Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged, on statutory and constitutional grounds, the telephone metadata program under which the NSA collects in bulk "on an ongoing daily basis" the metadata associated with telephone calls made by and to Americans. The NSA aggregates those metadata into a repository or data bank that can later be queried. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs have standing to sue; the court disagreed with the district court insofar as it held that plaintiffs are precluded from bringing suit against the government and hold that they have a right of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702; on the merits, the court concluded that § 215 of the PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, section 215, does not authorize the telephone metadata collection program; the court did not address the constitutionality of the program; and the court declined to conclude that a preliminary injunction is required, leaving it to the district court to reconsider, in the first instance, the propriety of preliminary relief in light of a correct understanding of the governing law. Therefore, the district court erred in ruling that section 215 authorizes the telephone metadata collection program. The telephone metadata program exceeds the scope of what Congress has authorized and therefore violates § 215. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "ACLU v. Clapper" on Justia Law

Florida voters elect judges. The Florida Supreme Court adopted Canon 7C(1) of its Code of Judicial Conduct, stating that judicial candidates “shall not personally solicit campaign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons” to raise money for election campaigns. Yulee mailed and posted online a letter soliciting financial contributions to her campaign for judicial office. The Florida Bar disciplined her for violating a Bar Rule requiring candidates to comply with Canon 7C(1). The Florida Supreme Court upheld the sanction against a First Amendment challenge. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. Florida’s interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary is compelling.. Unlike the legislature or the executive, the judiciary “has no influence over either the sword or the purse,” so its authority largely depends on the public’s willingness to respect its decisions. Canon 7C(1) raises no fatal underinclusivity concerns. The solicitation ban aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary: it is not riddled with exceptions. Allowing a candidate to use a committee and to write thank you notes reflect Florida’s effort to respect the First Amendment interests of candidates and contributors. Canon 7C(1) is not overinclusive It allows judicial candidates to discuss any issue with any person at any time; to write letters, give speeches, and put up billboards; to contact potential supporters in person, on the phone, or online; and to promote their campaigns through the media. Though they cannot ask for money, they can direct their campaign committees to do so. Florida has reasonably determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate inherently create an appearance of impropriety. Canon 7C(1) must be narrowly tailored, not “perfectly tailored” to address that concern. View "Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar" on Justia Law

Russell brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kentucky Secretary of State, Attorney General, and other state and local officials, alleging that Kentucky Revised Statute 117.235(3), which creates a 300-foot no-political-speech buffer zone around polling locations on election day, violated Russell’s free-speech rights. Russell’s business property is 150 feet from a polling location, with a four-lane highway and guardrails between. Citing the statute, Sheriff’s deputies have removed political signs from his property on previous election days, and the statute’s language prohibits Russell from, on his own property, waving signs and offering campaign literature to passersby. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit granted a partial stay of that injunction, which was issued only days before the 2014 general election, and expedited an appeal. The court then affirmed, holding that it had jurisdiction over the case, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against any of the remaining defendants, and that the statute facially violates the First Amendment because Kentucky failed to carry its burden of showing why it required a no-political-speech zone vastly larger than the Supreme Court has previously upheld. View "Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes" on Justia Law

In 1998, the Coalition filed a petition alleging that domestic producers of preserved mushrooms were injured by imports of preserved mushrooms from Chile, China, Indonesia, and India being sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. Giorgio accounted for approximately one half of total U.S. production, but was neither a Coalition member nor a petitioner. The International Trade Commission issued questionnaires to domestic producers, including Giorgio. Giorgio responded: “We take no position on Chile, China and Indonesia[.] We oppose the petition against India.” The Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping investigation, “on behalf of the domestic industry,” 19 U.S.C. 1673a(c)(4)(A)(i), noting that supporters of the petition accounted for over 50 percent of production of the domestic producers who expressed an opinion even if Giorgio’s position was not disregarded. Commerce found that dumping had occurred. The ITC determined that the domestic industry was materially injured; Commerce issued corresponding antidumping orders. Customs collected antidumping duties for distribution to “affected domestic producers.” Under the Byrd Amendment, an affected domestic producer “was a petitioner or interested party in support of the petition.” ITC rejected Giorgio’s request to be listed because Giorgio’s responses did not indicate support for the petition. Customs denied Giorgio’s claims for distributions. After the Federal Circuit upheld the Byrd Amendment against a facial First Amendment challenge, the Trade Court dismissed Giorgio’s suit, finding the support requirement constitutional under the standards governing commercial speech because it directly advanced the government’s substantial interest in preventing dumping. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Giorgio Foods, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2014 the Third Circuit decided King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, rejecting a challenge brought by licensed counselors to the constitutionality of Assembly Bill A3371, a statute banning the provision of “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) counseling to minors. A similar challenge was filed by a 15-year-old minor seeking to undergo SOCE counseling and by his parents. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Having decided, in King, that the statute did not violate the First Amendment rights of those wishing to “speak” the message of SOCE, the court concluded that the statute does not violate the rights of those who wish to receive that message. The court also rejected a parental rights claim. The fundamental rights of parents do not include the right to choose a specific type of provider for a specific medical or mental health treatment that the state has reasonably deemed harmful. View "Doe v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nonprofit charitable organization, solicits donations of clothing and shoes at unattended, outdoor donation bins for distribution in other countries. It locates bins at businesses that are “easily visible and accessible” with the consent of the owner. Its representatives generally collect donations weekly to avoid bin overflow. Bins are labeled so that people can report if they are full. In 2012, the city did not regulate donation bins. Plaintiff placed bins at a former grocery store and at a gas station. The city sent a letter claiming that they had “been found to create a nuisance as people leave boxes and other refuse around the containers,” denied a request for review, and removed the bins. A year later, the city council enacted a “total prohibition,” exempting the already-operational Lions Club Recycling. The ordinance states a purpose of preventing blight, protecting property values and neighborhood integrity, avoiding creation and maintenance of nuisances and ensuring safe and sanitary maintenance of properties. The Sixth Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction, finding that operation of bins to solicit and collect charitable donations qualified as protected speech and that the content-based ordinance fails strict scrutiny because it implements an overly broad, prophylactic ban on all bins so the city can avoid hypothetical nuisances or other issues that may arise in the future. View "Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

The owners of an adult entertainment establishment in the 500-resident Village of Dix that features nude dancing and permits customers to bring their own alcoholic beverages onto the premises, challenged the enactment of three ordinances that ban public nudity, open containers of alcohol in public, and the possession of liquor in public accommodations. Plaintiffs argued that the public nudity ban violates the free speech protections and that the Village lacks statutory authority to pass the challenged alcohol restrictions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to the First Amendment challenge; at this early stage of the litigation, Dix has not established the necessary evidentiary basis for its assertion that nude dancing causes adverse secondary effects to the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. The court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenge to Dix’s alcohol regulations, the enactment of which fell within the parameters of Illinois law and was supported by a rational basis. View "Foxxxy Ladyz Adult World Inc.v. Village of Dix" on Justia Law

Protestors, including those concerned with sexual abuse by clergy and those advocating the Catholic ordination of women and acceptance of gay, lesbian, and transgender people, raised a facial First Amendment challenge to Missouri's 2012 House of Worship Protection Act" Mo. Rev. Stat. 574.035, which prohibits intentionally disturbing a "house of worship by using profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior . . . either within the house of worship or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the worship services." The district court upheld the Act. The Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that there was no evidence of actual disturbances to houses of worship or that protesters interfered with churchgoers' entry or exit. The Act draws content based distinctions on the type of expression permitted near a house of worship, forbidding profane discourse and rude or indecent behavior which would disturb the order and solemnity of worship services and runs "a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." It impermissibly requires enforcement authorities to look to the content of the message and cannot survive strict scrutiny since its content-based distinctions are not necessary to achieve an asserted interest in protecting the free exercise of religion. View "Survivors Network v. Joyce" on Justia Law

In 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), by a vote of 219 to 212, following significant debate over whether PPACA included taxpayer funding for abortion. Driehaus, a Representative from Ohio and an anti-abortion Democrat, was an outspoken advocate of the “no taxpayer funding for abortion in the PPACA” movement, insisting that he would not vote for PPACA without inclusion of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, expressly forbidding use of taxpayer funds “to pay for any abortion or to cover any part of the costs of any health plan that includes coverage of abortion” except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother. Driehaus voted for the PPACA without the Amendment. President Obama later issued Executive Order 13535: “to … ensure that [f]ederal funds are not used for abortion services … consistent with a longstanding [f]ederal statutory restriction … the Hyde Amendment.” Debate continues as to whether PPACA includes federal funding for abortion. SBA, an anti-abortion public-advocacy organization, publicly criticized Driehaus, among other congressmen, for his vote. Driehaus considered SBA’s statement untrue and filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, alleging violation of Ohio Revised Code 3517.21(B) (Unfair Political Campaign Activities). OEC found probable cause of a violation. SBA sued, claiming that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Driehaus counterclaimed defamation. Staying the other claims, pending agency action, the district court granted summary judgment, holding that associating a political candidate with a mainstream political position, even if false, cannot constitute defamation. The Sixth Circuit Affirmed. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law