Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The district court issued a search warrant in a criminal case, directing appellant Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter") to produce information to the government related to the Twitter account "@realDonaldTrump." The search warrant was served along with a nondisclosure order that prohibited Twitter from notifying anyone about the existence or contents of the warrant. Although Twitter ultimately complied with the warrant, the company did not fully produce the requested information until three days after a court-ordered deadline. The district court held Twitter in contempt and imposed a $350,000 sanction for its delay. On appeal, Twitter argued that the nondisclosure order violated the First Amendment and the Stored Communications Act, that the district court should have stayed its enforcement of the search warrant, and that the district court abused its discretion by holding Twitter in contempt and imposing the sanction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that it affirmed the district court's rulings in all respects. The court wrote that the district court properly rejected Twitter's First Amendment challenge to the nondisclosure order. Moreover, the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion to manage its docket when it declined to stay its enforcement of the warrant while the First Amendment claim was litigated. Finally, the district court followed the appropriate procedures before finding Twitter in contempt of court - including giving Twitter an opportunity to be heard and a chance to purge its contempt to avoid sanctions. Under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ultimately held Twitter in contempt and imposed a $350,000 sanction. View "In re: Sealed Case (AMENDED REDACTED OPINION)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s partial judgment granting a motion to dismiss in favor of Defendant, Reward Zone USA, LLC (Reward Zone), in a putative class action lawsuit brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). In Plaintiff’s second cause of action, which is the subject of this opinion, Plaintiff alleged a violation of the TCPA because she received at least three mass marketing text messages from Reward Zone which utilized “prerecorded voices.”   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held the text messages did not use prerecorded voices under the Act because they did not include audible components. The panel relied on the statutory context of the Act and the ordinary meaning of voice, which showed that Congress used the word voice to include only an audible sound, and not a more symbolic definition such as an instrument or medium of expression. The panel addressed Plaintiff’s appeal of the district court’s dismissal of another cause of action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in a simultaneously-filed memorandum disposition. View "LUCINE TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment order of the district court requiring Memorial Hospital of Converse County (MHCC) to produce certain records requested under the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA) but also imposing a protective order on those documents, holding that the district court erred in finding that a certain document was not subject to disclosure under the WPRA.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the denial of her motion for summary judgment related to the production of documents involving a settlement between MHCC and a patient (MB settlement), arguing that the MB settlement was subject to production under the WPRA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred should have ordered MHCC to produce the MB settlement; and (2) the district court's entry of a protective order was contrary to the WPRA and without evidentiary support. View "Gates v. "Memorial Hospital of Converse County - Advanced Medicine. Hometown Care", ex rel. Board of Trustees of the Memorial Hospital of Converse County" on Justia Law

This case is part of the battle between telecommunications providers that are attempting to expand next-generation wireless services (commonly called 5G) and municipalities that are resisting that expansion. The City of Pasadena used another method: aesthetic design standards incorporating spacing and undergrounding requirements The city invoked those requirements to block Crown Castle’s ability to develop a 5G network in the region, and Crown Castle sued for relief. Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) anticipated those strategies and previously had passed the Federal Telecommunications Act (“FTA”) and responsive regulations. As a result, the district court decided in favor of Crown Castle, primarily basing its decision on the expansive language of the FTA and an FCC ruling interpreting the Act in light of 5G technology and associated challenges.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the FTA preempts the city’s spacing and undergrounding requirements, and the city forfeited its arguments relating to the safe-harbor provision in the FTA. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering a permanent injunction. The court explained that, as the court found, the regulations affect only small cell nodes that would permit T-Mobile to offer extensive 5G service in Pasadena. Moreover, the court wrote that a party seeking a permanent injunction must establish (1) actual success on the merits; (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in that party’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. All those factors weigh in Crown Castle’s favor. View "Crown Castle Fiber v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting (OFP) to provide documents in response to a public records request brought by Fair Housing Opportunities of Northwest Ohio (Fair Housing) and denying Fair Housing statutory damages and attorney fees, holding that there was no error.After OFP provided information it argued was partially responsive to Fair Housing's public records request Fair Housing brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering OFP to provide records responsive to the request. Fair Housing further sought statutory damages and attorney fees awards. The court of appeals found that OFP was a public office subject to the Public Records Act and granted a writ of mandamus. The court, however, denied statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OFP was subject to the Act; and (2) Fair Housing was not entitled to awards of statutory damages or attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Fair Housing Opportunities of Northwest Ohio v. Ohio Fair Plan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing Appellees to produce unreacted invoices for certain legal services under the Public Records Act, Ohio Pub. Rec. Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that the writ should have been denied.Appellant sought unreacted invoices for legal services provided to the Rootstown Township Board of Trustees by two entities. Appellant was provided with the invoices but redacted portions of them that contained information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Appellant then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that the information sought by Appellant was protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for an in camera inspection of the invoices. After an in camera inspection, the court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court modified the judgment in part by denying, rather than dismissing, the petition, holding that the redacted invoices contained information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Ames v. Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews" on Justia Law

The 1996 E-Rate program (Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support program, Telecommunications Act 110 Stat. 56), is intended to keep telecommunications services affordable for schools and libraries in rural and economically disadvantaged areas. The program subsidizes services and requires providers to charge these customers rates less than or equal to the lowest rates they charge to similarly situated customers. Heath brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that Wisconsin Bell charged schools and libraries more than was allowed under the program, causing the federal government to pay more than it should have. The district court granted Wisconsin Bell summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Heath’s briefing and evidence focused more on which party bore the burden of proving violations than on identifying specific violations in his voluminous exhibits and lengthy expert report, Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. It is reasonable to infer that government funds were involved and that if the government knew of actual overcharges, it would not approve claims. View "Heath v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against the Hamilton County clerk of courts (Appellee) to compel the production of public records and awarded him $700 in statutory damages, holding that Appellant failed to prevail on his claims.Appellant, an inmate, sent public records requests to the clerk, who informed Appellant that his requests were subject to approval from the judge who sentenced him or their successor according to Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B)(8). Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the clerk's response. The petition was dismissed, but the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, Appellant filed a motion for default judgment. The court of appeals denied both Appellant's motion for default judgment and his petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed and awarded statutory damages, holding that Appellant had prevailed on his claims to the extent the law allowed. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh" on Justia Law

Elanco Animal Health sent Ambassador Animal Hospital two unsolicited faxes inviting Ambassador’s veterinarians and its owner to RSVP for two free dinner programs: one titled “Canine and Feline Disease Prevention Hot Topics” and the other “Rethinking Management of Osteoarthritis.” The faxes indicated that both programs had been approved for continuing education credits and provided the names of the programs’ presenters. The corners of each invitation included the trademarked “Elanco” logo, and the bottom of each fax contained a notice encouraging recipients to consult their state or federal regulations or ethics laws about restrictions on accepting industry-provided educational and food items.Ambassador filed suit, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227 (TCPA), and arguing that the faxes were unsolicited advertisements because the free dinner programs were used to market or sell Elanco’s animal health goods and services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The text of the TCPA creates an objective standard narrowly focused on the content of the faxed document. The faxes do not indicate—directly or indirectly—to a reasonable recipient that Elanco was promoting or selling some good, service, or property as required by the TCPA. The court rejected a “pretext” argument. View "Ambassador Animal Hospital, Ltd. v. Elanco Animal Health Inc." on Justia Law

This case was the second round of appeals arising from Dalia Rojas’s lawsuit against HSBC Card Services, Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together, HSBC) for violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act . Rojas received hundreds of personal calls from her daughter Alejandra, an employee at an HSBC call center, which were recorded by HSBC’s full-time recording system. Rojas alleged HSBC intentionally recorded confidential calls without her consent. She also alleged HSBC intentionally recorded calls to her cellular and cordless phones without her consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to HSBC, and Rojas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding HSBC had not met its initial burden to show there was no triable issue of material fact on intent. On remand, HSBC made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, which Rojas did not accept. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where HSBC relied, in part, on workplace policies that purportedly barred call center agents from making personal calls at their desks to show it did not intend to record the calls. The trial court ultimately entered judgment for HSBC. Pertinent here, the court found Rojas did not prove HSBC’s intent to record. The court also found Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded, and did not prove lack of consent. Rojas appealed that judgment, contending the trial court made several errors in determining she did not prove her Privacy Act claims and that the evidence did not support its findings. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court applied correct legal standards in assessing lack of consent and substantial evidence supports its finding that Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded. Although the Court determined the record did not support the court’s finding that HSBC did not intend to record the calls between Rojas and her daughter, that determination did not require reversal. "What it underscores, however, is that a business’s full-time recording of calls without adequate notice creates conditions ripe for potential liability under the Privacy Act, and workplace policies prohibiting personal calls may not mitigate that risk." View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc." on Justia Law