contention that the websites contained disclaimers that the sites did not actually depict any minors. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the condition banning possession of any sexually explicit material was not restricted to material involving minors, nor was it limited to visual depictions, and that there were no findings or explanation for such a lifetime ban. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Petitioner's son was charged with assault and battery on a person over 60 years of age and with resisting arrest. The petitioner is the alleged victim. The son unsuccessfully moved to suppress a recording made by a third party, allegedly in violation of the wiretapping statute, G.L. c. 272, 99. The recording includes statements made by the defendant and the petitioner. The motion was denied. Petitioner sought relief under G.L. c. 211, 3, on the ground that the introduction of the recording into evidence in the defendant's trial would violate her privacy rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Nothing in G.L. c. 211, 3, or rule 2:21 grants a nonparty to a criminal case standing to obtain review of an interlocutory order. The Legislature has expressly provided a civil remedy, including compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees, for any aggrieved person whose oral or wire communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used, or whose privacy is violated by means of an unauthorized interception. G.L. c. 272, 99 Q. The petitioner does not address this remedy or explain why it would not be adequate to vindicate her privacy interests. View "In re Wadja" on Justia Law

This case arose from a physical struggle between Defendant Angel Moreno, Jr. and two Holland police officers when the officers sought to enter Defendant's home without a warrant. As a result, Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer and causing injury under MCL 750.81d. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant was properly charged after trial. It was determined that the officers entered his home illegally. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that MCL 750.81d did not abrogate Defendant's common-law right to resist illegal police conduct. As such, the Court instructed the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to quash the charges against him on the basis that the officers' conduct was unlawful.View "Michigan v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee the Rutland Herald appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants the Vermont State Police (VSP) and the Office of the Attorney General (collectively the State), and to deny disclosure of records related to a criminal investigation of possession of child pornography by employees of the Criminal Justice Training Council at the Vermont Police Academy. The court concluded that the records sought by the Herald, which included inquest records, were exempt from disclosure as "records dealing with the detection and investigation of crime." The Herald asserted on appeal that a strong policy in favor of public oversight of law enforcement actions should have lead to a different result. It argued that the Legislature could not have intended that records relating to the investigation and detection of crime be confidential forever. The Supreme Court rejected the Herald's arguments, finding the investigatory records were entitled to a blanket exemption under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5) and upheld the trial court's decision.View "Rutland Herald v. Vermont State Police" on Justia Law

An accountant and the company he owned (collectively, MBS), filed suit against Defendants, telecommunications companies, asserting claims for damages under Wis. Stat. 100.207 and other statutes, arguing that Defendants' telephone bills contained unauthorized charges. The circuit court dismissed MBS's claims for relief, determining that although the complaint properly alleged violations of section 100.207, the voluntary payment doctrine barred any entitlement to monetary relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Supreme Court had not decided whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine to be a viable defense against any cause of action created by a statute; and (2) under the circumstances, the conflict between the manifest purpose of section 100.207 and the common law defense left no doubt that the legislature intended that the common law defense should not be applied to bar claims under the statute. Remanded.View "MBS-Certified Pub. Accountants, LLC v. Wis. Bell Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when defendants' daughter revealed to her parents that plaintiff had raped and molested her when she was 10 and 12 years old. Defendants notified plaintiff's wife about her husband's alleged actions and informed her that defendants would file a civil suit against plaintiff. Plaintiff was never charged with a crime in connection with these allegations. Plaintiff adamantly denied that he had sexual contact with defendants' daughter and responded to these charges by commencing this action for defamation. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that even if they made the statements that were attributed to them, those utterances were not actionable because they had truthfully relayed their daughter's accusations and merely expressed their belief in her veracity. Supreme Court denied defendants' motions, finding triable issues of fact based on the conflicting testimony of the parties. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding that the alleged statements were statements of opinion, not fact. The court held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because they failed to establish as a matter of law that they did not defame plaintiff where, based on the conflicting recollections in this case, it was impossible to decipher exactly what was said by whom and the precise context in which the statements were made.View "Thomas H. v Paul B." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Lonnie Howard appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to delivery of methamphetamine. On two occasions, a confidential police informant bought methamphetamine tablets from Kayla Bruning. On both occasions, Defendant drove Bruning to pick up the tablets from a supplier and drove her to the site where the informant bought the tablets. After sentencing, Howard made a motion in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea. Howard argued he had not touched the drugs or money, and he was actually innocent of delivery. Howard argued the factual basis offered by the State did not support his guilty plea to "delivery." The State argued Defendant admitted to driving the vehicle that transported the methamphetamine, knew he was transporting methamphetamine in his vehicle to sell to another individual, and was present while the informant bought the methamphetamine in his vehicle. The district court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, noting that the definition of "delivery" included "constructive delivery" and "attempted delivery." Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "North Dakota v. Howard" on Justia Law

Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig‟s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can’t fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there.” The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock’s statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law