Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

On September 15, 2011, Elder Living ordered a background screening report on Rocheleau from First Advantage's predecessor, in conjunction with Rocheleau’s application for employment. The search disclosed criminal convictions matched to Rocheleau’s name and birth date. On September 16, First notified Rocheleau that it was reporting information derived from his public record and to direct any questions to its disclosure center. Days later, it sent another notice, advising that information from Rocheleau's report “may adversely affect [his] employment status” and that he was entitled to dispute it. The notice included a summary of rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. On September 26, First notified Rocheleau that he had not been hired again advising Rocheleau of dispute procedures. Rocheleau contends that Elder shared the report with his then-employer, which terminated his employment. Rocheleau contacted First and complained that he had not authorized the report's release; he did not dispute its accuracy. On November 25, 2013, Rocheleau filed suit under FCRA, claiming that Elder obtained the report without his permission or notifying him that adverse action could result; that neither First nor Elder issued certifications mandated by statute; and that First failed to adhere to required “strict procedures” in releasing his information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the claims as time-barred under the two-year limitations period. View "Rocheleau v. Elder Living Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received medical care from Mount Carmel Hospital in Columbus, Ohio. Consultant Anesthesiologists provided anesthesiology services to each at Mount Carmel Hospital. After plaintiffs did not pay their bills, Consultant Anesthesiologists transferred the delinquent accounts to Credit Adjustments, which called plaintiffs’ cell phone numbers, despite never having received their contact information directly from them. Credit Adjustments received the numbers from Consultant Anesthesiologists, which received them from Mount Carmel Hospital. As part of their admission for services to Mount Carmel Hospital, Baisden and Sissoko signed Patient Consent and Authorization forms covering “all medical and surgical care,” and stating “I understand Mount Carmel may use my health information for … billing and payment … I authorize Mt. Carmel to receive or release my health information, [to] agents or third parties as are necessary for these purposes and to companies who provide billing services.” Plaintiffs contend Credit Adjustments violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), when it placed debt collection calls to their cell phone numbers using an “automatic telephone dialing system” and an “artificial or prerecorded voice.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs gave their “prior express consent” to receive such calls. View "Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that defendants, who run internet advertising businesses, placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ web browsers in contravention of their browsers’ cookie blockers and defendant Google’s own public statements. Essentially they claimed that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet history information when, in the course of requesting webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited website, the plaintiffs’ browsers sent that information directly to the defendants’ servers. They cited the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510; the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C 2701; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030; and, against Google, violation of the privacy right conferred by the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the state Unfair Competition Law, the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims, stating that fraud or deceit does not amount to wiretapping; the alleged conduct implicated no protected “facility” under the Stored Communications Act; and the plaintiffs alleged no damages under the Fraud Act. The court vacated dismissal of the state law claims against Google. View "In Re: Google Inc Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig." on Justia Law

Leyse filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, after receiving a prerecorded telemarketing call on the landline he shares with his roommate. Leyse was not the intended recipient of the call— his roommate was. The district court dismissed for lack of statutory standing. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Leyse has statutory standing. His status as a regular user of the phone line and occupant of the residence that was called brings him within the language of the Act and the zone of interests it protects. View "Leyse v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

Brown filed a class action complaint, alleging that she contacted Defender by telephone in response to its advertisement for a home security system; that, during several calls, she provided Defender with personal information; and that Defender recorded those calls without her permission and without notifying her of the recording. Brown claimed violations of California Penal Code 632, which prohibits the recording of confidential telephone communications without the consent of all parties. Defender owned a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by First Mercury, covering “personal injury” and “advertising injury.” In a separate definitions section, the policy defined both “advertising injuries” and “personal injuries” as those “arising out of … [o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.” The parties eventually reached a settlement. Defender provided First Mercury with timely notice of the Brown suit. First Mercury denied coverage and refused to defend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Defender’s suit against First Mercury. Defender’s Policy requires “publication,” which was neither alleged nor proven. View "Defender Sec. Co. v. First Mercury Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act prohibits companies from making automated calls to a person’s cellphone without that person’s prior express consent, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Hill claims he received more than 100 prohibited phone calls from his creditor, Homeward, in connection to a debt he owed. Hill had given the company his cell number and knew that this number would be used if Homeward needed to reach him about his mortgage. He also listed the number on a loan modification document. While behind on his payments, Hill told Homeward not to call him at work anymore, instructing Homeward to call his cellphone instead. He also provided express written consent for Homeward to call his cellphone. The district court rejected Hills’s claims under the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A person gives his “prior express consent” when he gives his creditor his cellphone number in connection with a debt he owes. View "Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against DCI, alleging that DCI violated the Telephone Communications Practice Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by sending plaintiff two text messages. The court concluded that plaintiff gave his prior express consent to be contacted by voluntarily providing his cell phone number to DCI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff’s complaint alleges, on its face, facts that demonstrate prior express consent. View "Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC" on Justia Law

SEB distributes household products under several brand names, including electric steam irons sold under the Rowenta brand name. Euro-Pro distributes household appliances under the Shark brand name. The Shark packaging states: “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.” The “††”refers to a fine-print footnote on the package’s bottom, stating that the claim is “††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).” The packaging also asserts “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*” with a fine-print reference on the bottom stating it “*[o]ffers more grams per minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the same price range, at time of printing.” SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta performed the same as the Shark. SEB commissioned an independent laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta outperformed the Shark. SEB claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law. The Third Circuit affirmed entry of an injunction, agreeing that the packaging’s definition of a claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message and that the court properly disregarded consumer survey evidence offering alternative meanings. View "Groupe SEB USA Inc v. Euro Pro Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Redbox operates automated self‐service kiosks at which customers rent DVDs and Blu‐ray discs with a debit or credit card. Redbox outsources certain functions to service providers, including Stream, which provides customer service when, for example, a customer encounters technical problems at a kiosk and requires help from a live person. If resolution of the issue requires accessing that customer’s video rental history the Stream employee will do so. Redbox has granted Stream access to the database in which Redbox stores relevant customer information. Plaintiffs challenged Stream’s ability to access customer rental histories and Stream’s use of customer records during employee training exercises as violating the Video Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits “video tape service provider[s]” like Redbox from “disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider,” 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1). The Act includes an exception for disclosure incident to the video tape service provider’s ordinary course of business, defined as debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of ownership. The district court granted Redbox summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Redbox’s actions fall within the exception for disclosures in the ordinary course of business: disclosures incident to “request processing.” View "Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, against a hospital-based radiology provider and its debt collection agent for making autodialed or prerecorded calls. The collection bureau, Gulf Coast, contended that the calls fell within a statutory exception for "prior express consent," as interpreted in a 2008 declaratory ruling from the FCC. The district court concluded that the FCC's interpretation was inconsistent with the language of the TCPA and, regardless of the 2008 FCC Ruling, did not apply on the facts of this case. The court concluded, however, that the district court lacked the power to consider the validity of the 2008 FCC Ruling and erred in concluding that the FCC's interpretation did not control the disposition of the case. In these circumstances, plaintiff's claim falls squarely within the FCC order. Consequently, the TCPA exception for prior express consent entitled Gulf Coast to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded with instructions. View "Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau" on Justia Law