Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The government obtained a warrant to search the email account of Fattah, a U.S. Congressman, who is the subject of an investigation involving federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and bribery. Fattah alleged that he used the “gmail” account for both personal matters and official business relating to his congressional duties and challenged the unexecuted search warrant on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The court declined to invalidate the unexecuted search warrant. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because an unexecuted search warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. View "In the Matter of the Search of Elec Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Powell contends that his Christian beliefs compel him to publicly share his faith with others. Powell went to the Iowa State Fairgrounds and positioned himself on a sidewalk outside the paid admission area, close to a heavily-traveled intersection near the fair’s main gate. Uniformed Iowa State Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave the fairgrounds. The next day, Powell returned to the fairgrounds and stood in front of public restrooms outside the paid admission area. Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave. Powell brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 and sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted in part, prohibiting defendants from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell] solely for engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where [appellees] have already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to impede the flow of traffic.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Powell’s motion based on his First Amendment claim and remanded the case for consideration of Powell’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on his due process claim. View "Powell v. Noble" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court noted FOIA Exemption 7(C) which protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye,” and that individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press, Inc v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area, containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed, as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs received citations for violating this ordinance and alleged that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance in 2014, but granted rehearing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Reed v. Gilbert, and reversed. The majority in Reed stated: “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech” and “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” The Seventh Circuit opined that the majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation. View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area, containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed, as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs received citations for violating this ordinance and alleged that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance in 2014, but granted rehearing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Reed v. Gilbert, and reversed. The majority in Reed stated: “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech” and “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” The Seventh Circuit opined that the majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation. View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

After obtaining terrorism convictions, then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Convertino came under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). An unidentified DOJ source leaked information about that investigation to Ashenfelter, a reporter. The Detroit Free Press published details, including allegations that Convertino withheld Brady materials and threatened a defense lawyer with a baseless criminal investigation. DOJ’s attempts to find the source were unsuccessful. The terrorism convictions were vacated. The defendants’ claims against Convertino under 42 U.S.C. 1983 were dismissed based on prosecutorial and qualified immunity. Convertino was found not guilty of obstruction of justice. Convertino sued DOJ, alleging that the investigation, leak, and disciplinary measures were in retaliation for his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. Ultimately, a single claim remained--that DOJ violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, when its unidentified official leaked confidential information to Ashenfelter. The district court granted the motion to compel production from Ashenfelter. Ashenfelter asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at two depositions. The district court found that Ashenfelter had a reasonable basis for fearing that answering the questions would entail self-incrimination, sustained the assertion of privilege, and reduced its ruling to two written opinions—one public, and one sealed. Convertino unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing a statement by then-Attorney General Holder that the DOJ “will not prosecute any reporter.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the claims of privilege. View "Convertino v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

After the Fire District suspended Anzaldua, a paramedic and firefighter, for failing to respond to a directive issued by Chief Farwell, Anzaldua emailed a newspaper reporter expressing concerns about the District and about Farwell. The email “shocked” and “angered” his co-workers. Battalion chiefs noted it “fostered division between Anzaldua and his co-workers," and between firefighters and Farwell. The District terminated Anzaldua, who sued, alleging that the District and the individuals involved in his termination violated his First Amendment rights by retaliation and that Farwell and Anzaldua’s ex-girlfriend violated federal and state computer privacy laws by accessing his email account and obtaining his emails. The district court allowed some First Amendment claims to proceed but dismissed all other claims and denied leave to amend the computer privacy law claims. The court granted defendants summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims and denial of leave to amend federal computer privacy law claims, but reversed denial of leave to amend state computer privacy law claims. View "Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire" on Justia Law

Evilsizor and Sweeney married in 2010. Sweeney claimed that her son from a previous marriage had access to her cell phones, which were not password protected. The couple’s daughter was born in 2012. Sweeney became concerned that he might not be the child’s biological father after he read a message on his stepson’s phone, indicating that Evilsizor had received fertility treatments without his knowledge. He downloaded the contents of Evilsizor’s phones and confronted her. He went, uninvited, to the home of Evilsizor’s parents and disclosed private, sensitive information about Evilsizor. The parties separated; dissolution proceedings were initiated. Evilsizor sought to increase Sweeney’s support payments on the ground that her income had decreased because her father had fired her from her job with his company. Sweeney alleged that Evilsizor had colluded with her parents to make it appear she had been fired. Sweeney attached text messages supporting his opposition. Evilsizor sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to stop Sweeney from further disseminating the downloaded information. Finding that Sweeney’s actions amounted to abuse under the DVPA, the trial court prohibited Sweeney from distributing the information without court permission. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the order did not violate Sweeney’s constitutional rights to free speech. View "Evilsizor v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The Freeport Journal published an online article concerning Hadley’s decision to again seek election to the Stephenson County Board. Online readers could post comments after completing a basic registration. “Fuboy” posted: “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check out the view he has [an elementary school] from his front door” and “Anybody know the tale of Hadley’s suicide attempt? ….” Hadley filed a defamation lawsuit against the Journal and its parent company. The company provided Hadley the IP address acquired from Fuboy’s internet service provider, Comcast. The federal court dismissed the suit against as barred by federal statute. Hadley returned to state court with a defamation action against Subscriber Doe a/k/a “Fuboy” and issued a subpoena to Comcast. The circuit court directed Comcast to comply and to notify the subscriber. An attorney moved to quash. The court stated that the better procedure to discover Fuboy’s identity would be Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224, under which Hadley would have the burden of setting forth allegations that would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure 2-615, even if such a motion was not filed. The court allowed Hadley to add a count, directed at Comcast, seeking relief under Rule 224. The court concluded that count I could withstand a motion to dismiss, so Hadley was entitled to Rule 224 relief. The court found that the comment imputed the commission of a crime to Hadley; was not capable of innocent construction; and could not be considered an opinion. The court directed Comcast to provide identification. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hadley’s complaint states facts to establish a defamation cause of action sufficient to withstand a section 2-615 motion, so the court properly concluded that necessity was established under Rule 224. View "Hadley v. Subscriber Doe" on Justia Law

Gilbert, Arizona prohibits the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but exempts 23 categories. “Ideological Signs,” “communicating a message or ideas” that do not fit in any other category, may be up to 20 square feet and have no placement or time restrictions. “Political Signs,” may be up to 32 square feet and may only be displayed during an election season. “Temporary Directional Signs,” directing the public to a church or other “qualifying event,” are limited to six square feet and may be displayed no more than 12 hours before and one hour after the “qualifying event.” The Church held services at various temporary locations. It posted signs early each Saturday bearing its name and the time and location of the next service and did not remove the signs until midday Sunday. It was cited for exceeding the time limits and for failing to include an event date. The Ninth Circuit upheld the sign categories as content neutral , surviving intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court reversed. The code is content-based on its face. It defines categories of temporary, political, and ideological signs on the basis of their messages and subjects each category to different restrictions. A law that is content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of “animus toward the ideas contained.” While the law does not single out any viewpoint, the First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. The code singles out specific subject matter, even if it does not target viewpoints within that subject matter. The restrictions do not survive strict scrutiny; the town has not demonstrated that differentiation between temporary directional signs and other signs furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. View "Reed v. Town of Gilbert" on Justia Law