Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Freydin, a Chicago lawyer, posed a question on Facebook: “Did Trump put Ukraine on the travel ban list?! We just cannot find a cleaning lady!” After receiving online criticism for the comment, Freydin doubled down. People angered by Freydin’s comments went to his law firm’s Facebook, Yelp, and Google pages and left reviews that expressed their negative views of Freydin. Various defendants made comments including: An “embarrassment and a disgrace to the US judicial system,” “unethical and derogatory,” “hypocrite,” “chauvinist,” “racist,” “no right to practice law,” “not professional,” “discriminates [against] other nationalities,” do not “waste your money.,” “Freydin is biased and unprofessional attorney,” “terrible experience,” “awful customer service,” “disrespect[],” and “unprofessional[ism].” None of the defendants had previously used Freydin’s legal services.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Freydin’s suit, which alleged libel per se, “false light,” tortious interference with contractual relationships, tortious interference with prospective business relationships, and civil conspiracy. None of the reviews contained statements that are actionable as libel per se under Illinois law; each was an expression of opinion that could not support a libel claim. Freyding did not link the civil conspiracy claims to an independently viable tort claim. View "Law Offices of David Freyd v. Chamara" on Justia Law

In 2018, the FCC stopped treating broadband internet services as “telecommunications services” subject to relatively comprehensive, common-carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act, and classified them under Title I as lightly regulated “information services,” with the result of terminating federal net neutrality rules. Trade associations sought an injunction to prevent the California Attorney General from enforcing SB-822, which essentially codified the rescinded federal net neutrality rules, limited to broadband internet services provided to California customers.The district court concluded there was no federal preemption. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the California law. The court cited a 2019 D.C. Circuit decision, upholding the FCC’s 2018 reclassification but striking an order preempting state net neutrality rules. The court rejected arguments that SB-822 nevertheless was preempted because it conflicted with the policy underlying the reclassification and with the Communications Act or because federal law occupies the field of interstate services. Only the invocation of federal regulatory authority can preempt state regulatory authority; by classifying broadband internet services as information services, the FCC no longer had the authority to regulate in the same manner that it did when these services were classified as telecommunications services. The FCC, therefore, could not preempt state action, like SB-822, that protects net neutrality. SB-822 did not conflict with the Communications Act, which only limits the FCC’s regulatory authority. The field preemption argument was foreclosed by case law. View "ACA Connects v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons maintains a website and publishes the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, both of which host information concerning “important medical, economic, and legal issues about vaccines,” The Association, joined by an individual, sued a Member of Congress (Schiff) who wrote to several technology and social media companies before and during the COVID-19 pandemic expressing concern about vaccine-related misinformation on their platforms and inquiring about the companies’ policies for handling such misinformation. The Association alleged that the inquiries prompted the technology companies to disfavor and deprioritize its vaccine content, thereby reducing traffic to its web page and making the information more difficult to access.The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Association has not plausibly alleged injury-in-fact; it maintains that Schiff’s actions interfered with its “free negotiations” with the technology companies but never alleged that it has made any attempts at such negotiations, nor that it has concrete plans to do so in the future. The Association’s other claimed injuries, to its financial prospects and to its speech and associational interests, are not adequately supported by allegations that any injury is “fairly traceable” to Schiff’s actions. View "Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Schiff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by The Cincinnati Enquirer, a Division of Gannett GP Media, Inc., and directed at two judges of the Kentucky Court of Appeals who presided over separate trials in which the Enquirer was denied leave to intervene, holding that the Court of Appeals erred.These matters concerned constitutional challenges to Casey's Law, Ky. Rev. Stat. 222.430. Because all proceedings in such actions are confidential and not open to the general public the Court of Appeals entered orders in each action directing the record to remain confidential and restricting access to the Court. The Enquirer moved to intervene in each action to obtain access in order to court records. Intervention was denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals erroneously denied access to the record. View "Cincinnati Enquirer v. Honorable Dixon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Hamilton Southeastern Schools (HSE) and dismissing WTHR-TV's complaint seeking documents in a HSE employee's personnel file, holding that HSE's factual basis for the employee's discipline was insufficient.Rick Wimmer, a teacher at an HSE high school, was disciplined for an unknown reason. WTHR requested access to and copies of the portions of Wimmer's personnel file that contained disclosable information under Ind. Code 5-14-3-4(b)(8), which requires public agencies to disclose certain information in public employee personnel files, including the "factual basis" for the disciplinary actions. HSE responded by providing a compilation of the requested information but did not provide copies of the underlying documents in the personnel file. WTHR sued, and the trial court ruled for HSE. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) WTHR was not entitled to the underlying documents because an agency may compiled the required information into a new document; and (2) a "factual basis" must be a fact-based account of what caused the discipline instead of a bald conclusion, which is what HSE provided in this case. View "WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit concluded that an unsolicited faxed invitation to participate in a market research survey in exchange for money does not constitute an "unsolicited advertisement" under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting Focus Forward's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. The court reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and found them to be without merit. View "Bruce Katz, M.D., P.C., v. Focus Forward, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that a Maine statute requiring cable operators to grant subscribers pro rata credits or rebates for the days remaining in the billing period after the termination of cable service is not preempted by the Cable Communications Act of 1984 (Cable Act).The Cable Act preempts stat laws that regulate rates for the provision of cable service if the Federal Communications Commission determines that cable operators in that state are subject to effective competition. See 42 U.S.C. 543(a)(2), 556(c). In 2020, Maine, a state that has effective competition, adopted into law the statute at issue in this case, the Pro Rata Act. Plaintiffs filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that the law was preempted by the Cable Act. The district court concluded that the Pro Rata Act was preempted by the Cable Act as a matter of law. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Maine's Pro Rata Act is not preempted by federal law because it is not a law governing rates for the provision of cable service and is, rather, a consumer protection law that is not preempted. View "Spectrum Northeast, LLC v. Frey" on Justia Law

In 2020, the FCC opened the 6 gigahertz (GHz) band of radiofrequency spectrum to unlicensed devices—routers and the devices they connect to, such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets. In doing so, the Commission required that such unlicensed devices be designed and operated to prevent harmful interference with licensees now using the 6 GHz band. Licensees, emphasizing that existing uses of the band involve vital public safety and critical infrastructure, argue that harmful interference could nonetheless occur and that the Order therefore runs afoul of both the Communications Act of 1934 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The DC Circuit concluded that petitioners have failed to provide a basis for questioning the Commission's conclusion that the Order will protect against a significant risk of harmful interference, just the kind of highly technical determination to which the court owed considerable deference. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review in all respects except one that is related to the petition brought by licensed radio and television broadcasters using the 6 GHz band. The court concluded that the Commission failed adequately to respond to their request that it reserve a sliver of that band exclusively for mobile licensees and thus remanded for further explanation as to that issue. View "AT&T Services, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Alexander Hood, a Colorado resident, appealed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of his putative class-action claim against American Auto Care (AAC) in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. AAC, a Florida limited liability company whose sole office was in Florida, sold vehicle service contracts that provided vehicle owners with extended warranties after the manufacturer’s warranty expires. Hood’s complaint alleged AAC violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and invaded Hood’s and the putative class members’ privacy by directing unwanted automated calls to their cell phones without consent. Although he was then residing in Colorado, the calls came from numbers with a Vermont area code. He had previously lived in Vermont, and his cell phone number had a Vermont area code. Hood was able to trace one such call to AAC. Although it determined that Hood had alleged sufficient facts to establish that AAC purposefully directs telemarketing at Colorado, the trial court held that the call to Hood’s Vermont phone number did not arise out of, or relate to, AAC’s calls to Colorado phone numbers. In light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), the Tenth Circuit determined the trial court's dismissal could not stand. "The argument regarding 'purposeful direction' ... is implicitly rejected by Ford, and the argument regarding 'arise out of or relate to' ... is explicitly rejected. ... We also determine that AAC has not shown a violation of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." View "Hood v. American Auto Care, et al." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction of plaintiff's action against HuffPost, alleging that it libeled him by calling him a white nationalist and a Holocaust denier. Plaintiff filed suit against HuffPost in the Southern District of Texas, but HuffPost is a citizen of Delaware and New York. Furthermore, HuffPost has no physical ties to Texas, has no office in Texas, employs no one in Texas, and owns no property there. In this case, plaintiff identifies only one link to Texas that relates to the dispute: the fact that HuffPost's website and the alleged libel are visible in Texas. The court stated that mere accessibility cannot demonstrate purposeful availment. The court explained that although HuffPost's site shows ads and sells merchandise, neither act targets Texas specifically. Even if those acts did target Texas, the court concluded that neither relates to plaintiff's claim, and thus neither supports specific jurisdiction. Finally, plaintiff has not met his burden to merit jurisdictional discovery. View "Johnson v. TheHuffingtonpost.com, Inc." on Justia Law