Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The national organization, chartered by Congress (36 U.S.C. 80302), decided to reduce the number of local councils, which are, essentially, franchises. The plan called for dissolution of the plaintiff council and dividing its territory among other councils. The district court ruled in favor of the national organization, reasoning that to apply the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law to the national organization would violate the organizationâs freedom of expression, guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The fact that a law of general application might indirectly and unintentionally impede the organization's efforts to communicate its message is not enough to render the law inapplicable. The law, which forbids a franchisor to terminate or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause, applies to the nonprofit organization; the national organization "all but abandoned" its argument that it had good cause.

Each summer, plaintiff leads a group of Christians at the Arab International Festival with a goal of converting Muslims to Christianity. In 2009, Dearborn police instituted a restriction that prohibited leafleting from sidewalks directly adjacent to Festival attractions and on sidewalks and roads that surround the Festivalâs core by one to five blocks; it allowed leafleting at the Festival only from a stationary booth and not while walking. The district court denied a temporary restraining order before the 2009 Festival and granted summary judgment to the defendants in 2010. The Sixth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal for the 2010 Festival, permitting leafleting from outer sidewalks and roads, but not on sidewalks directly adjacent to attractions, then reversed with respect to the "free speech" claim. The restriction on sidewalks adjacent to attractions does not serve a substantial government interest. The city keeps those sidewalks open for public traffic and permits sidewalk vendors, whose activity is more obstructive than leafleting; the prohibition is not narrowly tailored to the goal of isolating inner areas from vehicular traffic. The city can be held liable because the Chief of Police, who instituted the leafleting restriction, created official municipal policy.

Defendant was convicted of five electronic communications offenses when she began an anonymous electronic campaign of harassment against a former romantic partner. Defendant challenged her convictions and sentence on numerous grounds. The court held that the felony convictions of Count 2 and Count 4 must be vacated and reduced to misdemeanors where both Counts created a merger problem which implicated double jeopardy principles and where the indictment failed to establish any crime in Count 4. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant on Count 1 and Count 6 where the record showed that she conspired unlawfully to access computers and electronic storage facilities containing unopened e-mails for the purpose of accessing other computers and harassing, annoying, and harming the victim and his family and where the illegal access to voicemail facilitated the harassing telephone calls by supplying the ammunition that made the calls harassing and threatening. The court rejected defendant's claim that her Sixth Amendment rights were violated where the district court granted her request to represent herself. The court further rejected defendant's remaining sentencing arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Finally, in light of Count 2 and Count 4, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

The city amended its code to prohibit sexually-oriented businesses in downtown and planned development districts and later published notice of intent to prohibit such uses in a development authority district and imposed a temporary ban on issuance of new licenses. While the ban was in place, the owner sought permission to operate a topless bar in the area. The ordinance requires the clerk to act within 20 days; the clerk rejected the application after 24 days. The amendment prohibiting the use was enacted about two weeks later. The district court rejected the owner's civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The city's evidence showed that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to deal with secondary effects, blight and deterioration of property values, and leaves open reasonable opportunity to operate an adult business. Even if only 27 sites are available, rather than 39 as the district court concluded, the number is adequate in a city that had only two applications in five years. The 24-day decision period did not amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint; prompt judicial review was available.