Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Before Dante (age 2) died, his aunt, Mercado, filed a report with the Office of Children and Youth Services, which investigated Dante’s welfare. Bowie, who was dating Dante’s mother, was charged with murdering him. In criminal discovery, Bowie got documents from the investigation that were stored in a statewide database. He gave them to Mercado, who believed he was innocent. Mercado, wanting to blame Youth Services for failing to protect her nephew, started a Facebook group, “Justice for Dante.” and posted some of the documents. Bowie was acquitted. In the meantime, York County District Attorney Sunday charged Mercado with violating Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law. The Law makes it a crime to willfully release or permit the release of any information contained in the Statewide child abuse database to persons or agencies not permitted to receive that information. The DA later dismissed the charge,Schrader, Dante’s grandmother, wants to publish documents generated during Youth Services’ investigation to further publicize Youth Services’ failures. She fears that she will be prosecuted if she does so. Invoking the First Amendment, she claimed that the Law is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to her. The district court agreed with the as-applied challenge and preliminarily enjoined the prosecution of Schrader for sharing child-abuse documents concerning Dante. The Third Circuit vacated with instructions to narrow the injunction to eliminate a reference to "other documents" that may come into Schrader's possession. Under the content-focused test, the Law is likely unconstitutional as applied here. View "Schrader v. District Attorney York County" on Justia Law

In White Deer Township, a four-mile gap in Verizon’s wireless coverage overlays Interstate 80; Verizon customers are likely to experience “dropped calls,” “ineffective call attempts,” and “garbled audio.” The area is within Bald Eagle State Forest. A 2000 Pennsylvania moratorium prohibits the construction of cell towers on state forest land, so Verizon’s options were limited. After considering several sites and antenna configurations, Verizon decided to construct a 195-foot monopole topped with a four-foot antenna on privately owned land, comprising 1.9 acres and containing a cabin, shed, pavilion, and privy. Verizon leased 0.0597 acres, in the northeast corner of the property for the tower.The Township then permitted cell towers that complied with a minimum permissible lot size of one acre; cell towers had to be set back “from lot lines and structures a distance equal to the height of the facility, including towers and antennas, plus 10% of such height.” The Zoning Board denied Verizon’s variance applications, finding that Verizon’s alleged hardship was insufficient because it was “not a hardship connected to the capacity for the property to be used reasonably, but rather, the hardship [was connected to Verizon’s] capacity to use the property as desired.” The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Verizon. The denial had “the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services,” in violation of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). View "Cellco Partnership v. White Deer Township Zoning Hearing Board" on Justia Law

In this appeal stemming from a challenge to Maryland's Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act the Court of Appeals vacated the orders of the circuit court granting a declaratory judgment that a digital advertising tax was unconstitutional and illegal under federal law the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the action.At issue was Maryland's Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act, codified at Title 7.5 of the Tax-General Article, which imposed a tax on annual gross revenues of certain high revenue businesses derived from state digital advertising services. Plaintiffs, various subsidiaries of Comcast Corporation and Verizon Communications, Inc., filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the tax was unconstitutional and illegal. The circuit court granted judgment for Plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals vacated the orders below, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to exhaust mandatory administrative and judicial review remedies provided in the Tax-General Article for the resolution of tax disputes; and (2) absent exhaustion of the available statutory administrative remedies, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the challenge. View "Comptroller v. Comcast" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court entered upon a jury verdict in favor of Mainely Media, LLC on the tort claims brought by Norman Gaudette, a former Biddeford police officer, and his wife Joanne, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain testimony.The Gaudettes brought this action claiming defamation, false light, and loss of consortium alleging that Mainely Media had published incorrect information indicating that Norman had sexually abused minors years earlier while he was a police officer. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Mainely Media. On appeal, the Gaudettes argued that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike a detective's testimony that an earlier investigation of Norman did not exonerate him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the detective's testimony. View "Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provides subsidies to encourage telecommunication companies to expand high-speed broadband internet services in rural areas where customer revenues would otherwise be insufficient to justify the cost of doing business. Venture Communications Cooperative (“Venture”) provides broadband services to rural South Dakota customers. James Valley Cooperative Telephone Company and its wholly owned subsidiary, Northern Valley Communications (collectively, “Northern Valley”), is a competing provider. Venture filed this lawsuit against Northern Valley. The primary claim is that Northern Valley violated 47 U.S.C. Section 220(e) by filing a Form 477 that “intentionally, deliberately, fraudulently, and maliciously misrepresented” information “for the sole unlawful purpose of harming [Venture]” by depriving Venture of FCC subsidies in census blocks where Northern Valley was deemed to be an unsubsidized competitor. The district court granted Northern Valley summary judgment, concluding “there is no evidence that Northern Valley willfully overreported its broadband capabilities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Venture’s claim of intent to injure is belied by Northern Valley helping Venture by filing a letter with the FCC clarifying that Northern Valley did not offer voice service in the Overlap Area. The court likewise affirmed the dismissal of Venture’s tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims under South Dakota law. The court agreed with the district court that Venture proffered no evidence of an “intentional and unjustified act of interference” because Northern Valley complied with all FCC reporting requirements. As Northern Valley complied with the Telecommunications Act in filing Form 477 at issue, there is no plausible underlying tort alleged. Summary judgment is warranted on this claim. View "Venture Comm. Co-Op, Inc. v. James Valley Co-Op Telephone Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus but denying his requests for statutory damages and court costs, holding that there was no error.Appellant, an inmate, sent a public-records request to Appellee, an employee of a private company that contracts with the state of Ohio to house state prisoners. Dissatisfied with the ultimate response, Appellant filed the current action asking for a writ of mandamus ordering Appellee to produce the records requested. The court of appeals granted the writ to a limited extent and denied Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs. View "State ex rel. Atakpu v. Shuler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act alleging that Defendants sent text messages to a cell phone number that she had placed on the National Do-Not-Call Registry and provided to her thirteen-year-old son. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing because she failed to allege that she was the “actual user” of the phone or the “actual recipient” of the text messages.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that the owner and subscriber of a phone with a number listed on the Do-Not-Call Registry has suffered an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing when unsolicited telemarketing calls or texts are sent to the number in alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The panel held that the owner and subscriber of the phone suffers a concrete, de facto injury when their right to be free from such communications is violated, even if the communications are intended for or solicited by another individual and even if someone else is using the phone at the time the messages are transmitted. View "KRISTEN HALL V. SMOSH DOT COM, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Smith, wanting to expand her graphic design business to include wedding websites, worried that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act would require her to create websites celebrating marriages that defy her belief that marriage should be between one man and one woman. Smith intends to produce a story for each couple using her own words and original artwork, combined with the couple’s messages. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Smith’s request for an injunction.The Supreme Court reversed. The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs conveying messages with which the designer disagrees. The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to speak his mind regardless of whether the government considers his speech “misguided.” Generally, the government may not compel a person to speak preferred messages. The wedding websites Smith seeks to create involve her speech and are pure speech protected by the First Amendment. Colorado seeks to put Smith to a choice prohibited by precedent. If she wishes to speak, she must either speak as Colorado demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs.Public accommodations laws are vital to realizing the civil rights of all Americans; governments have a “compelling interest” in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation. States may protect gay persons, just as they protect other classes of individuals. However, public accommodations laws are not immune from the demands of the Constitution. Smith does not seek to sell an ordinary commercial good but intends to create “customized and tailored” expressive speech “to celebrate and promote the couple’s wedding.” Speakers do not shed their First Amendment protections by accepting compensation or employing the corporate form to disseminate their speech. Smith will gladly conduct business with those having protected characteristics when the product she is creating does not violate her beliefs. View "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that all of the documents underlying an external investigation into allegations of undue influence in a public university's admissions process were protected by the attorney-client privilege and were thus exempt from disclosure under the Texas Public Information Act, holding that the university's attorney-client privilege as to specific documents was waived.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the investigator acted as a lawyer's representative in conducting the investigation; (2) the subject documents fell within the attorney-client privilege; (3) the university did not waive the privilege by disclosing to the investigator some of the documents; and (4) the publication of the investigator's final report waived the university's attorney-client privilege as to documents that the final report directly quoted from or otherwise disclosed a significant part of. View "University of Tex. System v. Franklin Center for Gov't & Public Integrity" on Justia Law

From 2014-2016, Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W., a local musician. Each time C.W. tried to block him, Counterman created a new Facebook account and resumed contacting C.W. Several of his messages envisaged violent harm. C.W. stopped walking alone, declined social engagements, canceled performances, and eventually contacted the authorities. Counterman was charged under a Colorado statute making it unlawful to repeatedly make any form of communication with another person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress, that does cause that person to suffer serious emotional distress. Colorado courts rejected Counterman’s First Amendment argument.The Supreme Court vacated. In true-threat cases, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature.The First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few areas, including true threats--serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence. The existence of a threat depends on what the statement conveys to the person receiving it but the First Amendment may demand a subjective mental-state requirement shielding some true threats because bans on speech have the potential to deter speech outside their boundaries. In this context, a recklessness standard, a showing that a person consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause harm to another, is the appropriate mental state. Requiring purpose or knowledge would make it harder for states to counter true threats, with diminished returns for protected expression. View "Counterman v. Colorado" on Justia Law