Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court applying the catalyst theory in denying Plaintiff's request for attorney fees in this public records dispute, holding that the district court misconstrued one of the factors in the catalyst-theory analysis and neglected to conduct more than a summary analysis of several other factors.Plaintiff submitted a public records request to the City of Henderson under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) for certain documents. When the City requested a payment from Plaintiff to cover the cost of a review of the documents for privilege Plaintiff sought mandamus relief. Thereafter, the City reviewed the documents for privilege and provided to Plaintiff copies of non-privileged records while the privilege-review fee issue was being litigated. The district court concluded that the City satisfied its requirements under the NPRA. The Supreme Court remanded the case, but before the issue was addressed on remand, the City voluntarily disclosed eleven documents it had withheld pursuant to the deliberative-process privilege. At issue was whether Plaintiff was entitled to recovery of attorneys fees as the prevailing party under the catalyst theory. The district court denied attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in applying the catalyst theory. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court ordering certain messages to be released because they constituted "public records" pursuant to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Ark. Code Ann. 25-19-101 et seq., holding that the circuit court clearly erred.While Mark Myers was employed as director of the Department of Information Systems (DIS) and Jane Doe was employed by a company that did business with DIS the two developed an intimate personal relationship. After legislative audit disclosed that Myers was under investigation for improperly authorizing $8.2 million for the purchase of equipment from a vendor represented by Doe, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Inc. submitted its FOIA request seeking correpondence between Myers and any representatives of Cisco Systems. Myers filed suit seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent the Secretary of Transportation and Shared Services from releasing Blackberry Messenger between Myers and Doe. The circuit court concluded that the messages were public records and that the public had a right to their content. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred by not determining whether each individual message met the definition of a "public record." View "Myers v. Fecher" on Justia Law

Spokane Public Library hosted a children’s event called “Drag Queen Story Hour.” Because the event proved controversial, police separated 150 protesters and 300 counterprotesters into separate zones near the library. Yaghtin arrived at the event wearing a press badge and identified himself as a member of the press. Yaghtin alleges he was assigned a police “detail” to accompany him through a crowd of counterprotesters out of concern that he was “fake press.” While walking through the counterprotest zone, Yaghtin began speaking with a counterprotester, who asked him whether he was the person that had advocated for the execution of gay people. Officer Doe interrupted the exchange, and escorted Yaghtin through the counterprotest zone. Affirming the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Ninth Circuit held that Doe was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs did not challenge the ordinance or permit scheme, nor the police department’s use of separate protest zones. No precedent would have alerted Doe that his enforcement would violate clearly established First Amendment law; it was not unreasonable for Doe to believe that it was lawful for him to examine the substance of Yaghtin’s speech to enforce the separate protest zone policy. The city cannot be held liable because nothing in the complaint plausibly alleged a policy, custom, or practice leading to any violation. Plaintiffs’ allegations amounted to only an “isolated or sporadic incident” that could not form the basis of liability under “Monell.” View "Saved Magazine v. Spokane Police Department’" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review challenging an FCC order removing the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations. The order was issued in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision holding that the Solicited Fax Rule was unlawful, and vacating a 2014 order of the FCC that affirmed the validity of the Rule. The court concluded that it is bound by the D.C. Circuit's decision and that the agency did not err by repealing the Rule following the D.C. Circuit's ruling. Pursuant to the Hobbs Act's channeling mechanism, the court explained that the D.C. Circuit became the sole forum for addressing the validity of the Rule. Therefore, once the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 2014 Order and the Rule, that holding became binding in effect on every circuit in which the regulation's validity is challenged. Accordingly, the FCC was bound to comply with the D.C. Circuit's mandate and could not pursue a policy of nonacquiescence. View "Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

BuzzFeed, a media outlet, sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking disclosure of an unredacted version of the report prepared by Special Counsel Robert Mueller on his investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The district court permitted most of DOJ’s redactions. BuzzFeed challenged the decision only with respect to information redacted pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(C), and relating to individuals investigated but not charged. Exemption 7(C) permits the withholding of law enforcement records which, if disclosed, “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”The D.C. Circuit affirmed with respect to redacted passages containing personally-identifying facts about individuals that are not disclosed elsewhere in the Report and would be highly stigmatizing to the individuals’ reputations. The court reversed with respect to redacted passages that primarily show how Special Counsel interpreted relevant law and applied it to already public facts available elsewhere in the Report in reaching individual declination decisions. After in camera review of the Report, the court concluded that those passages show only how the government reached its declination decisions and do not contain new facts or stigmatizing material. Matters of substantive law enforcement policy are properly the subject of public concern” and are “a sufficient reason for disclosure independent of any impropriety.” View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the West Virginia Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (West Virginia Act), W. Va. Code 62-1D-1 through 16, runs afoul of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution and W. Va. Const. art. III, 7 and is unconstitutional as appleid to the extent that it allows a civil action to be maintained against an innocent third party who publishes information of public concern that was obtained by the unlawful interception of wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of the statute but who did not participate in the unlawful interception of the communication.Petitioners, public school employees, alleged that the mother of A.P., a special education student in their classroom, violated both the West Virginia Act and its federal construct by placing a secret audio recording device in A.P.'s hair, purporting to show Petitioners physically and verbally abusing students. After Petitioners resigned, they brought this complaint alleging that Respondents, various media groups or outlets, violated the West Virginia Act by using and disclosing Petitioners' intercepted communications. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the case. View "Yurish v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States and four states sued DISH Network, LLC (“DISH”) for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). DISH submitted a claim for defense and indemnity to its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“National Union”). National Union denied the claim and filed suit in Colorado federal court seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify DISH in the underlying TCPA lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment to National Union, relying on the Tenth Circuit's decision in ACE American Insurance Co. v. DISH Network, LLC, 883 F.3d 881 (10th Cir. 2018). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. Further, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of DISH’s request for further discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). And we deny DISH’s motion to certify a question of state law to the Colorado Supreme Court. View "National Union Fire Insurance v. Dish Network" on Justia Law

New “Voice over Internet Protocol,” (VoIP) systems resulted in the 2008 New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act, 47 U.S.C. 222, 615a, 615a-1, 615b and 942.2 The “911 Fee Parity Provision” allows non-federal government entities to charge a fee to commercial phone services for the support of 911 services but specifies that, “[f]or each class of subscribers to IP-enabled voice services, the fee or charge may not exceed the amount of any such fee or charge applicable to the same class of subscribers to telecommunications services.”Alabama 911 Districts contended that the Provision authorized them to charge non-VoIP service providers per access line and VoIP service providers per 10-digit telephone number even if the total charges for a given class of VoIP subscribers exceed the total charges for the same class of non-VoIP subscribers for the same amount of burden each group imposes on the 911 system.The district court referred the matter to the FCC, which concluded that the Provision prohibits state and local governments from charging 911 fees to VoIP providers that are greater than those charged to non-VoIP providers for the same amount of burden imposed on the 911 system. The order precludes the 911 Districts from charging VoIP providers and non-VoIP providers the same base fee based on different units if the total fee charged for comparable 911 access is higher for VoIP service providers. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding Congress’s intent unambiguous. View "Autauga County Emergency Management Communication District v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

White, a white supremacist, is now in federal prison. His Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requests concern a conspiracy theory: that the racist movement he joined is really an elaborate government sting operation. Dissatisfied with the pace at which the FBI and Marshals Service released responsive records and their alleged failure to reveal other records, White filed suit.The court granted the agencies summary judgment and denied White’s subsequent motion seeking costs because the Marshals Service alone was delinquent in responding; the 1,500 pages held by that agency were an insubstantial piece of the litigation compared to 100,000 pages of FBI documents. The court stated that “the transparent purpose of White’s FOIA requests and lawsuit was to harass the government, not to obtain information useful to the public.” White then filed an unsuccessful motion to reconsider, arguing that the court should not render a final decision until the FBI had redacted, copied, and sent all the responsive records, which will take more than a decade. White next moved to hold the Marshals Service in contempt for telling the court in 2018 that it would soon start sending him records; by 2020 White had received nothing. The court admonished the agency but determined that no judicial order had been violated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge “carefully parsed White’s numerous and wide-ranging arguments and explained the result." View "White v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In 1981, a Georgia federal district court concluded that Atlanta’s zoning regulations for adult businesses were constitutionally overbroad in their entirety and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Atlanta did not appeal. Cheshire operates an Atlanta adult novelty and video store, Tokyo Valentino, and sued, asserting that the definitions of “adult bookstore,” “adult motion picture theater,” “adult mini motion picture theater,” “adult cabaret,” and “adult entertainment establishment” in the current Atlanta City Code are facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.On remand, the district court granted Atlanta summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in providing a narrowing construction of certain terms (the term “patron” in the definitions of “adult motion picture theater” and “adult mini-motion picture theater”) in the challenged provisions. The phrase “intended, designed, or arranged” suggests that the challenged provisions do not apply to isolated or intermittent uses of the property. Cheshire failed to show that any overbreadth in the provisions is “substantial” as required by Supreme Court precedent. The challenged provisions do not purport to ban the activities or conduct they define or describe but are part of a zoning scheme regulating where covered establishments can locate or operate. View "Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta," on Justia Law