Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), an effective consent to automated calls is one that relates to the same subject matter covered by the challenged messages. Akira, a retailer, engaged Opt for text-message marketing services. Akira gathered 20,000 customers’ cell phone numbers for Opt’s messaging platform. Akira customers could join its “Text Club” by providing their cell phone numbers to Akira representatives inside stores, by texting to an opt-in number, or by completing an “Opt In Card,” stating that, “Information provided to Akira is used solely for providing you with exclusive information or special offers. Akira will never sell your information or use it for any other purpose.” In 2009-2011, Akira sent about 60 text messages advertising store promotions, events, contests, and sales to those customers, including Blow. In a purported class action, seeking $1.8 billion in damages, Blow alleged that Akira violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make calls without the recipient’s express consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Akira. Blow’s attempt to parse her consent to accept some promotional information from Akira while rejecting “mass marketing” texts construed “consent” too narrowly. The court declined to award sanctions for frivolous filings. View "Blow v. Bijora, Inc." on Justia Law

Businesses challenged New York General Business Law section 518, which provides that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means,” as violating the First Amendment by regulating how they communicate their prices, and as unconstitutionally vague. The Second Circuit vacated a judgment in favor of the businesses, reasoning that in the context of singlesticker pricing—where merchants post one price and would like to charge more to customers who pay by credit card—the law required that the sticker price be the same as the price charged to credit card users. In that context, the law regulated a relationship between two prices: conduct, not speech. The Supreme Court vacated, limiting its review to single-sticker pricing. Section 518 regulates speech. It is not a typical price regulation, which simply regulates the amount a store can collect. The law tells merchants nothing about the amount they may collect from a cash or credit card payer, but regulates how sellers may communicate their prices. Section 518 is not vague as applied to the businesses; it bans the single-sticker pricing they wish to employ, and “a plaintiff whose speech is clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim.” View "Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, municipal corporations operate the local “emergency communications” or “911” programs in their respective counties, alleged that the telephone company, to reduce costs, offer lower prices, and obtain more customers, engaged in a covert practice of omitting fees mandated by Tennessee’s Emergency Communications District Law (Code 7-86-101), and sought compensation under that statute. They also alleged that, while concealing this practice, the telephone company violated the Tennessee False Claims Act. The district court dismissed the first claim, finding that the statute contained no implied private right of action, and rejecting the second claim on summary judgment on the second claim, finding that the statements at issue were not knowingly false. In consolidated appeals, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs provided evidence of a “massive quantity of unexplained unbilled lines,” establishing a disputed question of material fact. The Law does not require the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted in some form of bad faith, given that the statute imposes liability for “deliberate ignorance” View "Knox County Emergency Communications District v. BellSouth Telecommunications LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that defendants sent unauthorized text messages in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227; California Business and Professions Code 17538.41; and California Business and Professions Code 17200. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff has Article III standing under Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins because plaintiff established a concrete injury-in-fact. On the merits, the court concluded that the FCC has established no rule that a consumer who gives a phone number to a company has consented to be contacted for any reason. Instead, FCC orders and rulings show that the transactional context matters in determining the scope of a consumer’s consent to contact. In this case, the court held that as a matter of law plaintiff gave prior express consent to receive defendants’ text messages where he gave his cell phone number for the purpose of a gym membership contract. Revocation of consent must be clearly made and express a desire not to be called or texted. The court joined its sister circuits and agreed that the TCPA permits consumers to revoke their prior express consent to be contacted by telephone autodialing systems. Here, the court held that, although consumers may revoke their prior express consent, plaintiff's gym cancellation was not effective in doing so here. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff lacked standing to bring his claim under the California Business and Professions Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group" on Justia Law

A veterans’ group challenged an anti‑robocall statute, Ind. Code 24‑5‑14‑5, under the First Amendment. The law prohibits automated calls with recorded messages unless the recipient has previously consented or the message is immediately preceded by a live operator who obtains consent. The Seventh Circuit upheld the law, noting that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, which contains similar restrictions, has been sustained by the Ninth and Eighth Circuits. The court rejected a claim of content-based discrimination. While the law exempts messages from school districts to students, parents, or employees; messages to recipients with whom the caller has a current business or personal relationship; messages advising employees of work schedules, nothing in the law, including those exceptions, disfavors political speech. The exceptions primarily concern who may be called, not what may be said. The court noted the legitimate purposes of the law. View "Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

On September 15, 2011, Elder Living ordered a background screening report on Rocheleau from First Advantage's predecessor, in conjunction with Rocheleau’s application for employment. The search disclosed criminal convictions matched to Rocheleau’s name and birth date. On September 16, First notified Rocheleau that it was reporting information derived from his public record and to direct any questions to its disclosure center. Days later, it sent another notice, advising that information from Rocheleau's report “may adversely affect [his] employment status” and that he was entitled to dispute it. The notice included a summary of rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. On September 26, First notified Rocheleau that he had not been hired again advising Rocheleau of dispute procedures. Rocheleau contends that Elder shared the report with his then-employer, which terminated his employment. Rocheleau contacted First and complained that he had not authorized the report's release; he did not dispute its accuracy. On November 25, 2013, Rocheleau filed suit under FCRA, claiming that Elder obtained the report without his permission or notifying him that adverse action could result; that neither First nor Elder issued certifications mandated by statute; and that First failed to adhere to required “strict procedures” in releasing his information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the claims as time-barred under the two-year limitations period. View "Rocheleau v. Elder Living Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received medical care from Mount Carmel Hospital in Columbus, Ohio. Consultant Anesthesiologists provided anesthesiology services to each at Mount Carmel Hospital. After plaintiffs did not pay their bills, Consultant Anesthesiologists transferred the delinquent accounts to Credit Adjustments, which called plaintiffs’ cell phone numbers, despite never having received their contact information directly from them. Credit Adjustments received the numbers from Consultant Anesthesiologists, which received them from Mount Carmel Hospital. As part of their admission for services to Mount Carmel Hospital, Baisden and Sissoko signed Patient Consent and Authorization forms covering “all medical and surgical care,” and stating “I understand Mount Carmel may use my health information for … billing and payment … I authorize Mt. Carmel to receive or release my health information, [to] agents or third parties as are necessary for these purposes and to companies who provide billing services.” Plaintiffs contend Credit Adjustments violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), when it placed debt collection calls to their cell phone numbers using an “automatic telephone dialing system” and an “artificial or prerecorded voice.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs gave their “prior express consent” to receive such calls. View "Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that defendants, who run internet advertising businesses, placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ web browsers in contravention of their browsers’ cookie blockers and defendant Google’s own public statements. Essentially they claimed that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet history information when, in the course of requesting webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited website, the plaintiffs’ browsers sent that information directly to the defendants’ servers. They cited the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510; the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C 2701; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030; and, against Google, violation of the privacy right conferred by the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the state Unfair Competition Law, the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims, stating that fraud or deceit does not amount to wiretapping; the alleged conduct implicated no protected “facility” under the Stored Communications Act; and the plaintiffs alleged no damages under the Fraud Act. The court vacated dismissal of the state law claims against Google. View "In Re: Google Inc Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig." on Justia Law

Leyse filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, after receiving a prerecorded telemarketing call on the landline he shares with his roommate. Leyse was not the intended recipient of the call— his roommate was. The district court dismissed for lack of statutory standing. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Leyse has statutory standing. His status as a regular user of the phone line and occupant of the residence that was called brings him within the language of the Act and the zone of interests it protects. View "Leyse v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

Brown filed a class action complaint, alleging that she contacted Defender by telephone in response to its advertisement for a home security system; that, during several calls, she provided Defender with personal information; and that Defender recorded those calls without her permission and without notifying her of the recording. Brown claimed violations of California Penal Code 632, which prohibits the recording of confidential telephone communications without the consent of all parties. Defender owned a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by First Mercury, covering “personal injury” and “advertising injury.” In a separate definitions section, the policy defined both “advertising injuries” and “personal injuries” as those “arising out of … [o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.” The parties eventually reached a settlement. Defender provided First Mercury with timely notice of the Brown suit. First Mercury denied coverage and refused to defend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Defender’s suit against First Mercury. Defender’s Policy requires “publication,” which was neither alleged nor proven. View "Defender Sec. Co. v. First Mercury Ins. Co." on Justia Law