Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

A law enforcement agency served an electronic service provider with a search warrant for data associated with an email account belonging to a university graduate student under investigation for rape. The warrant was accompanied by a nondisclosure order (NDO) prohibiting the provider from notifying the student or anyone at the university about the warrant for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction against notifying the account holder but sought permission to inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant's existence, citing concerns under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) and the First Amendment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that several statutory criteria for “adverse results” under CalECPA were present, justifying the NDO. When the provider requested to modify the order to allow notification of a university contact, the court considered the proposal but ultimately declined after law enforcement objected, noting the court lacked jurisdiction over the university and could not ensure compliance with the NDO. The order was extended once and later lifted after the target was arrested. The provider’s initial petition for writ of mandate was summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court then granted review and transferred the matter back to the appellate court for further consideration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and held that the trial court made the required findings under CalECPA before issuing the NDO and that the NDO did not violate the provider’s First Amendment rights. The court found the NDO served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to protect the integrity of an ongoing investigation. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a Nevada-domiciled trust, managed by a Nevada family trust company, whose trustee petitioned the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada to seal confidential information and close all court proceedings under NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256. The district court sealed nearly all documents and concealed the existence of the case, citing concerns over revealing personal, financial, and business information, and later provided limited case information after media inquiries. Several media organizations, having reported on the matter—especially due to its connection to Rupert Murdoch and control over major media holdings—sought intervention to access court records and proceedings, arguing that the First Amendment presumption of public access applied.The probate commissioner recommended allowing media intervention but denying access, and the district court entered an order adopting this recommendation. The court interpreted the statutes as granting automatic and comprehensive confidentiality, finding that privacy and security concerns—heightened by the parties’ public profiles—constituted a compelling interest for sealing and closure. The district court also concluded it lacked discretion to consider redaction as an alternative and held that the statutes’ confidentiality provisions justified the broad closure, even after the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court recognized a First Amendment presumption of access in civil and family court proceedings.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision, holding that NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 permit only provisional sealing and require judicial discretion. The statutes do not automatically justify blanket sealing or closure, nor do they displace the common law or constitutional presumption of openness. The court found that the district court failed to make specific, non-speculative factual findings to justify the sealing and closure and did not adequately consider less restrictive alternatives. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its sealing order and conduct the required analysis for each document and hearing transcript. View "New York Times Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives used public funds and the resources of the House Democratic Caucus to send five pre-recorded, automated phone calls to constituents. These calls provided information about public health resources, employment opportunities, and community events. The calls were approved and administered by House staff, who determined that each served a clear legislative purpose and public benefit. The recipient of these calls, Andrew Perrong, filed suit, alleging that the calls violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which generally prohibits automated or pre-recorded calls made by “any person.”The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the legislator’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the legislator was a “person” under the TCPA and could be sued in his individual capacity, even though the calls were made as part of his official duties. The District Court also found that the suit was not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, reasoning that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was not the real party in interest, and that qualified immunity did not apply because the statutory prohibition was clear.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the statutory question and the immunity defenses. The Third Circuit held that the TCPA’s use of the term “person” does not clearly and unmistakably include state legislators acting in their official capacity when performing legitimate government functions. The court reasoned that longstanding interpretive presumptions, constitutional federalism principles, and statutory context all support excluding such official acts from the statute’s reach. As a result, the court reversed the District Court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that the TCPA’s robocall restriction does not apply to calls made by state legislators in connection with their legitimate government functions. View "Perrong v. Bradford" on Justia Law

A group of broadband internet providers in Georgia entered into contracts with the Georgia Department of Transportation to install and maintain their equipment along public rights of way. These contracts set annual permit fees and included a clause stating that the contracts would remain in effect until the parties entered into a new agreement. In 2021, the Department amended its rules, increasing permit fees and requiring providers to sign new contracts. The providers refused, and the Department notified them that, absent new agreements, they would be subject to the new rules. The providers then filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that their contracts were enforceable, not terminable at will, and that the Department’s actions impaired their contractual rights in violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.The Superior Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that sovereign immunity was waived under Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Georgia Constitution because the providers sought declaratory relief from alleged unconstitutional acts. The court granted summary judgment to the providers, holding that the contracts were enforceable and not terminable at will by the Department.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the lower court that sovereign immunity was waived for this declaratory judgment action, as the providers sought relief from acts allegedly violating constitutional provisions. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the contracts. It held that the contracts were of indefinite duration and, under longstanding Georgia law, were terminable at will by either party with notice. The Court affirmed the waiver of sovereign immunity but vacated the judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Dovetel Communication, LLC" on Justia Law

California enacted a law aimed at addressing concerns about minors’ addiction to social media by regulating how internet platforms provide personalized content to users under 18. The law restricts minors’ access to algorithmic feeds without parental consent, imposes default settings such as hiding like counts and requiring private accounts, and mandates future age-verification procedures. NetChoice, a trade association representing major internet companies, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing it unconstitutionally restricts both platforms’ and users’ speech, and that some provisions are unconstitutionally vague.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against two provisions not at issue in this appeal, but otherwise denied NetChoice’s request for broader injunctive relief. The district court found that NetChoice lacked associational standing to challenge the personalized-feed restrictions as applied to its members, that the age-verification requirements were not ripe for review, and that the default settings provisions (including the like-count and private-mode requirements) were constitutional. The court also rejected NetChoice’s vagueness arguments and found that any unconstitutional provisions could be severed from the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit agreed that NetChoice lacked associational standing for as-applied challenges to the personalized-feed provisions and that the age-verification requirements were unripe. The court held that the private-mode default setting survived intermediate scrutiny, but found that the like-count default setting was a content-based restriction on speech and failed strict scrutiny. The court determined that the like-count provision was severable and ordered the district court to enjoin its enforcement, while affirming the denial of injunctive relief as to the other challenged provisions. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Sprint Corporation and T-Mobile USA, Inc., both wireless carriers, operated programs that sold customer location information (CLI) to third-party aggregators, who then resold the data to other service providers. Although the carriers’ contracts required these third parties to obtain customer consent before accessing CLI, in practice, the carriers did not verify compliance, and several third parties accessed the data without proper consent. After public reports revealed abuses—including unauthorized access by law enforcement and bounty hunters—the carriers terminated some third-party access but continued their programs for months without implementing effective new safeguards.The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) investigated and issued Notices of Apparent Liability (NALs) to both carriers, alleging violations of the Communications Act’s duty to protect the confidentiality of customer proprietary network information (CPNI), which includes CLI. The FCC found that the carriers’ reliance on contractual promises, without independent verification or effective monitoring, was unreasonable. The FCC also concluded that the carriers failed to promptly address their inadequate safeguards after learning of the breaches. The FCC assessed penalties totaling $92 million, calculating separate violations for each third-party relationship that allowed unauthorized access after the carriers were on notice of the problems.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the carriers’ petitions challenging the FCC’s orders. The court held that CLI is CPNI under the Communications Act, that the carriers’ safeguards were inadequate, and that the FCC’s interpretation of the statute was the most natural reading, providing fair notice. The court also found the penalty calculations reasonable and rejected the carriers’ constitutional arguments, including their Seventh Amendment claim, because they had the statutory right to a jury trial but waived it by paying the penalties and seeking direct appellate review. The court denied the petitions for review. View "Sprint Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding a rule requiring broadcasters to disclose if any programming was paid for by a foreign governmental entity. The FCC's 2021 Rule mandated such disclosures and included specific diligence steps for broadcasters to follow. NAB challenged the rule, leading to a court decision that vacated part of the rule requiring broadcasters to search federal databases.The FCC then issued a revised rule in 2024, which retained the core disclosure requirements but modified the diligence steps. The new rule exempted commercial ads and political candidate ads from the disclosure requirement but included paid public service announcements (PSAs) and issue advertisements. NAB challenged the 2024 Rule, arguing it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the First Amendment, and exceeded the FCC's statutory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2024 Rule complied with the APA's notice-and-comment requirements and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the rule did not violate the First Amendment, as it was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in preventing foreign influence in U.S. broadcasting. The court further determined that the FCC did not exceed its statutory authority with the reasonable diligence requirements, as the rule did not directly regulate lessees but required broadcasters to seek information from them.Ultimately, the court denied NAB's petition for review, upholding the FCC's 2024 Rule. View "National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including Eugene Volokh and two social media companies, challenged New York's Hateful Conduct Law, which mandates social media networks to provide mechanisms for reporting hateful conduct and to disclose policies on how they address such reports. The law defines hateful conduct as speech that vilifies, humiliates, or incites violence against groups based on protected characteristics. Plaintiffs argued that these requirements compel speech and chill protected speech, violating the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction, halting the law's enforcement. The court found that the law likely violates the First Amendment by compelling social media networks to engage in speech and by being overly broad and vague, thus chilling users' speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the constitutionality of the Hateful Conduct Law hinges on its interpretation. If the law requires social media networks to adopt the state's definition of hateful conduct, it would be subject to strict scrutiny and likely fail. However, if the law merely requires disclosure of any content moderation policy without specific reference to the state's definition, it might survive under the more relaxed Zauderer standard.The Second Circuit deferred its decision and certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals: whether the law requires explicit reference to the state's definition of hateful conduct in social media policies, whether the reporting mechanism must specifically address hateful conduct, and whether social media networks must respond to reports of hateful conduct. The answers to these questions will determine the law's constitutionality. View "Volokh v. James" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute established procedures for internet broadband service providers to access railroad property and lay cable across tracks. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) challenged the statute, arguing it was preempted by federal law and violated the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that AAR lacked standing to bring the claims because they required the participation of individual member railroads.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that AAR lacked associational standing for both its preemption and Takings Clause claims. The court found that the preemption claim required a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the statute unreasonably burdened rail transportation, necessitating individual member participation. Similarly, the Takings Clause claim required individualized proof of inadequate compensation for each crossing, which also required member participation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that AAR had standing to pursue its preemption claims, as these could be litigated without the participation of individual members. The court reasoned that the preemption claims involved general judgments about the statute's nature and operation, not specific operations of individual railroads. However, the court affirmed the district court's ruling on the Takings Clause claim, agreeing that it required individualized proof of compensation for each crossing, necessitating member participation.The Fourth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Association of American Railroads v. Hudson" on Justia Law