Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court concerning whether an "early termination fee" (ETF) in a broadband internet service contract constituted an "alternative performance provision" or as a liquidated damages clause. Appellants are all customers who either incurred this ETF for canceling early or were threatened with this ETF for attempting to cancel early. All Appellants were dissatisfied with Clearwire’s service, alleging that instead of the fast and reliable service promised, they received inconsistent and painstakingly slow speeds. Plaintiff Chad Minnick sued Clearwire in King County Superior Court in April 2009, claiming that Clearwire was committing false advertising and was imposing ETFs unlawfully. He then filed the first amended complaint in May, which added the other 11 plaintiffs through class certification. In July, Clearwire removed the case to the federal district court where it filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellants' claims. The district court granted Clearwire's motion. Appellants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the ETF was a liquidated damages provision and not an alternative performance provision as the trial court found. Under Washington law, an alternative performance provision is distinguishable from a liquidated damages provision because it provides a "real option" to the promisor and the alternatives are reasonably equal to each other. Here, the ETF provided a "real option" at the time of contracting because Appellants wanted to retain the control and flexibility that the early cancellation allowed them. Further, the ETF was less expensive than the remaining payments for the majority of the contract's life, thereby indicating the options were reasonably related. The ETF also allowed Appellants to benefit from reduced monthly premiums under the fixed-term contract but also enjoy some of the flexibility of the month-to-month subscription. Therefore, the ETF is an alternative performance provision that is not subject to a penalty analysis.View "Minnick v. Clearwire US, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. AT&T claimed the trial court erred by ruling that AT&T had not been assigned Plaintiff Pike Porter’s cell phone contract before sending him unsolicited text messages and erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue. AT&T also argued that even if Plaintiff's claims arose before AT&T purchased his contract, the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that AT&T cannot enforce the binding arbitration agreement in Plaintiff's original cell phone contract. The court also noted that the arbitration agreement could not bind Plaintiff "with regard to events between him and AT&T that took place at a time when his only contract was with Unicel, not AT&T." AT&T highlighted four pieces of evidence it submitted along with its motion to amend and reconsider as "undisputed" proof that it purchased Plaintiff's contract in December 2008. Upon review of AT&T's evidence, the Supreme Court concluded the document did not establish that Plaintiff's contract was one of the 100,000 to 150,000 contracts sold, nor did it suggest that "certain Unicel assets" included all of the wireless contracts Unicel held in Vermont. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of Plaintiff.View "Porter v. AT&T Mobility, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, Gager applied for a line of credit to purchase computer equipment. The application required that she provide her home phone number. Gager listed her cellular phone number without stating that the number was for a cellular phone, or indicating that Dell should not use an automated telephone dialing system to call her at that number. Gager defaulted on the loan Dell granted. Dell began using an automated telephone dialing system to call Gager’s cell phone, leaving pre-recorded messages concerning the debt. In 2010, Gager sent a letter, listing her phone number and asking Dell to stop calling it regarding her account. The letter did not indicate that the number was for a cellular phone. Dell continued to call, using an automated telephone dialing system. Gager filed suit, alleging that Dell violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court dismissed on the theory that she could not revoke her consent once it was given. The Third Circuit reversed. The fact that Gager entered into a contract with Dell does not exempt Dell from the TCPA. Dell will still be able to call Gager about her delinquent account, but not using an automated dialing system. View "Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs. LLC" on Justia Law

Sprint entered into interconnection agreements with incumbent local exchange carriers (CenturyLink Plaintiffs) providing for the mutual exchange of telecommunications traffic pursuant to the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. When Sprint began to withhold payments under the agreement, CenturyLink brought a breach of contract claim in federal district court. The court held that the 1996 Act did not require a State commission to interpret and enforce an interconnection agreement (ICA) in the first instance; neither the text of the 1996 Act nor prudential considerations compelled federal deference to State commissions in the first instance; the district court judge's ownership of shares in plaintiff did not constitute a financial interest in plaintiff for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 455(b); the district court did not violate the recusal statute and therefore did not abuse his discretion in deciding that neither recusal nor vacatur was appropriate; when viewed in conjunction with the ambiguity in the ICA's coverage of voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traffic over Feature Group D (FGD) trunks, the parties' course of dealing reinforced the court's conclusion that the district court did not err in entering judgment for plaintiff on its breach of contract claim; and, in the face of ambiguity, the court construed the relevant provisions of the North Carolina ICA against Sprint and in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Central Telephone Co. v. Sprint Communications Co." on Justia Law

Southern Walk, a homeowners association, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment against OpenBand, the corporation with which it had contracted in 2001 for wire-based video services. Southern Walk alleged that the 2007 Exclusivity Order issued by the FCC rendered "null and void" OpenBand's exclusive rights under the 2001 contracts to provide such wire-based video services to Southern Walk homeowners. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court to the extent that it held that Southern Walk failed to allege facts supporting standing in this case, but vacated that judgment to the extent that it dismissed the case with prejudice, and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. The court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees to OpenBand. View "Southern Walk at Broadlands v. Openband at Broadlands, LLC" on Justia Law

The homeowners association sued OpenBand, a group of interlocking entities that provided cable services to Lansdowne real estate development. The homeowners alleged that OpenBand entered into a series of contracts that conferred upon Open Band the exclusive right to provide video services to the the development, in violation of an order of the FCC prohibiting such exclusivity arrangements. Because the contract prohibited competing cable providers from accessing the Lansdowne development in patent violation of the FCC's Order, the court affirmed the district court's judgment declaring the challenged provisions null and void and permanently enjoining their enforcement. View "Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Assoc. v. Openband at Lansdowne, LLC" on Justia Law

Cogent sued, alleging that Hyalogic was disseminating false information regarding Cogent’s product Baxyl, an “oral, liquid HA supplement that is sold into the human natural products market.” Shortly after the filing, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Cogent moved to enforce the settlement agreement, claiming that Hyalogic caused false and misleading videos to be uploaded to You Tube and by statements made at a conference. The district court found no breach of the settlement agreement and denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The contract unambiguously refers to a clear statement “about the other Party’s product.” Statements that refer to preservatives that can be found in a number of products, including Cogent’s products, are not statements “about the other Party’s products.” View "Cogent Solutions Grp, LLC v. Hyalogic, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the FCC's issuance of an order requiring telecommunications carriers to make payments into a Universal Service Fund for subsidizing services for certain categories of consumers. At issue was what should happen to the intrastate portion of the fees that the customers paid to reimburse the carriers for the payments they made to the fund. The court held that the district court correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the claims. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the FCC's orders at all, it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the orders were invalid because they were outside the jurisdictional authority of the agency. View "Self v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gol TV produces soccer-related television programming, while Defendants EchoStar Satellite Corporation and EchoStar Satellite L.L.C. (known as DISH Network) distribute television programming to individual viewers via satellite. From 2003 until 2008, Gol TV’s programming was made available to subscribers of certain EchoStar service packages in exchange for EchoStar’s payment to Gol TV of contractually determined licensing fees. Gol TV brought a breach-of-contract suit against Echostar to recover monies due under the contract. The issue on appeal central to this dispute involved: (1) the calculation of licensing fees for the final ten days of the contract period; and (2) the accrual of interest for overdue payments. Upon review of the contract at issue, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation and affirmed its disposition of the case. View "Gol TV v. Echostar" on Justia Law

Razorback Concrete Company (Razorback) sued Dement Construction Company (Dement) for breach of contract and fraud based on disputes over performance of a concrete supply contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Dement on the fraud claim and partial summary judgment to Dement as to the measure of damages for the breach of contract claim, holding that Razorback was not entitled to recover damages under a lost profits theory. After obtaining a judgment on the contract claim, Razorback appealed the grants of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Dement on Razorback's fraud claim, as Razorback failed to identify any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dement knew its representation as false at the time it was made; and (2) granting partial summary judgment to Dement on Razorback's claim for lost provides, holding that Razorback failed to supply evidence creating a fact issue regarding whether it was a lost volume seller or whether damages provided or under Ark. Code Ann. 4-2-708(1) were otherwise inadequate. View "Razorback Concrete Co. v. Dement Constr. Co. " on Justia Law