Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Q Link Wireless LLC (Q Link) petitioned the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (Commission) for designation as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC). The designation would have made Q Link eligible to access certain federal funds for providing telecommunications services to underserved communities in New Mexico. Following lengthy and protracted proceedings before the Commission’s hearing examiner, Q Link filed a motion to withdraw its petition. The hearing examiner filed an Order Recommending Dismissal of Proceeding with Prejudice (Recommended Decision). The recommendation was to dismiss the petition and to ban Q Link from ever again filing a petition to obtain an ETC designation. The Commission adopted the Recommended Decision in full. Q Link appealed, and the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Commission lacked express or implied statutory authority to ban Q Link from ever again seeking an ETC designation. View "Q Link Wireless LLC v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) arbitrarily and capriciously denied Open Justice Baltimore's (OJB) request for a fee waiver in relation to the production of closed files relating to certain use of force investigations and remanded the case to BPD to reconsider OJB's requested fee waiver in light of the factors set forth in this opinion, as well as other relevant factors.OJB, an organization seeking to investigate and publicize reports of police misconduct, filed several requests under the Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA) for records relating to citizen and administrative complaints of police misconduct. OJB asked BPD to waive the approximately $245,000 in fees it would cost to produce the files, asserting that a fee waiver would be in the public interest. BPD denied the fee waiver request in its entirety. The circuit court upheld the fee waiver denial. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that BPD's fee waiver denial was arbitrary and capricious because BPD failed meaningfully to consider all relevant factors in deciding whether to grant the requested fee waiver. View "Baltimore Police Dep't v. Open Justice Baltimore" on Justia Law

The National Police Association (NPA), a non-profit organization, describes its purpose as “educat[ing] supporters of law enforcement in how to help police departments accomplish their goals.” In 2018-2019, some police departments around the country took issue with fundraising mailers the NPA sent residents, characterizing the solicitations as deceptive. The Indianapolis Star and the Associated Press reported on the alerts issued by these police departments in articles that questioned whether the money NPA raised went to police departments. Counsel for the NPA sent a letter to the publisher and AP’s general counsel, providing notice under Indiana Code 34-15-4-2 that the NPA considered the articles defamatory and intended to sue. The letter sought a retraction and removal of public access to online copies of the stories. NPA subsequently sued the publishers, alleging libel. The district court dismissed its case, reasoning that NPA never alleged “actual malice”—that the publishers were aware of an inaccuracy or had serious doubts about the accuracy of the material—when the stories were first published.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting “a novel interpretation of the Restatement (Second) Torts 577(2)” that would create a requirement that internet publishers remove previously published libelous information. The court declined to certify questions to the Indiana Supreme Court to confirm that such a duty exists in Indiana. The alleged duty lacks doctrinal support. View "National Police Association, Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Harry Barr a limited writ of mandamus, holding that Barr was entitled to relief on his request for certain inmate records predating State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 201 N.E.3d 853 (Ohio 2022).Barr, an inmate, sought certain documents from James Wesson, the institutional public information officer at Grafton Correctional Institution (GCI), pursuant to Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. Wesson produced some records and, as to the remaining, claimed that Barr failed sufficiently to specify which records he wanted and that Barr's requests predated Mobley, thus rendering them unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted Barr a limited writ of mandamus as to prison-kite logs predating Mobley, ordered Wesson to produce the email messages that Barr requested if they exist, denied the writ as to Barr's request for a list of cross-gender employees, dismissed his complaint for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and denied his motion to strike a certain affidavit, holding that Barr demonstrated that he had a clear legal right to access the prison-kite logs and specified email messages if they existed. View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court ordering the disclosure of a redacted version of a police report created by the police department at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital documenting the police department's investigation into the death of a Whiting patient after a medical event, holding that the report, with minimal redaction, must be disclosed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-200 et seq.After the trial court ordered the disclosure of a redacted version of the police report the Freedom of Information Commission appealed, arguing that the report should be released in its entirety under FOIA because it was not exempt for disclosure by the psychiatrist-patient communications privilege set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-146d(2) and 52-146e(a), as well as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d et seq., as implemented by the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. 160.101 et seq. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the police report was not a communication or record exempt from disclosure under FOIA; and (2) because the report included identifiable patient information, the report should be redacted in the manner described in this opinion. View "Comm'r of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 to prohibit harassment and discrimination in the practice of law. Greenberg, a Pennsylvania-licensed attorney, regularly gives continuing legal education presentations about First Amendment protections for offensive speech. His presentations involve quoting offensive language from judicial opinions and discussing arguably controversial topics. Greenberg fears his speech at these presentations will be interpreted as harassment or discrimination under the Rule and alleges the Rule violates the First Amendment and is unconstitutionally vague.The district court enjoined enforcement of the Rule. The Third Circuit reversed. Greenberg lacks standing to bring his challenge. Rule 8.4(g) does not arguably prohibit anything Greenberg plans to do. The Rule covers only knowing or intentional harassment or discrimination against a person. Nothing in Greenberg’s planned speeches comes close to meeting this standard. Rule 8.4(g) does not generally prohibit him from quoting offensive words or expressing controversial ideas, nor will the defendants impose discipline for his planned speech. Any chill to his speech is not objectively reasonable or cannot be fairly traced to the Rule. View "Greenberg v. Lehocky" on Justia Law

McElhaney’s daughter, L.M., played high school softball. The school's “Parent–player Information” sheet stated: “Playing time is a non-negotiable for coaches to talk directly with parents about.” L.M.’s playing time decreased. McElhaney texted Coach Williams to express his displeasure. Williams responded, indicating McElhaney should reconsider either his tactics or his participation. McElhaney texted a conciliatory reply but Williams forwarded the messages to Principal Stepp, who banned McElhaney from a week’s worth of softball games. McElhaney unsuccessfully challenged but did not honor the suspension. Stepp spotted McElhaney and asked him to leave. Fearing arrest, McElhaney left. He filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), asserting that his communications with Williams constituted First Amendment-protected speech and that the school officials had impermissibly retaliated against him for exercising those speech rights and did not afford him due process before infringing on his property right to his season tickets. The district court held that the right to attend games after criticizing the coach was not clearly established, meaning any purportedly retaliatory acts did not violate McElhaney’s settled constitutional rights and that McElhaney did not experience a due process violation because any alleged injury could be remedied through a breach of contract action.The Sixth Circuit reversed. It is clearly established at a low level of generality that when a school employee interacts with a student, speech by the student’s parent about those interactions enjoys First Amendment protection. On remand, the court must resolve whether retaliation occurred. View "McElhaney v. Williams" on Justia Law

This original proceeding involves a protracted legal battle between several rural telephone companies and the Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”). Petitioners are telephone corporations that provide telephone service in rural areas. After the Rural Telephone Bank (“RTB”) had just dissolved and redeemed all shares of stock it had issued. Many telephone companies, including Petitioners, owned RTB stock. The Commission had clarified in a 2006 decision that all gains on the sale of public utility company assets that were never in rate base accrue to company shareholders. Relying on this decision, the companies that never had stock in rate base so stated in the application and did not disclose any of their redemption proceeds. The Commission penalized the companies in the amount of $2,752,000 for violating Rule 1.1. The companies challenged the decision in an administrative appeal, but the Commission denied rehearing.   The Fifth Appellate District annulled penalty decision and the decision denying rehearing. The court agreed that Petitioners lacked fair notice of their obligation to disclose their redemption proceeds in the 2007 application. The court explained that Petitioners’ redemption proceed amounts were irrelevant to a ratemaking determination because Petitioners’ shares were never in rate base. All gains or losses on the redemption accrued to Petitioners’ shareholders, not the ratepayers. No other allocation was legally allowed. The Commission should have instructed Petitioners to disclose their redemption proceeds in the Application if that is what the Commission wanted from Petitioners. But the Commission did not give fair notice to Petitioners of this disclosure requirement and penalized them for essentially failing to intuit the disclosure requirement. View "Kerman Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

StreetMedia and Turnpike Media were companies that are in the sign business: owners of billboards and other advertising signs. They contended that Colorado’s regulatory scheme violated the First Amendment because it treated billboards, so-called “advertising devices,” differently depending on whether the message was paid for or not. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case. Applying recent Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed: Colorado’s signage act was a constitutionally permissible policy choice—it furthered Colorado’s objectives of promoting roadside safety and aesthetics. View "StreetMediaGroup, et al. v. Stockinger, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court awarding attorney fees to the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) based on the court's ruling after an evidentiary hearing that the Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded Risk Management Pool (Risk Pool) had refused in bad faith to comply with HRDC's lawful request for records, holding that the Risk Pool's response constituted a bad faith refusal.HRDC submitted to the Risk Pool a request for records pursuant to the Maine Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), Me. Rev. Stat. 1, 400-414. The Risk Pool never denied or explicitly refused to comply with HRDC's request. Pursuant to FOAA's appeal procedure, HRDC filed a complaint against, among others, the Risk Pool. The Risk Pool filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that HRDC had failed to meet the FOAA requirement that the appeal be filed within thirty calendar days of the agency's "refusal, denial, or failure" to comply with the FOAA request. The motion was denied, and the court entered judgment in favor of HRDC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HRDC's complaint was timely filed; and (2) the court did not err in awarding attorney fees based on the finding that the Risk Pool acted in bad faith in responding to HRDC's FOAA request. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. Maine County Commissioners Ass'n Self-Funded Risk Management Pool" on Justia Law