Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Noble Prestige Limited lent Paul Thomas Horn $500,000 to pursue litigation against a telecommunications company. While the litigation was pending, a conservatorship over Horn’s assets was commenced in a probate court in Denver, Colorado (the “Denver Probate Court”). The case was settled, and the proceeds were placed in the conservatorship estate, subject to Galle’s management and the ultimate custody and control of the Denver Probate Court. Noble ultimately obtained arbitral awards that required Horn to pay Noble the debt owed under the loan agreement and Galle to pay Noble costs associated with the arbitration. Noble moved to confirm the awards and sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting Galle, Horn, and Galle’s law firm. Galle and GLG (together, “Respondents”) opposed Noble’s request and moved to dismiss the action. The district court granted Noble’s request, entering what it termed a “temporary restraining order” that prohibited Galle from dissipating or transferring $10,000,000 “notwithstanding any order(s) entered by the [Denver] Probate Court.” The district court also entered an order granting Respondents’ motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part. Respondents appealed both orders.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Respondents’ appeal to the extent it challenged the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss, vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case. The court explained that Noble’s petition fails to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the district court and, therefore, the issuance of a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 was improper. Further, the court explained that district court lacked the power to issue an order freezing the AT&T settlement funds pending judgment. View "Noble Prestige Limited v. Craig Thomas Galle, et al" on Justia Law

The Illinois Cable and Video Competition Law requires operators to obtain statewide authorization and become a “holder” and requires anyone who wants to provide cable or video service to obtain permission from state or local authorities and pay a fee, as a condition of using public rights of way. In recent years traditional cable services have been supplemented or replaced by streaming services that deliver their content through the Internet. East St. Louis, contending that all streaming depends on cables buried under streets or strung over them, sought to compel each streaming service to pay a fee. None of the defendants were “holders.” A magistrate dismissed the complaint, concluding that only the Attorney General of Illinois is authorized to sue an entity that needs but does not possess, “holder” status.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first concluding that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Normally the citizenship of any entity other than a corporation depends on the citizenship of its partners and members but, under section 1332(d), part of the Class Action Fairness Act, an unincorporated entity is treated like a corporation. The court then held that the statutory system applies to any “cable service or video service” and the defendants do not offer either. If “phone calls over landline cables, electricity over wires, and gas routed through pipes are not trespasses on the City’s land— and they are not—neither are the electrons that carry movies and other videos.” View "City of East St. Louis v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

Western requested records “about or related to” the “Strada Verde Project.” including: “all Public Records Act requests sent by anyone concerning” the Project; “[a]ll writings received by the County concerning the Project”; “[a]ll writings sent by the County to anyone” concerning the Project; “[a]ll writings concerning” two individuals; “[a]ll text messages sent or received by” two individuals relating to the Project; “[a]ll writings" concerning procedures relating to the consideration of general plan amendments; and “[a]ll writings concerning potential offsite consequences.” Western later requested documents “concerning or discussing” a presentation titled “San Benito Public Records Reveal Deception and Misconduct” and investigations into said deception and misconduct.Western sued to compel the County to produce the documents for both requests and sought a declaration that the County’s policies and procedures were unlawful. In the litigation, Western’s requests for production of documents included a request for “[a]ll documents responsive to the [public records] request.”The court of appeal modified the discovery order, citing the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code 7921.000) the "court must determine whether the discovery sought is necessary to resolve whether the agency has a duty to disclose, and … consider whether the request is justified given the need for an expeditious resolution.” Although most of Western’s discovery requests were proper, the request to produce the same documents ultimately at issue in the proceeding and the interrogatories seeking a new narrative justification for the County’s past decisions were improper. View "County of San Benito v. Superior Court of San Benito County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Respondent James Wesson, the warden's assistant at the Grafton Correctional Institution (CGI), to, within fourteen days, either produce records in response to a December 2022 public-records request or show cause why the records could not be produced, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.Relator, an inmate at CGI, sent a public-records request by electronic kite to Wesson requesting three records. Relator subsequently commenced this mandamus action asking the Court to order Wesson to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ ordering Wesson to produce a copy of a mental-health kite with reference number GCI0422002492 from April 21, 2022 or to show cause why it could not be produced, holding that Relator established that he was entitled to the writ. View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law

Since 1979, Tennessee has made it a crime for anyone other than election officials to distribute the state’s official form for applying to vote absentee. During much of this time, Tennessee kept close guard of this form to deter fraud. Election officials now make the form widely available online so that eligible voters may easily apply. According to the Plaintiffs, this change has rendered the ban on distributing the application form “outdated.” They want to distribute the form while encouraging absentee voting at their get-out-the-vote drives. They allege that the First Amendment gives them the right to do so and that, because they seek to distribute the form while expressing a political message, the ban is subject to strict scrutiny.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Tennessee’s ban prohibits an act--distributing a government form--that qualifies as conduct, not speech. While the First Amendment provides some protection to “expressive conduct,” strict scrutiny does not apply to Tennessee’s ban because it neutrally applies no matter the message that a person seeks to convey and because it burdens nobody’s ability to engage in actual speech. At most, the Supreme Court’s lenient First Amendment test for neutral laws that regulate conduct applies and the ban survives that nondemanding test, View "Lichtenstein v. Hargett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to request numbers 2, 3, and 4 from Jeffrey Howard's August 2022 public records request and denied the writ as to the remaining public records requests, holding that Howard was entitled to mandamus in part.Howard, an inmate, brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to produce records and documents in response to several records requests. Howard sought an award of statutory damages as to each request. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ ordering Respondents to provide records responsive to three public records requests; and (2) denied the writ as to the remaining requests because Howard no longer sought mandamus relief as to those public records requests. View "State ex rel. Howard v. Watson" on Justia Law

In 2020, Lafayette City Councilmember and former Mayor, Burks, and his wife, Ackley, hosted an open house in their home in support of a school bond measure. The invitation stated Burks was “hosting this event as an individual resident of Lafayette and a father of school-aged children.” Peterson attended and had an “odd” and “stilted” conversation with Ackley in which Peterson referred to Ackley's birthday. Peterson later reposted on his Facebook page a family photo from Ackley’s public Facebook page. In the comments, Peterson wondered where they hid the girls during the open house. He mused, “They live near Burton Valley School … Burks, has a different name than his wife, I wonder what their daughters’ last name is?” Burks felt Peterson “could be a threat” to his wife and daughters. Later, Ackley received a “confusing” letter and check in the mail from Peterson, again mentioning the daughters. The rambling letter was a screed against local politics.Peterson was convicted of stalking and sentenced to two years of probation, with one year of home confinement. The court of appeal reversed. Peterson’s speech acts were constitutionally protected activities. A reasonable listener would not have found Peterson’s speech or speech-related acts a true threat of violence. View "People v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under the Open Meetings Act, Ohio Rev. Code 121.22 and denying Plaintiff's request for an award of statutory damages under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(2), holding that the court of appeals erred in its analysis of the statutory damages issue.In an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' grant of summary judgment for the Portage County Board of Commissioners, the Portage County Solid Waste Management District Board of Commissioners (SWMD) and the Portage County Court of Common Pleas and remanded the case with instructions that the court of appeals to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to relief under the Open Meetings Act and Public Records Act. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the board and the SWMD and denied statutory damages. The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to an award of statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Ames v. Portage County Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2019, two Oakland journalists filed requests with the Oakland Police Department under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (previously Gov. Code 6250, now 7921.000), including for information regarding the “Celeste Guap” scandal, which involved several Oakland police officers who had sex with Guap while she was underage. The trial court ordered Oakland to produce documents responsive to those requests. Oakland produced a redacted version of the internal affairs investigation report.The court of appeal agreed that some of the challenged redactions were not permitted under the statute. In 2018 Senate Bill 1421 amended Penal Code section 832.7 to require public access to certain records of police misconduct and use of force. The trial court improperly permitted Oakland to redact certain information under section 832.7(b)(4) and (b)(5), including the Guap report’s training and policy recommendations; witness statements containing general information about Guap and her social-media use (without any information about allegations of misconduct against any officer); screenshots of Guap’s Facebook profile; and large portions of her statements to investigators. Redaction of witness-officer’s names or other identifying information from the interview summaries is not appropriate under section 832.7(b)(6)(B) in order to “preserve the anonymity of . . . witnesses.” View "Bondgraham v. Superior Court of Alameda County" on Justia Law

Liapes filed a class action against Facebook, alleging it does not provide women and older people equal access to insurance ads. The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits businesses from discriminating against people with protected characteristics (Civ. Code 51, 51.5, 52(a)). Liapes alleged Facebook requires all advertisers to choose the age and gender of users who will receive ads; companies offering insurance products routinely tell it to not send their ads to women or older people. She further alleged Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithm discriminates against women and older people.The trial court dismissed, finding Facebook’s tools neutral on their face and concluding that Facebook was immune under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The court of appeal reversed. Liapes has stated an Unruh Act claim. Facebook, a business establishment, does not dispute women and older people were categorically excluded from receiving various insurance ads. Facebook, not the advertisers, classifies users based on their age and gender via the algorithm. The complaint also stated a claim under an aiding and abetting theory of liability An interactive computer service provider only has immunity if it is not also the content provider. That advertisers are the content providers does not preclude Facebook from also being a content provider by helping develop at least part of the information at issue. View "Liapes v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law