Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Leyse filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, after receiving a prerecorded telemarketing call on the landline he shares with his roommate. Leyse was not the intended recipient of the call— his roommate was. The district court dismissed for lack of statutory standing. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Leyse has statutory standing. His status as a regular user of the phone line and occupant of the residence that was called brings him within the language of the Act and the zone of interests it protects. View "Leyse v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

Brown filed a class action complaint, alleging that she contacted Defender by telephone in response to its advertisement for a home security system; that, during several calls, she provided Defender with personal information; and that Defender recorded those calls without her permission and without notifying her of the recording. Brown claimed violations of California Penal Code 632, which prohibits the recording of confidential telephone communications without the consent of all parties. Defender owned a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by First Mercury, covering “personal injury” and “advertising injury.” In a separate definitions section, the policy defined both “advertising injuries” and “personal injuries” as those “arising out of … [o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.” The parties eventually reached a settlement. Defender provided First Mercury with timely notice of the Brown suit. First Mercury denied coverage and refused to defend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Defender’s suit against First Mercury. Defender’s Policy requires “publication,” which was neither alleged nor proven. View "Defender Sec. Co. v. First Mercury Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act prohibits companies from making automated calls to a person’s cellphone without that person’s prior express consent, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Hill claims he received more than 100 prohibited phone calls from his creditor, Homeward, in connection to a debt he owed. Hill had given the company his cell number and knew that this number would be used if Homeward needed to reach him about his mortgage. He also listed the number on a loan modification document. While behind on his payments, Hill told Homeward not to call him at work anymore, instructing Homeward to call his cellphone instead. He also provided express written consent for Homeward to call his cellphone. The district court rejected Hills’s claims under the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A person gives his “prior express consent” when he gives his creditor his cellphone number in connection with a debt he owes. View "Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against DCI, alleging that DCI violated the Telephone Communications Practice Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by sending plaintiff two text messages. The court concluded that plaintiff gave his prior express consent to be contacted by voluntarily providing his cell phone number to DCI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff’s complaint alleges, on its face, facts that demonstrate prior express consent. View "Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC" on Justia Law

SEB distributes household products under several brand names, including electric steam irons sold under the Rowenta brand name. Euro-Pro distributes household appliances under the Shark brand name. The Shark packaging states: “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.” The “††”refers to a fine-print footnote on the package’s bottom, stating that the claim is “††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).” The packaging also asserts “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*” with a fine-print reference on the bottom stating it “*[o]ffers more grams per minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the same price range, at time of printing.” SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta performed the same as the Shark. SEB commissioned an independent laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta outperformed the Shark. SEB claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law. The Third Circuit affirmed entry of an injunction, agreeing that the packaging’s definition of a claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message and that the court properly disregarded consumer survey evidence offering alternative meanings. View "Groupe SEB USA Inc v. Euro Pro Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Redbox operates automated self‐service kiosks at which customers rent DVDs and Blu‐ray discs with a debit or credit card. Redbox outsources certain functions to service providers, including Stream, which provides customer service when, for example, a customer encounters technical problems at a kiosk and requires help from a live person. If resolution of the issue requires accessing that customer’s video rental history the Stream employee will do so. Redbox has granted Stream access to the database in which Redbox stores relevant customer information. Plaintiffs challenged Stream’s ability to access customer rental histories and Stream’s use of customer records during employee training exercises as violating the Video Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits “video tape service provider[s]” like Redbox from “disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider,” 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1). The Act includes an exception for disclosure incident to the video tape service provider’s ordinary course of business, defined as debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of ownership. The district court granted Redbox summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Redbox’s actions fall within the exception for disclosures in the ordinary course of business: disclosures incident to “request processing.” View "Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, against a hospital-based radiology provider and its debt collection agent for making autodialed or prerecorded calls. The collection bureau, Gulf Coast, contended that the calls fell within a statutory exception for "prior express consent," as interpreted in a 2008 declaratory ruling from the FCC. The district court concluded that the FCC's interpretation was inconsistent with the language of the TCPA and, regardless of the 2008 FCC Ruling, did not apply on the facts of this case. The court concluded, however, that the district court lacked the power to consider the validity of the 2008 FCC Ruling and erred in concluding that the FCC's interpretation did not control the disposition of the case. In these circumstances, plaintiff's claim falls squarely within the FCC order. Consequently, the TCPA exception for prior express consent entitled Gulf Coast to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded with instructions. View "Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 42 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), that Campbell-Ewald instructed or allowed a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on behalf of the Navy, with whom Campbell-Ewald had a marketing contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Campbell-Ewald under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity. The court rejected Campbell-Ewald's claim that the personal and putative class claims were mooted by petitioner's refusal to accept the settlement offer; Campbell-Ewald's constitutional claims were unavailing where the company relied upon a flawed application of First Amendment principles; the TCPA imposes vicarious liability where an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, is established between the defendant and a third-party caller; and the application of the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is inapplicable in this case. Because Campbell-Ewald failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor child, filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991's (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), prohibition on autodialing cell phones without the express consent of the called party. Wells Fargo had called the cell phone number used by the child to collect a debt from a former customer who had listed the phone number on a Wells Fargo account application. Wells Fargo was unaware that the cell phone number was no longer assigned to the former customer and the former customer never revoked his consent or requested that Wells Fargo cease calling the number. The court concluded that "called party," for purposes of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) means the subscriber to the cell phone service or user of the cell phone called. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in plaintiff's favor. View "Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

American Satellite, a third party retailer of Dish Network satellite television services, received a call from a potential customer. A woman, who identified herself as “Dickley,” provided what she claimed to be her social security number. In actuality, the number belonged to a man named Bickley. Dickley was an identity thief. The agent entered Dickley’s name and social security number into an interface that connects to credit reporting agencies. Unable to verify the information, American Satellite informed Dickley that her attempt to open an account was declined. Bickley later received a credit report indicating that Dish had made an inquiry on his name. Dish informed him that someone had attempted to open an account in his name, providing a recording of the conversation between the agent and the identity thief. A year later, despite knowing that the inquiry had prevented the theft of his identity, Bickley filed suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681b, alleging request and use of his credit report without a “permissible purpose” and sought emotional distress damages. The district court entered summary judgment for Dish, including a counterclaim for abuse of process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, referring to the conspicuous underdevelopment of key factual detail in Bickley’s complaint and in briefs as “bordering on deceitful” and to the adage that no good deed goes unpunished. View "Bickley v. Dish Network LLC" on Justia Law