Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

After Air Wisconsin stopped flying aircraft that Hoeper was certified to fly, Hoeper failed three attempts to gain new certification. Air Wisconsin gave him one final chance. He performed poorly during required training and responded angrily, tossing his headset, using profanity, and making accusations against the instructor. Airline officials discussed the outburst, Hoeper’s impending termination; the history of assaults by disgruntled employees; and the chance that Hoeper, a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), permitted “to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 44921(f)(1) might be armed. An airline executive notified the TSA that Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed,” that the airline was “concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm,” and that an “[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today.” The TSA removed Hoeper (returning home from training) from his plane, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. Hoeper sued for defamation. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. 44941(a), provides airlines and employees immunity for reporting suspicious behavior except where such disclosure is “made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading” or “made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.” The jury found for Hoeper. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. ATSA immunity, patterned after the Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” standard, may not be denied to materially true statements, even if made recklessly; a falsehood cannot be material absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response. Any falsehoods in the statement to the TSA were not material. A reasonable TSA officer, knowing that Hoeper was an FFDO, upset about losing his job, would have wanted to investigate whether he was armed. While Hoeper had not actually been fired at that time, everyone knew that termination was imminent. It would be inconsistent with the ATSA’s text and purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because the manager who placed the call could have chosen a slightly better phrase to articulate the airline’s concern. View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

Time Warner petitioned for review of the FCC's 2011 order promulgated under section 616(a)(3) and (5) of the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act), as amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), 47 U.S.C. 536(a)(3), (5). Section 616(a)(3) and (5) and that part of the 2011 Order establishing the standard for demonstrating a prima facie violation of these statutory provisions (the program carriage regime) were intended to curb anticompetitive behavior by limiting the circumstances under which a distributor of video programming could discriminate against unaffiliated networks that provided such programming. The court concluded that the program carriage regime did not violate the First Amendment where its case-specific standards for identifying affiliation-based discrimination served important government interests in promoting competition and diversity in an industry still posing serious competitive risks and were narrowly tailored not to burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. The court concluded, however, that the 2011 Order was substantive and therefore subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Because the FCC failed to comply with such requirements, the court granted the petition for review insofar as it raised an APA challenge. View "Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Grand Resort, which has operated in the Great Smoky Mountains since 1982, claims that TripAdvisor’s publication of a survey that concluded that Grand Resort was the dirtiest hotel in America caused irreparable damage to its business and that TripAdvisor used a flawed rating system that distorted actual performance and perspective. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the “dirtiest hotels” list is protected opinion; it reflects TripAdvisor’s users’ subjective opinions and is not capable of being defamatory. The court rejected a motion to amend to add claims of trade libel-injurious falsehood and tortious interference with prospective business relationships to the claims of false light-invasion of privacy and of defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that amendment of the complaint would be futile. View "Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC" on Justia Law

Scottie Pippen won six championship rings with the Chicago Bulls and was named to the National Basketball Association’s list of the 50 greatest players in its history. Since he retired in 2004, he has lost much of the fortune he amassed during his playing days through bad investments. He has pursued multiple lawsuits against former financial and legal advisors. The media learned of Pippen’s problems and several news organizations incorrectly reported that he had filed for bankruptcy. Pippen contends that the false reports have impaired his ability to earn a living by product endorsements and appearances. He filed suit, alleging that he was defamed and cast in a false light. The district court dismissed, finding that the falsehoods did not fit any of the categories of statements recognized by Illinois law to be so innately harmful that damages may be presumed and that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendants had published the falsehoods with knowledge the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false, as required for a public figure such as Pippen to recover defamation damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Pippen v. NBC Universal Media LLC" on Justia Law

The Michigan anti-begging statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 900, has existed since at least 1929 and provides that “[a] person is a disorderly person if the person is any of the following: ... (h) A person found begging in a public place.” A person convicted under section 750.167(1)(h) is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. The Grand Rapids police recorded 409 incidents of police enforcing the anti-begging law from 2008–2011. Plaintiffs, two homeless adults, were arrested. One was holding signs saying: “Cold and Hungry, God Bless” and “Need Job, God Bless.” The other, a veteran, needed money for bus fare, and asked a person on the street: “Can you spare a little change?” The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the law was unconstitutional. Begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects and the statute cannot withstand facial attack because it prohibits a substantial amount of solicitation, but allows other solicitation based on content. View "Speet v. Schuette" on Justia Law

The Contributor produces a street newspaper to educate people about homelessness and poverty and helps develop job skills for homeless and formerly homeless persons, employing them as street vendors. Two such vendors were cited for attempting to sell issues of the newspaper on the streets and sidewalks of Brentwood, Tennessee, under an ordinance that provided that no person could use or occupy any portion of the city street, alley, sidewalk or the public right-of-way to sell any goods or materials. The city then revised the ordinance to provide that it should not “be construed as prohibiting the sale or distribution of newspapers, magazines, periodicals, handbills, flyers or similar materials, except that: (1) Such activity shall be prohibited on any portion of any street within the city. (2) Such materials shall not be handed to the occupant of any motor vehicle that is on a street, nor shall any action be taken which is intended or reasonably calculated to cause the vehicle occupant to hand anything to the person selling or distributing the materials." The district court upheld the revised ordinance as leaving open adequate alternative channels of communication. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "The Contributor v. City of Brentwood" on Justia Law

The Government filed three applications under section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701-2712, seeking evidence relevant to three separate criminal investigations. At issue on appeal was whether court orders authorized by the Act to compel cell phone service providers to produce the historical cell site information of their subscribers were per se unconstitutional. The court concluded that cell site data are business records and should be analyzed under that line of Supreme Court precedent; because the magistrate judge and district court treated the data as tracking information, they applied the wrong legal standard; using the proper framework, the Act's authorization of section 2703(d) orders for historical cell site information if an application meets the lesser "specific and articulable facts" standard, rather than the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard, was not per se unconstitutional; and as long as the Government met the statutory requirements, the Act did not give the magistrate judge discretion to deny the Government's application for such an order. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to grant the applications. View "In re: Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data" on Justia Law

Peele worked for the Portage Police Department as a detective. In 2007 he supported Charnetzky’s Democratic primary campaign to become mayor. Charnetzky lost. Peele spoke to a local reporter and criticized Sheriff Lain for endorsing the opponent, apparently stating that Sheriff Lain “won’t get any support here.” The day after the comments were published, Peele was reassigned to the more deskbound position of “Station Duty Officer.” Peele sued, claiming that he was demoted and constructively discharged without due process; retaliation for his support of Charnetzky; and defamation. The defendants counterclaimed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to retaliation, noting that the district court did not address conspiracy, immunity, or the city’s liability. View "Peele v. Burch" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Adult-Oriented Establishment Registration Act of 1998 is a county-option state law to address deleterious secondary effects associated with adult-oriented businesses, including crime, spread of venereal disease, and decreased property values. Adult-oriented establishments that are subject to the Act, and their employees, must obtain licenses. The Act prohibits nudity, certain sexual activities, touching of certain anatomical areas, all physical contact during performances, sale or consumption of alcohol on the premises; it requires that all performances occur on a stage at least 18 inches above floor level with all performers at least six feet away from customers and other performers. Shelby County adopted the Act in 2007. Owners of adult establishments challenged the ordinance. Following denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the law, except with respect to a claim of facial invalidity attacking the reasonableness of coverage of establishments featuring “briefly attired” dancers. The court then rejected that challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting First Amendment challenges. View "Entm't Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State Board, alleging that it violated his First Amendment rights by causing him to self-censor certain speech on his website wherein he offered both free and fee-based dietary advice to website visitors. The court reversed the district court's holding that plaintiff did not have standing to bring these claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in not analyzing plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment standing framework where, under that analysis, plaintiff satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement by showing that the State Board's action had an objectively reasonable chilling effect on his speech. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooksey v. Futrell" on Justia Law