Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Gager applied for a line of credit to purchase computer equipment. The application required that she provide her home phone number. Gager listed her cellular phone number without stating that the number was for a cellular phone, or indicating that Dell should not use an automated telephone dialing system to call her at that number. Gager defaulted on the loan Dell granted. Dell began using an automated telephone dialing system to call Gager’s cell phone, leaving pre-recorded messages concerning the debt. In 2010, Gager sent a letter, listing her phone number and asking Dell to stop calling it regarding her account. The letter did not indicate that the number was for a cellular phone. Dell continued to call, using an automated telephone dialing system. Gager filed suit, alleging that Dell violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court dismissed on the theory that she could not revoke her consent once it was given. The Third Circuit reversed. The fact that Gager entered into a contract with Dell does not exempt Dell from the TCPA. Dell will still be able to call Gager about her delinquent account, but not using an automated dialing system. View "Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs. LLC" on Justia Law

Using FOIA requests directed to the South Carolina DMV, attorneys obtained names and addresses, then sent letters to more than 34,000 individuals, seeking clients for a lawsuit against car dealerships for violation of a state law. The letters were headed “ADVERTISING MATERIAL,” explained the lawsuit, and asked recipients to return an enclosed card to participate in the case. Recipients sued the attorneys, alleging violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(4), by obtaining, disclosing, and using personal information from motor vehicle records for bulk solicitation without express consent. The district court dismissed, based on a DPPA exception permitting disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding," including "investigation in anticipation of litigation." The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. An attorney’s solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose under the (b)(4) litigation exception. DPPA’s purpose of protecting privacy in motor vehicle records would be substantially undermined by application of the (b)(4) exception to the general ban on disclosure of personal information and ban on release of highly restricted personal information in cases there is any connection between protected information and a potential legal dispute. The Court noted examples of permissible litigation uses: service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and execution or enforcement of judgments and orders. All involve an attorney’s conduct as an officer of the court, not a commercial actor, seeking a business transaction. A contrary reading of (b)(4) could affect interpretation of the (b)(6) exception, which allows an insurer and certain others to obtain DMV information for use in connection with underwriting, and the (b)(10) exception, which permits disclosure and use of personal information in connection with operation of private tollroads. View "Maracich v. Spears" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in this case arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394. Plaintiff's claims were based upon the receipt of one fax advertisement from defendant, which plaintiff's agent undisputedly consented to receive. The one fax plaintiff received did not contain opt-out language that he argued was mandated by federal regulation. According to the FCC, the contested opt-out language was required, even on faxes sent after obtaining a potential recipient's consent. The court reversed because the Administrative Orders Review Act (Hobbs Act), 28 U.S.C. 2342 et seq., precluded the court from entertaining challenges to the regulation other than on appeals arising from agency proceedings. Without addressing such challenges, the court could not reject the FCC's plain-language interpretation of its own unambiguous regulation. View "Nack v. Walburg" on Justia Law

KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC’s service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC’s plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press “1” during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson’s extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to “exercise independent judgment” in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gayen Hancock, David Cross, Montez Mutzig, and James Bollinger sought to represent a class of customers dissatisfied with "U-verse," a digital telecommunications service offered by Defendants AT&T and several of its subsidiaries. The Oklahoma federal district court dismissed their claims based on forum selection and arbitration clauses in the U-verse terms of service. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims. Finding no error in the district court's interpretation of the terms of service, and finding no abuse of the court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. View "Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved an interlocutory appeal from an order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification where the certified class putatively consisted of various governmental entities within the State of Louisiana whose representatives entered into contracts with defendants for cellular telephone service. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in deceptive billing practices that constituted a breach of contract and violated the state's unfair trade and consumer protection laws. The court agreed with defendants that the district court abused its discretion when it certified plaintiffs' class because, in doing so, it effectively certified an "opt in" class, which was impermissible under Rule 23. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for further proceedings. View "Ackal, et al v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, et al" on Justia Law

Leyse received a prerecorded telemarketing call from a radio station. He sued, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2394, which prohibits certain prerecorded telemarketing calls. The district court dismissed, finding that the Federal Communications Commission had issued regulations exempting the type of call at issue from the TCPA’s prohibitions; that the FCC was authorized by Congress to do so; that the court should defer to the resulting regulation; and that the regulation passed muster under Chevron. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that “Chevron deference” applies to the regulation and that the regulation is valid under Chevron. The court rejected an argument that it lacked jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. View "Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad. Inc." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, curtails use of automated dialers and prerecorded messages to cell phones, whose subscribers often are billed for the call. AT&T hired a bill collector to call cell phone numbers at which customers had agreed to receive calls. The collection agency used a predictive dialer that works autonomously until a human voice answers. Predictive dialers continue to call numbers that no longer belong to the customers and have been reassigned to individuals who had not contracted with AT&T. The district court certified a class of individuals receiving automated calls after the numbers were reassigned and held that only consent of the subscriber assigned the number at the time of the call justifies an automated or recorded call. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products, alleged that provisions of the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment upholding the law and partial summary judgment to plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and ruled in favor of the government on most issues, declining to apply strict scrutiny and finding that warnings required by the Act reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers. The court upheld bans on event sponsorship, branding non- tobacco merchandise, and free sampling (loyalty and continuity programs); a requirement that tobacco manufacturers reserve significant packaging space for textual health warnings; the restriction of tobacco advertising to black and white text; and the constitutionality of the Act's color graphic and non-graphic warning label requirement. Reversing the district court, the court upheld the Act's restriction on claims that tobacco products are "safe or less harmful by virtue of” FDA regulation, inspection or compliance" 21 U.S.C. 331(tt)(4).View "Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former customers of AT&T, filed a class action against AT&T, alleging unjust enrichment and and breach of contract. AT&T responded by seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its contracts with plaintiffs. The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds, relying primarily on the agreement's class-action waiver provision. The court reversed the district court's substantive unconscionability ruling where the FAA preempted the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver. The court remanded for further proceedings related to plaintiffs' procedural unconscionability claims for the district court to apply Washington choice-of-law rules. View "Coneff, et al. v. AT&T Corp, et al." on Justia Law