Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

In 2020, the FCC opened the 6 gigahertz (GHz) band of radiofrequency spectrum to unlicensed devices—routers and the devices they connect to, such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets. In doing so, the Commission required that such unlicensed devices be designed and operated to prevent harmful interference with licensees now using the 6 GHz band. Licensees, emphasizing that existing uses of the band involve vital public safety and critical infrastructure, argue that harmful interference could nonetheless occur and that the Order therefore runs afoul of both the Communications Act of 1934 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The DC Circuit concluded that petitioners have failed to provide a basis for questioning the Commission's conclusion that the Order will protect against a significant risk of harmful interference, just the kind of highly technical determination to which the court owed considerable deference. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review in all respects except one that is related to the petition brought by licensed radio and television broadcasters using the 6 GHz band. The court concluded that the Commission failed adequately to respond to their request that it reserve a sliver of that band exclusively for mobile licensees and thus remanded for further explanation as to that issue. View "AT&T Services, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Alexander Hood, a Colorado resident, appealed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of his putative class-action claim against American Auto Care (AAC) in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. AAC, a Florida limited liability company whose sole office was in Florida, sold vehicle service contracts that provided vehicle owners with extended warranties after the manufacturer’s warranty expires. Hood’s complaint alleged AAC violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and invaded Hood’s and the putative class members’ privacy by directing unwanted automated calls to their cell phones without consent. Although he was then residing in Colorado, the calls came from numbers with a Vermont area code. He had previously lived in Vermont, and his cell phone number had a Vermont area code. Hood was able to trace one such call to AAC. Although it determined that Hood had alleged sufficient facts to establish that AAC purposefully directs telemarketing at Colorado, the trial court held that the call to Hood’s Vermont phone number did not arise out of, or relate to, AAC’s calls to Colorado phone numbers. In light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), the Tenth Circuit determined the trial court's dismissal could not stand. "The argument regarding 'purposeful direction' ... is implicitly rejected by Ford, and the argument regarding 'arise out of or relate to' ... is explicitly rejected. ... We also determine that AAC has not shown a violation of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." View "Hood v. American Auto Care, et al." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction of plaintiff's action against HuffPost, alleging that it libeled him by calling him a white nationalist and a Holocaust denier. Plaintiff filed suit against HuffPost in the Southern District of Texas, but HuffPost is a citizen of Delaware and New York. Furthermore, HuffPost has no physical ties to Texas, has no office in Texas, employs no one in Texas, and owns no property there. In this case, plaintiff identifies only one link to Texas that relates to the dispute: the fact that HuffPost's website and the alleged libel are visible in Texas. The court stated that mere accessibility cannot demonstrate purposeful availment. The court explained that although HuffPost's site shows ads and sells merchandise, neither act targets Texas specifically. Even if those acts did target Texas, the court concluded that neither relates to plaintiff's claim, and thus neither supports specific jurisdiction. Finally, plaintiff has not met his burden to merit jurisdictional discovery. View "Johnson v. TheHuffingtonpost.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court applying the catalyst theory in denying Plaintiff's request for attorney fees in this public records dispute, holding that the district court misconstrued one of the factors in the catalyst-theory analysis and neglected to conduct more than a summary analysis of several other factors.Plaintiff submitted a public records request to the City of Henderson under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) for certain documents. When the City requested a payment from Plaintiff to cover the cost of a review of the documents for privilege Plaintiff sought mandamus relief. Thereafter, the City reviewed the documents for privilege and provided to Plaintiff copies of non-privileged records while the privilege-review fee issue was being litigated. The district court concluded that the City satisfied its requirements under the NPRA. The Supreme Court remanded the case, but before the issue was addressed on remand, the City voluntarily disclosed eleven documents it had withheld pursuant to the deliberative-process privilege. At issue was whether Plaintiff was entitled to recovery of attorneys fees as the prevailing party under the catalyst theory. The district court denied attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in applying the catalyst theory. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court ordering certain messages to be released because they constituted "public records" pursuant to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Ark. Code Ann. 25-19-101 et seq., holding that the circuit court clearly erred.While Mark Myers was employed as director of the Department of Information Systems (DIS) and Jane Doe was employed by a company that did business with DIS the two developed an intimate personal relationship. After legislative audit disclosed that Myers was under investigation for improperly authorizing $8.2 million for the purchase of equipment from a vendor represented by Doe, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Inc. submitted its FOIA request seeking correpondence between Myers and any representatives of Cisco Systems. Myers filed suit seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent the Secretary of Transportation and Shared Services from releasing Blackberry Messenger between Myers and Doe. The circuit court concluded that the messages were public records and that the public had a right to their content. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred by not determining whether each individual message met the definition of a "public record." View "Myers v. Fecher" on Justia Law

Spokane Public Library hosted a children’s event called “Drag Queen Story Hour.” Because the event proved controversial, police separated 150 protesters and 300 counterprotesters into separate zones near the library. Yaghtin arrived at the event wearing a press badge and identified himself as a member of the press. Yaghtin alleges he was assigned a police “detail” to accompany him through a crowd of counterprotesters out of concern that he was “fake press.” While walking through the counterprotest zone, Yaghtin began speaking with a counterprotester, who asked him whether he was the person that had advocated for the execution of gay people. Officer Doe interrupted the exchange, and escorted Yaghtin through the counterprotest zone. Affirming the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Ninth Circuit held that Doe was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs did not challenge the ordinance or permit scheme, nor the police department’s use of separate protest zones. No precedent would have alerted Doe that his enforcement would violate clearly established First Amendment law; it was not unreasonable for Doe to believe that it was lawful for him to examine the substance of Yaghtin’s speech to enforce the separate protest zone policy. The city cannot be held liable because nothing in the complaint plausibly alleged a policy, custom, or practice leading to any violation. Plaintiffs’ allegations amounted to only an “isolated or sporadic incident” that could not form the basis of liability under “Monell.” View "Saved Magazine v. Spokane Police Department’" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review challenging an FCC order removing the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations. The order was issued in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision holding that the Solicited Fax Rule was unlawful, and vacating a 2014 order of the FCC that affirmed the validity of the Rule. The court concluded that it is bound by the D.C. Circuit's decision and that the agency did not err by repealing the Rule following the D.C. Circuit's ruling. Pursuant to the Hobbs Act's channeling mechanism, the court explained that the D.C. Circuit became the sole forum for addressing the validity of the Rule. Therefore, once the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 2014 Order and the Rule, that holding became binding in effect on every circuit in which the regulation's validity is challenged. Accordingly, the FCC was bound to comply with the D.C. Circuit's mandate and could not pursue a policy of nonacquiescence. View "Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

BuzzFeed, a media outlet, sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking disclosure of an unredacted version of the report prepared by Special Counsel Robert Mueller on his investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The district court permitted most of DOJ’s redactions. BuzzFeed challenged the decision only with respect to information redacted pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(C), and relating to individuals investigated but not charged. Exemption 7(C) permits the withholding of law enforcement records which, if disclosed, “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”The D.C. Circuit affirmed with respect to redacted passages containing personally-identifying facts about individuals that are not disclosed elsewhere in the Report and would be highly stigmatizing to the individuals’ reputations. The court reversed with respect to redacted passages that primarily show how Special Counsel interpreted relevant law and applied it to already public facts available elsewhere in the Report in reaching individual declination decisions. After in camera review of the Report, the court concluded that those passages show only how the government reached its declination decisions and do not contain new facts or stigmatizing material. Matters of substantive law enforcement policy are properly the subject of public concern” and are “a sufficient reason for disclosure independent of any impropriety.” View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the West Virginia Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (West Virginia Act), W. Va. Code 62-1D-1 through 16, runs afoul of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution and W. Va. Const. art. III, 7 and is unconstitutional as appleid to the extent that it allows a civil action to be maintained against an innocent third party who publishes information of public concern that was obtained by the unlawful interception of wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of the statute but who did not participate in the unlawful interception of the communication.Petitioners, public school employees, alleged that the mother of A.P., a special education student in their classroom, violated both the West Virginia Act and its federal construct by placing a secret audio recording device in A.P.'s hair, purporting to show Petitioners physically and verbally abusing students. After Petitioners resigned, they brought this complaint alleging that Respondents, various media groups or outlets, violated the West Virginia Act by using and disclosing Petitioners' intercepted communications. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the case. View "Yurish v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States and four states sued DISH Network, LLC (“DISH”) for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). DISH submitted a claim for defense and indemnity to its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“National Union”). National Union denied the claim and filed suit in Colorado federal court seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify DISH in the underlying TCPA lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment to National Union, relying on the Tenth Circuit's decision in ACE American Insurance Co. v. DISH Network, LLC, 883 F.3d 881 (10th Cir. 2018). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. Further, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of DISH’s request for further discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). And we deny DISH’s motion to certify a question of state law to the Colorado Supreme Court. View "National Union Fire Insurance v. Dish Network" on Justia Law