Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

In a license revocation proceeding before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the United States sought to admit classified evidence relating to electronic surveillance it had conducted against China Telecom (Americas) Corporation (China Telecom). Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),the government filed this petition for a determination that the electronic surveillance was lawful and that fruits of the surveillance were admissible in the underlying FCC proceedings. After the district court granted the government’s petition, the FCC revoked China Telecom’s license in the underlying action and we then denied China Telecom’s petition for review of the FCC order without relying on or otherwise considering the classified evidence.   The DC Circuit vacated the district court order granting the government’s petition because the government’s petition no longer presents a live controversy. Accordingly, China Telecom’s appeal from the district court order is moot. The court explained that here, the district court’s review of the surveillance materials was triggered by the government’s notice of its intent to use the surveillance in a “trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before [a] court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States.” In response, China Telecom principally requests disclosure pursuant to section 1806(g), asserting a due process right to discover the classified materials so that it may defend itself in the underlying FCC proceeding. The court explained that any order requiring the government to disclose classified evidence at issue in an FCC revocation proceeding would be wholly ineffectual because the proceedings in which the parties sought to use that evidence have ended. View "USA v. China Telecom (Americas) Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court summarily denying the City of Greensboro's request that the trial court modify restrictions it imposed upon the possible use and discussion of certain police video records by the Greensboro City Council, holding that the trial court abused its discretion.The order at issue was entered pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 132-1.4A(g) to release recordings of an incident that occurred in Greensboro on September 10, 2016. The City of Greensboro interpreted the conditions in the order as a "gag order" and requested that the trial court modify the restrictions. The trial court summarily denied the request, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new hearing, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying, without explanation, the City's motion to modify the restrictions. View "In re Custodial Law Enforcement Recording" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court awarding the Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVRJ) costs and attorney fees in proceedings under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing such a substantial discount from the amount requested without explaining its reasons for doing so.The award at issue in this case discounted the costs and fees requested by the LVRJ by almost forty percent. When the LVRJ asked the judge to explain the reduction, the judge did not elaborate on his reasons for the reduction. The Supreme Court vacated so much of the order as discounted the fees and costs requested by the LVRJ and otherwise affirmed, holding that, without specific reasons for the discount, this Court could not determine whether the district court's order was an abuse of discretion. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus requested by Relator, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution, against Respondents, including Anthony Davis, (collectively, TCI) seeking production of records responsive to six public-records requests he sent in June 2021, holding that Relator was entitled, in part, to mandamus.By way of six messages, Relator requested four records. As to the first record, the Supreme Court denied mandamus on the ground that Relator failed to establish that Davis was the custodian of the record in question. As to the remaining three requested records, the Supreme Court held that TCI breached a statutory obligation to provide Relator with the records. The Court then awarded Relator $3,000 in statutory damages, holding that Relator satisfied the method-of-transmission requirement for an award of statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Wine" on Justia Law

Uebelacker sent a former coworker (Schuman) private Facebook messages disparaging her bosses. Soon afterward, Uebelacker’s employer discovered the messages while another employee (Booth) was transferring files from Schuman’s former work computer so others could access them. Schuman was still signed in to her personal Facebook account on the active internet browser. Booth opened the conversation and took screenshots of the conversation. Uebelacker was demoted and eventually fired. Uebelacker sued under the Stored Communications Act, which prohibits unauthorized access to communications in electronic storage, 18 U.S.C. 2701(a).The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer based on the statute of limitations, which requires that suits be filed no later than “two years after the date upon which the claimant first discovered or had a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.” The Act’s limitations period began running in January 2019 and expired in January 2021. Uebelacker did not file suit until March 2021. A vague fear of termination cannot save Uebelacker’s claim. View "Uebelacker v. Rock Energy Cooperative" on Justia Law

YouTube, a video-sharing website, places “advertising restrictions” on certain videos to prevent the user who posted the video from realizing advertising revenues. Network administrators and individual subscribers can also elect to limit user access to YouTube videos using “Restricted Mode.” YouTube considers whether the content involves drugs, alcohol, sex, violence, tragedies, inappropriate language, and whether the content is "gratuitously incendiary, inflammatory, or demeaning towards an individual or group.” YouTube uses an “automated filtering algorithm.” Users whose videos have been restricted or demonetized may request human review. Prager has posted more than 250 YouTube videos and has been prohibited from monetizing over 50 of its videos. In some cases, other users have posted videos identical to Prager’s restricted videos; the copycat videos have not been restricted. Prager claims the restrictions are based on its political identity or viewpoints.After a district court dismissed its federal lawsuit, Prager sued in state court. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, for interactive computer service providers acting as “publishers or speakers” of content provided by others. The challenged conduct is the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, The court rejected arguments that the defendants are themselves information content providers, that their terms of service and public pronouncements subjected them to liability notwithstanding the Act, and that the Act, in immunizing defendants from Prager’s state law claims, is unconstitutional. View "Prager University v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Kirkland, a Maryville patrol officer, used her Facebook account to criticize the county sheriff. She belittled his public speaking abilities and referred to his supporters as “brainwashed minions.” Kirkland had previously worked as a Sheriff’s Office corrections officer. Kirkland had previous disciplinary issues. Kirkland’s supervisors became concerned that her posts would undermine the Department’s relationship with the Sheriff’s Office and asked her to stop. They also reprimanded her for other behavioral issues. Following Kirkland’s Facebook post claiming the sheriff had excluded her from a training event because she was female and opposed his reelection, Maryville fired Kirkland.Kirkland sued, citing First Amendment retaliation, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor. Although the statements were made in Kirkland’s capacity as a private citizen and Maryville did not show Kirkland made the post with knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, its falsity, the balance of interests favored the city. The court noted the heightened need for order, loyalty, and efficiency in law enforcement. The city has “legitimate and powerful interests” as a law enforcement agency in preserving its working relationship with the Sheriff’s Office that outweigh Kirkland’s speech rights. View "Kirkland v. City of Maryville" on Justia Law

The Chicago Sun-Times sent Cook County Health and Hospitals System a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1) for information about gunshot wound patients who arrive at the defendant’s emergency rooms unaccompanied by law enforcement. The newspaper was investigating whether the defendant was meeting a requirement to notify local law enforcement when so-called “walk-in” gunshot wound patients are treated, 20 ILCS 2630/3, and asked for the “time/date” of each relevant hospital admission and the corresponding “time/date” of law enforcement notification. Cook County asserted two FOIA exemptions and withheld the records, claiming they contained personal health information prohibited from disclosure by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (110 Stat. 1936) and private information barred from disclosure under FOIA. The newspaper argued that the year listed on each record was discoverable, even if the time of day, day of the month, and month were not.The Cook County circuit court granted the defendant summary judgment. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed, holding that HIPAA and FOIA permitted the release of the year elements of the records as long as the individual identifying information was redacted, or “deidentified” to maintain patient confidentiality. View "Chicago Sun-Times v. Cook County Health and Hospital System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Netflix Inc. and Hulu, LLC (together, Defendants) were not video-service providers under the Fair Competition in Cable Operations Act, Ohio Rev. Code 1332.21 (the Act) and that the Act did not expressly or impliedly give the City of Maple Heights the authority to bring a cause of action such as the one at issue in this case.The City of Maple Heights filed a federal class action and declaratory judgment lawsuit against Netflix and Hulu in federal court asserting that Defendants were in violation of the Act. Defendants moved separately to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that their streaming services did not fall within the Act. The federal court certified two state-law questions for Supreme Court review. The Court answered (1) Netflix and Hulu were not service providers under Ohio law; and (2) the Act did not grant Maple Heights either an express or an implied right to bring an action against Defendants to enforce Ohio's video service provider provisions. View "City of Maple Heights v. Netlix, Inc." on Justia Law

New Jersey permits candidates running in primary elections to include beside their name a slogan of up to six words to help distinguish them from others on the ballot but requires that candidates obtain consent from individuals or incorporated associations before naming them in their slogans. Candidates challenged this requirement after their desired slogans were rejected for failure to obtain consent. They argued that ballot slogans are, in effect, part of the campaign and that the consent requirement should be subject to traditional First Amendment scrutiny.The district court disagreed, holding that, though the ballot slogans had an expressive function, the consent requirement regulates the mechanics of the electoral process. The court applied the Anderson-Burdick test. The Third Circuit affirmed. The line separating core political speech from the mechanics of the electoral process “has proven difficult to ascertain.“ The court surveyed the election laws to which the Supreme Court and appellate courts have applied the Anderson-Burdick test, as opposed to a traditional First Amendment analysis, and derived criteria to help distinguish which test is applicable. New Jersey’s consent requirement is subject to Anderson-Burdick’s balancing test; because New Jersey’s interests in ensuring election integrity and preventing voter confusion outweigh the minimal burden imposed on candidates’ speech, the requirement passes that test. View "Mazo v. New Jersey Secretary of State" on Justia Law