Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Soon after Tara Grinstead went missing from Irwin County in October 2005, her disappearance attracted significant media attention. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies investigated her disappearance for more than eleven years, and throughout the course of that investigation, news organizations continued to show an interest, reporting from time to time on her disappearance and developments in the investigation. When Ryan Duke was arrested in 2017 and charged with Grinstead’s murder, his arrest was the subject of extensive media coverage. Media coverage was most intense in Irwin County and surrounding areas of central and south Georgia. To a lesser extent, the record showed that Duke’s arrest also was covered by television stations and newspapers in Atlanta, as well as some national news organizations. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a gag order instituted in this case, which restrained the lawyers, the defendant and the lawyers in a related case, court personnel, and current and retired law enforcement personnel from making extrajudicial, public statements on certain subjects related to the murder case for so long as it remained pending. The Supreme Court held gag orders like this one may be constitutionally permissible in exceptional circumstances, but the record here did not reveal circumstances sufficiently exceptional to warrant such a restraint. For that reason, the Supreme Court vacated the gag order. View "WXIA-TV v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Connecticut General Statute 52‐59b, which provides for long‐arm jurisdiction over certain out‐of‐state defendants except in defamation actions, does not violate plaintiff's First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. This case arose out of a news article published by Bloomberg News, reporting a lawsuit filed by plaintiff against his former employer, Palladyne International Asset Management, and others. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's defamation action as to the out-of-state defendants. In regard to allegedly defamatory statements made by the remaining defendants, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's defamation claim based on the "as much as $500 million" statement, and reversed the district court's dismissal of the defamation claim based on the "repeatedly tried to extort" statement, pursuant to New York Civil Rights Law 74. View "Friedman v. Bloomberg L.P." on Justia Law

Superior, a nonprofit corporation, operates 21 Michigan radio broadcast stations. The City of Riverview owns a 320-foot broadcast tower. With an FCC permit to operate a low-powered FM radio broadcast station, Superior contracted to operate broadcasting equipment on the city-owned tower. Superior installed a single-bay antenna at 300 feet and a transmitter in the equipment shelter. The agreement limited modifications to Superior’s equipment; upgrades required the city’s prior approval. Without the city’s knowledge, Superior obtained a modification of its FCC permit to allow a significant increase in broadcast power. In response to Superior’s request, the city engaged a consultant, who reported that the proposed four-bay antenna would cause Superior’s equipment to occupy 30 feet of tower space instead of its current three feet of space; would expose individuals around the tower to unsafe levels of radiofrequency electromagnetic radiation; and might create radio interference with other tower tenants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city, rejecting arguments under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151. The Agreement unambiguously granted the city the right to refuse Superior’s requested upgrade, which the city properly exercised. The city did not enact a “regulation” within the meaning of the Act but acted in its proprietary capacity and had a rational basis for its actions, so that Superior’s constitutional claims failed. View "Superior Communications v. City of Riverview" on Justia Law

Herald-Leader sells and distributes Community News, a weekly four- to six-page non-subscription publication, containing local news and advertising for Lexington, Kentucky and the surrounding area. Herald-Leader delivers Community News free of charge to more than 100,000 households each week, including by driveway delivery. Lexington adopted an ordinance that permits the delivery of “unsolicited written materials” only: to a porch, nearest the front door; securely attached to the front door; through a mail slot; between an exterior front door and an interior front door; in a distribution box on or adjacent to the premises, if permitted; or personally with the owner, occupant, or lessee. Before the law went into effect, Herald-Leader obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, finding that Herald-Leader had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment claim. The ordinance is narrowly tailored to further the city’s goals of reducing visual blight and reducing litter. The court rejected an overbreadth argument and stated that, in determining whether the law leaves adequate alternative methods of communication, the district court failed to balance expense against the harms that can arise when cheap and efficient methods of circulating written materials are abused. View "Lexington H-L Services, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government" on Justia Law

Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct.” In 2011, individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT for items of apparel. The applicants assigned the application to Brunetti, who amended it to allege use of the mark. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter because FUCT is the past tense of “fuck,” a vulgar word, and is therefore scandalous. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. While substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings and it did not err concluding the mark comprises immoral or scandalous matter, section 2(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. The bar is a content-based restriction on speech; trademark registration is not a government subsidy program that could justify such a bar. Nor is trademark registration a “limited public forum,” in which the government can more freely restrict speech. The bar survives neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny. Even if the government had a substantial interest in protecting the public from scandalous or immoral marks, the regulation does not directly advance that interest because section 2(a) does not directly prevent applicants from using their marks. View "In re: Brunetti" on Justia Law

After receiving the answer to two certified questions from the Nevada Supreme Court, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's defamation suit. The Nevada Supreme Court held that a hyperlink to source material about a judicial proceeding may suffice as a report within the common law fair report privilege, and that the online petition, as it existed when plaintiff's complaint was filed, fell within the purview of Nevada's fair report privilege. The state court also held that, pursuant to Delucchi v. Songer, 396 P.3d 826 (Nev. 2017), Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute covers communication that is aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result or outcome which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood, even if that communication was not addressed to a government agency. In this case, plaintiff failed to allege knowledge of falsity, much less facts to support such a conclusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for additional discovery and the district court's application of the anti‐SLAPP statute to this case. View "Adelson v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the circuit court’s order requiring the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) to provide Steven Shults with the pharmaceutical package inserts and labels for its supply of midazolam, one of the drugs in the State’s execution protocol.Shults filed a complaint against the ADC after it refused to provide him with public records pertaining to the State’s supply of midazolam pursuant to his Arkansas Freedom of Information Act request. The ADC refused to disclose the package inserts or labels for the midazolam, arguing that these documents could be used to identify the sellers or suppliers of the drug in violation of the Method of Execution Act (MEA), Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-617. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court correctly determined that the identity of drug manufacturers is not protected under the confidentiality provisions of section 5-4-617; but (2) the circuit court erred in requiring disclosure of the unredacted records, as certain information was confidential under section 5-4-617(j). The court remanded the case for the circuit court to determine which information must be redacted on the midazolam labels and/or package inserts at issue. View "Arkansas Department of Correction v. Shults" on Justia Law

Salt Lake City’s denial of the request of Outfront Media, LLC, formerly CBS Outdoor, LLC (CBS), to relocate its billboard and grant of the relocation request of Corner Property L.C. were not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.CBS sought to relocate its billboard to an adjacent lot along Interstate 15, and Corner Property sought to relocate its billboard to the lot CBS was vacating. On appeal, CBS argued that the City’s decision to deny its requested relocation was illegal because the City invoked the power of eminent domain to effect a physical taking of CBS’s billboard without complying with the procedural requirements that constrain the use of eminent domain. The district court upheld the City’s decisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Billboard Compensation Statute, Utah Code 10-9a-513, creates a standalone compensation scheme that does not incorporate, expressly or impliedly, the procedural requirements that circumscribe the eminent domain power; and (2) the City’s decision was not illegal, arbitrary or capricious. View "Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

Believing nonpublic content of the victim's Facebook account might provide exculpatory evidence helpful in preparing for trial, real-party-in-interest Lance Touchstone served petitioner Facebook with a subpoena for the subscriber records and contents of the victim's Facebook account, including timeline posts, messages, phone calls, photos, videos, location information and user-input information from account inception to the present date. Touchtone was awaiting trial for attempted murder. On the public portion of his Facebook page, the victim posted updates of court hearings in this case, asking his friends to attend the preliminary hearing. In public posts the victim also discussed his personal use of guns and drugs, and described his desire to rob and kill people. Facebook filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the ground the Stored Communications Act (SCA) prohibited disclosure of the victim's account contents. In an accompanying declaration, counsel for Facebook stated that Touchstone could obtain the requested contents directly from the victim or by working with the prosecutor to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to quash and ordered Facebook to produce the contents of the victim's account for in camera inspection by a certain date. Facebook seeks a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to quash the subpoena and to enter a new order granting the motion to quash. Facebook contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to quash and ordering production of documents for in camera inspection because the SCA prohibits Facebook from disclosing the content of its users' accounts in response to a subpoena. Facebook further contends that compelling it to disclose the contents of the victim's account is not necessary to preserve Touchstone's constitutional right to a fair trial because Touchstone can obtain the contents directly from the victim or through the prosecutor via a search warrant. The Court of Appeal granted Facebook’s application and granted a writ of mandate, vacating the trial court’s order and effectively quashing the subpoena duces tecum. View "Facebook v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Interstate 90 runs through Campbell, Wisconsin, with a speed limit of 65 miles per hour. Two streets and one pedestrian overpass cross the highway within the town. A traffic survey in 2008 found that 23,000-29,000 trucks and cars pass through the town on I-90 every day. The local Tea Party placed banners on the pedestrian overpass, bearing messages such as “HONK TO IMPEACH OBAMA,” leading the town to enact an ordinance forbidding all signs, flags, and banners (other than traffic-control information) on any of the overpasses, or within 100 feet of the end of those structures. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to the challenge to the 100-foot buffer zone but otherwise affirmed. The ordinance is content-neutral; it does not matter what message any privately placed sign bears. It is a time, place, and manner limit, permitting messages to be conveyed anywhere else in Campbell. A “state or local legislature that attempts to reduce the incidence of sudden braking on a superhighway cannot be thought to be acting irrationally or trying to suppress speech for no good reason.” The town did not try to justify the buffer zone. View "Luce v. Town of Campbell, Wisconsin" on Justia Law