Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Communications Law
Counterman v. Colorado
From 2014-2016, Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W., a local musician. Each time C.W. tried to block him, Counterman created a new Facebook account and resumed contacting C.W. Several of his messages envisaged violent harm. C.W. stopped walking alone, declined social engagements, canceled performances, and eventually contacted the authorities. Counterman was charged under a Colorado statute making it unlawful to repeatedly make any form of communication with another person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress, that does cause that person to suffer serious emotional distress. Colorado courts rejected Counterman’s First Amendment argument.The Supreme Court vacated. In true-threat cases, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature.The First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few areas, including true threats--serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence. The existence of a threat depends on what the statement conveys to the person receiving it but the First Amendment may demand a subjective mental-state requirement shielding some true threats because bans on speech have the potential to deter speech outside their boundaries. In this context, a recklessness standard, a showing that a person consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause harm to another, is the appropriate mental state. Requiring purpose or knowledge would make it harder for states to counter true threats, with diminished returns for protected expression. View "Counterman v. Colorado" on Justia Law
Diana Mey v. Judson Phillips
After receiving a flood of telemarketing phone calls concerning debt relief through lower interest rates on credit cards, Appellee brought suit pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), and the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (“WVCCPA”), against several defendants. Throughout the course of the litigation, Appellants failed to respond fulsomely and accurately to discovery requests and to comply with court orders pertaining to those requests. As a sanction for their repeated discovery violations, the district court entered a default judgment against Appellants.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Appellants acted in bad faith and entered a default judgment against them. The court explained that because the damages consisted strictly of statutory penalties, the amount of which was readily discernable on the basis of undisputed evidence in the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment in favor of Appellee and awarding statutory damages without a trial. Further, because penalties under the TCPA and WVCCPA are not exclusive and the statutes separately penalize different violative conduct, damages under the WVCCPA may be awarded in addition to those under the TCPA for a single communication that violates both statutes. View "Diana Mey v. Judson Phillips" on Justia Law
Hughes Communications India Private Limited v. The DirecTV Group, Inc.
Plaintiff Hughes Communications India Private Limited (“Hughes India”) appealed from a district court judgment dismissing its indemnification claims against The DirecTV Group, Inc. (“DirecTV”). The case arises out of an asset purchase agreement in which DirecTV spun off fourteen subsidiaries, including Hughes India (the “Agreement”). The Agreement requires DirecTV to indemnify Hughes India for certain contractually defined “Taxes” that accrued before the closing of the spin-off transaction and “Proceedings” that were initiated prior to the closing date. Hughes India sought a declaration that DirecTV must indemnify it for unpaid license fees, interest, and penalties imposed by India’s Department of Telecommunications (the “DOT”). The district court granted summary judgment for DirecTV, concluding that the license fees were not subject to indemnification because they were neither Taxes nor the result of Proceedings against Hughes India as defined by the Agreement. Hughes India appealed.
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court agreed with Hughes India that under the plain terms of the Agreement, the license fees are Taxes, and the Provisional License Fee Assessment (the “Provisional Assessment”) issued by the DOT initiated a Proceeding against Hughes India. The court concluded that DirecTV is obligated to indemnify Hughes India for license fees, interest, and penalties accrued for tax periods ending on or before closing and for those amounts related to the Provisional Assessment issued for fiscal years 2001 to 2003, which was the only Proceeding initiated before closing. View "Hughes Communications India Private Limited v. The DirecTV Group, Inc." on Justia Law
Conrad v. Reno Police Dep’t
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court to deny Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) challenging the failure of the Reno Police Department (RPD) to disclose certain records, holding that the district court erred in part.At issue on appeal was RPD's refusal to disclose an investigative report to Appellant, who owned and operated an online news website, and RPD's redaction to officers' faces before disclosing body-worn camera footage. The district court denied Appellant's mandamus petition as to both issues. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part regarding the investigative report, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's petition with respect to the report without individualized findings regarding the redacted material; and (2) affirmed the district court's decision regarding the redactions to the body-worn camera footage, holding that the district court correctly denied this portion of the petition. View "Conrad v. Reno Police Dep't" on Justia Law
Todd Kashdan v. George Mason University
Plaintiff, a tenured psychology professor at George Mason University (GMU), appealed the district court’s dismissal of his Title IX, procedural due process, and First Amendment claims against GMU and other defendants sued after he was disciplined for creating a hostile educational environment that amounted to sexual harassment.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s erroneous-outcome claim. Such a claim requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that (1) he was subjected to a procedurally flawed or otherwise flawed proceeding; (2) which led to an adverse and erroneous outcome; and (3) involved particular circumstances that suggest ‘gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding. Here, Plaintiff does not connect these generalized pressures to his case in a way that creates a reasonable inference that anti-male bias-motivated GMU’s finding that he sexually harassed his students. Thus, as the district court explained, Plaintiff “has provided no basis from which to infer the existence of bias in his specific proceeding.” Further, Plaintiff’s “allegations of selective enforcement are not supported by any well-pled facts that exist independent of his legal conclusions.” Finally, the court explained that while Plaintiff’s research, publishing, and teaching about sex may qualify as matters of public concern, his contested speech veered well outside his teaching and scholarship into areas of private, personal interest. View "Todd Kashdan v. George Mason University" on Justia Law
Jack Daniel’s™ Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC
VIP makes a chewable dog toy that looks like a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle; the words “Jack Daniel’s” become “Bad Spaniels.” “Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” turns into “The Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.” Jack Daniel’s demanded that VIP stop selling the toy.VIP sought a declaratory judgment that Bad Spaniels neither infringed nor diluted Jack Daniel’s trademarks. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed. The Lanham Act defines a trademark by its primary function: identifying a product’s source and distinguishing that source from others. A typical infringement case examines whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(A), 1125(a)(1)(A). A typical dilution case considers whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a trademark. VIP cited the “Rogers test,” which requires dismissal of an infringement claim when “expressive works” are involved unless the complainant can show either that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of VIP.The Supreme Court vacated. When an alleged infringer uses a trademark as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, the Rogers test does not apply. Consumer confusion about source is most likely to arise when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark. Bad Spaniels was not automatically entitled to Rogers’ protection because it “communicate[d] a humorous message.” VIP used the Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source identifiers. Although VIP’s effort to parody Jack Daniel’s does not justify the application of the Rogers test, it may make a difference in the standard trademark analysis on remand. View "Jack Daniel's™ Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC" on Justia Law
Hastings College Conservation Committee v. Faigman
In January 2023, Assembly Bill 1936 changed the name of the former “Hastings College of the Law” to “College of the Law, San Francisco.” The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of AB 1936. The College’s Dean and Directors in their official capacities (College Defendants) filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.162), arguing that the complaint was replete with references to their public statements and resolutions regarding a new name and calling upon the Legislature to pass legislation adopting it. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the causes of action were based on the Legislature’s enactment of AB 1936, not on the speech or petitioning activity that preceded it.On appeal, the College Defendants argued that the anti-SLAPP statute applied because AB 1936 “authorizes and requires” them to engage in particular speech—the new name by which they “represent the College’s identity and values to the public”—and because the claims, if successful, would prevent or interfere with that speech. The court of appeal upheld the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. Even assuming that future speech in which the College Defendants use the new name is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, it is not the reason the plaintiffs have sued them. The plaintiffs’ claims are not based on the College Defendants’ speech. View "Hastings College Conservation Committee v. Faigman" on Justia Law
Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP
Dickson alleges that Direct delivered multiple ringless advertising voicemails (RVMs) directly into his voicemail box, without placing a traditional call to his wireless phone. An RVM placed on November 3, 2017, stated that the call was from “Nancy Brown with Direct Energy.” Dickson never consented to receive these communications. Dickson filed a purported class action, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, automated calling prohibitions. At his deposition, Dickson testified that he received 11 RVMs from Direct and that he generally listened to every voicemail message in its entirety. Direct retained an expert witness to analyze Dickson’s phone records, who concluded that only the November 3, 2017 voicemail was from Direct.The district court dismissed, holding that Dickson’s receipt of one RVM did not constitute concrete harm sufficient for Article III standing because he could not recall what he was doing when he received it, he was not charged for the RVM, it did not tie up his phone line, and he spent a small amount of time reviewing the RVM. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Regardless of the number of RVMs Dickson received, his asserted injury bears a close relationship to one recognized at common law, intrusion upon seclusion; Direct caused Dickson precisely the type of harm Congress sought to address through the TCPA. View "Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP" on Justia Law
MacIntosh v. Clous
During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law
Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith
In 1984, Goldsmith, a portrait artist, granted Vanity Fair a one-time license to use a Prince photograph to illustrate a story about the musician. Vanity Fair hired Andy Warhol, who made a silkscreen using Goldsmith’s photo. Vanity Fair published the resulting image, crediting Goldsmith for the “source photograph,” and paying her $400. Warhol used Goldsmith’s photograph to derive 15 additional works. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF) licensed one of those works, “Orange Prince,” to Condé Nast to illustrate a magazine story about Prince. AWF received $10,000. Goldsmith received nothing. When Goldsmith asserted copyright infringement, AWF sued her. The district court granted AWF summary judgment on its assertion of “fair use,” 17 U.S.C. 107. The Second Circuit reversed.The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” weighs against AWF’s commercial licensing to Condé Nast. Both the 1984 and the 2016 publications are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince; the “environment[s]” are not “distinct and different.” The 2016 use also is of a commercial nature.
Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic but the purpose of that use is still to illustrate a magazine about Prince. The degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF. To hold otherwise would potentially authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs, to be used for purposes that are substantially the same as those of the originals. AWF offers no independent justification for copying the photograph. View "Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law