Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Two individuals brought a class action against Amazon, alleging that its Virtual Try-On (VTO) feature—used to preview makeup and eyewear products by rendering them on users’ faces via their mobile devices—violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The VTO software, developed both in-house and by a third party, captured users’ facial geometry to overlay products for virtual preview. The plaintiffs claimed Amazon collected, stored, and used their facial data and that of many others in Illinois without proper notice, informed consent, or the creation of required data retention and destruction policies as mandated by BIPA.After removal from Illinois state court to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The district court certified a class of all individuals who used Amazon’s VTO feature in Illinois after September 7, 2016. The district court found the class satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and that common questions—primarily concerning the VTO’s functionality and Amazon’s use of biometric data—predominated over individual questions such as location and damages. It also found a class action was superior due to the size and cost of potential individual litigation.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the class certification decision, focusing on predominance and superiority. The court affirmed the district court’s certification, holding that common questions about Amazon’s alleged statutory violations predominated and that individual questions regarding user location and damages were manageable. The court also agreed that a class action was superior to individual suits, given the complexity and cost of litigation, and affirmed the district court’s discretion. View "Svoboda v Amazon.com Inc." on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A company operating movie theaters in several Midwestern states offered free movie trailers on its website to attract customers. After a website visitor viewed these trailers, she began to receive targeted advertisements on her Facebook page. She alleged that the company had installed a program, Meta Pixel, which tracked her activity and shared her personal information with Meta (Facebook’s parent company). She claimed that the company, as a “video tape service provider,” had a duty under the Video Privacy Protection Act not to disclose her personally identifiable information without consent.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the complaint. The district court found that the company was not a “video tape service provider” as defined by the statute, because it was not engaged in the business of renting, selling, or delivering prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials. As a result, the court concluded that the company had no statutory obligation to withhold the plaintiff’s personal information under the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the district court, holding that movie theaters are not “engaged in the business” of renting, selling, or delivering prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials. The court reasoned that the statutory definition requires a physical medium similar to video cassette tapes, which does not include theatrical screenings or free online trailers. The court further determined that offering trailers online did not constitute a separate business of delivering audio visual materials for livelihood or gain. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Christopherson v. Cinema Entertainment Corp." on Justia Law

The State of Nevada brought a consumer protection action against TikTok, Inc. and related entities, alleging violations of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA). The State claimed that TikTok knowingly designed its social media platform to addict young users, causing various harms to minors in Nevada, and made misrepresentations and material omissions about the platform’s safety. The complaint detailed TikTok’s collection and sale of young users’ personal data to advertisers, the use of design features to maximize user engagement, and public statements about youth safety that the State alleged were misleading.The case was first heard in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, where TikTok moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction, and that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) § 230 and the First Amendment immunized it from liability. The district court denied TikTok’s motion in part, finding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over TikTok based on purposeful conduct directed at Nevada, and that the State’s NDTPA claims were not barred by CDA § 230 or the First Amendment. Other claims were dismissed without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed TikTok’s petition for writ relief. The court held that the district court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over TikTok, as the State made a prima facie showing that TikTok purposefully directed its conduct at Nevada through targeted marketing and data collection. The court further held that the CDA § 230 and the First Amendment do not bar the State’s NDTPA claims at the pleading stage, as the claims target TikTok’s own alleged misrepresentations and harmful design features, not third-party content or expressive activity. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied TikTok’s petition. View "TikTok, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns multiple petitions for review challenging a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order that established new rate caps for communications services provided to incarcerated individuals. The FCC’s order, issued pursuant to the Martha Wright-Reed Just and Reasonable Communications Act of 2022, also dismissed as moot certain petitions for clarification and waiver filed by Securus Technologies, LLC, a provider of these services. After the FCC published portions of the order in the Federal Register, several parties—including service providers, advocacy organizations, and state governments—filed petitions for review in various federal appellate courts, contesting different aspects of the order.Following the filing of these petitions, the FCC notified the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3), which randomly selected the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to hear the consolidated petitions. The administrative record was filed in the First Circuit, and subsequent petitions filed in other circuits were transferred there pursuant to statute. Some petitioners, notably Securus and Pay Tel Communications, Inc., argued that the petitions should be transferred to the Fifth Circuit, asserting that it was the proper venue based on the timing and nature of the initial filings. The First Circuit denied these transfer motions, and a request for mandamus to the Supreme Court was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the petitions for review are properly before it, as the administrative record was filed there pursuant to the JPML’s direction. The court rejected arguments for mandatory transfer to the Fifth Circuit, finding no legal basis to override the JPML’s selection or to collaterally attack its determination. The court also declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the petitions elsewhere. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania resident requested an investigation into alleged contamination of his property, which was linked to fracking operations involving EQT. An employee of Environmental Health Sciences (EHS), based in Pennsylvania, conducted research and sampling on the property, which informed a news series published by EHS. EHS is headquartered in Montana, but its journalists work remotely from various states. During litigation in Pennsylvania, EQT sought documents from EHS related to the research and reporting. The subpoena was domesticated and served on EHS in Montana.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, Montana, granted EHS’s motion to quash the subpoena, holding that Montana’s Media Confidentiality Act applied and provided absolute privilege over the requested records. The court found that the relevant communications and research occurred in Pennsylvania but concluded that Montana law should govern under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 139. EQT sought relief after a related Montana Supreme Court decision, but the District Court denied the motion, maintaining its original analysis.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the choice-of-law issue. The court determined that an actual conflict existed between Montana’s absolute privilege and Pennsylvania’s narrower, qualified reporter’s privilege. Applying the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 factors, the Montana Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania’s privilege law should apply because Pennsylvania had the most significant relationship to the communications and newsgathering at issue. The court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply Pennsylvania’s privilege law to determine whether the subpoenaed records are protected. View "EQT CHAP v Environmental Health Sciences" on Justia Law

A member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives used public funds and the resources of the House Democratic Caucus to send five pre-recorded, automated phone calls to constituents. These calls provided information about public health resources, employment opportunities, and community events. The calls were approved and administered by House staff, who determined that each served a clear legislative purpose and public benefit. The recipient of these calls, Andrew Perrong, filed suit, alleging that the calls violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which generally prohibits automated or pre-recorded calls made by “any person.”The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the legislator’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the legislator was a “person” under the TCPA and could be sued in his individual capacity, even though the calls were made as part of his official duties. The District Court also found that the suit was not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, reasoning that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was not the real party in interest, and that qualified immunity did not apply because the statutory prohibition was clear.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the statutory question and the immunity defenses. The Third Circuit held that the TCPA’s use of the term “person” does not clearly and unmistakably include state legislators acting in their official capacity when performing legitimate government functions. The court reasoned that longstanding interpretive presumptions, constitutional federalism principles, and statutory context all support excluding such official acts from the statute’s reach. As a result, the court reversed the District Court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that the TCPA’s robocall restriction does not apply to calls made by state legislators in connection with their legitimate government functions. View "Perrong v. Bradford" on Justia Law

A group of broadband internet providers in Georgia entered into contracts with the Georgia Department of Transportation to install and maintain their equipment along public rights of way. These contracts set annual permit fees and included a clause stating that the contracts would remain in effect until the parties entered into a new agreement. In 2021, the Department amended its rules, increasing permit fees and requiring providers to sign new contracts. The providers refused, and the Department notified them that, absent new agreements, they would be subject to the new rules. The providers then filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that their contracts were enforceable, not terminable at will, and that the Department’s actions impaired their contractual rights in violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.The Superior Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that sovereign immunity was waived under Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Georgia Constitution because the providers sought declaratory relief from alleged unconstitutional acts. The court granted summary judgment to the providers, holding that the contracts were enforceable and not terminable at will by the Department.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the lower court that sovereign immunity was waived for this declaratory judgment action, as the providers sought relief from acts allegedly violating constitutional provisions. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the contracts. It held that the contracts were of indefinite duration and, under longstanding Georgia law, were terminable at will by either party with notice. The Court affirmed the waiver of sovereign immunity but vacated the judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Dovetel Communication, LLC" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that a telecommunications company, through a controlled shell entity, fraudulently obtained nearly $113 million in bidding credits during a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum license auction. The core claim was that the shell entity misrepresented its independence and concealed its relationship with the larger company, which, if disclosed, would have disqualified it from receiving small business credits. The relators asserted that the shell entity never operated as a genuine business and had an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses to the larger company after a regulatory waiting period.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia twice dismissed the case, first without prejudice and then with prejudice, finding that the public-disclosure bar of the False Claims Act applied. The court concluded that the alleged fraud had already been publicly disclosed through the shell entity’s FCC filings, and that the relators’ complaint did not materially add to the information already available.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that, even assuming the prior FCC filings constituted public disclosures of substantially the same fraud, the relators qualified as “original sources” because their allegations materially added to the publicly disclosed information. Specifically, the relators provided new evidence that the shell entity never functioned as an independent business and plausibly alleged an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses, both of which were not revealed in the public filings. The court found that these additions were significant enough to potentially influence the government’s decision to pursue the case. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. U.S. Cellular Corp." on Justia Law

Verizon Communications Inc. provided mobile voice and data services to customers and, until 2019, operated a program that sold access to customer device-location data through third-party aggregators. These aggregators resold the data to various entities for uses such as call routing and roadside assistance. Verizon relied on contractual arrangements and an external auditor to ensure that customer consent was obtained before disclosing location data. In 2018, a news report revealed that a third party, Securus Technologies, enabled law enforcement to access customer location data without proper consent, exposing flaws in Verizon’s safeguards. Verizon subsequently terminated access for Securus and related entities, but continued the program for other providers for several months.Following the news report, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an enforcement action, issuing a Notice of Apparent Liability and, after considering Verizon’s response, a forfeiture order. The FCC found that Verizon’s device-location data qualified as “customer proprietary network information” under § 222 of the Communications Act, and that Verizon failed to reasonably protect this information both before and after the Securus incident. The FCC imposed a $46.9 million penalty, calculated as 63 continuing violations—one for each third-party relationship that persisted after the breach was publicized—and included a 50% upward adjustment for egregious conduct. Verizon paid the penalty and petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that device-location data is protected under § 222, the FCC’s liability finding was not arbitrary or capricious, and the penalty did not exceed statutory limits. The court also found that Verizon’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not violated, as Verizon could have obtained a jury trial by declining to pay the penalty and contesting the forfeiture in federal district court. The petition for review was denied. View "Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law