Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar’s property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge’s comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct “unique circumstances” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

Dearborn hosted the Arab International Festival from 1995 until 2012, welcoming roughly 250,000 people with carnival attractions, entertainment, and international food. The 2012 Festival had 85 vendors, information tables, and booths, including several affiliated with Christian and other groups. Bible Believers attended the 2011 Festival, bearing “Christian signs, banners, and t-shirts” that provoked confrontations. Preparing for the 2012 Festival, their attorney wrote a letter, asserting that the sheriff sided with “the violent Muslims,” that “officers have a duty to protect speakers … from … hostile audiences,” and demanding protection. Counsel responded, stating that the sheriff “owes a duty to the public as a whole and is not required to serve as a security force for the sole benefit of … Believers … cannot protect everyone from the foreseeable consequences that come from speech that is designed and perhaps intended to elicit a potentially negative reaction.” The sheriff claims to have allocated more personnel to the Festival than to “the World Series or the President of the United States.” At the 2012 Festival, Believers displayed messages including “Islam Is A Religion of Blood and Murder.” One carried a severed pig’s head on a stick; others preached, using a megaphone, referring to a “pedophile” prophet. The crowd yelled, threw debris, and shoved a Believer to the ground. Officers detained debris-throwers and attempted to quell the crowd. As the confrontation intensified, Believers continued to preach. Officers reiterated safety concerns. Officers escorted the Believers out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the county defendants. Finding no constitutional violations, it did not address qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the plan for Festival security was content-neutral and that the Believers were not treated differently than the counter-protestors.View "Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty. " on Justia Law

Dr. Kiser is trained as a general dentist and as an endodontist specializing in root canal procedures. In 2009, the Ohio State Dental Board issued a warning to Kiser for practicing “outside the scope” of his declared specialty, stating, “if you wish to continue to declare yourself as a specialist in endodontics, you must advertise accordingly, and limit your practice per the ADA’s definition. If you would prefer to practice in areas outside the scope of endodontics, you may do so by no longer holding yourself out as a specialist in endodontics. You can be a general dentist, and then advertise and perform specialty services you are qualified to perform, so long as you also state you are a general dentist.” The Board took no further action and declined to answer Kiser’s 2012 inquiry about signage including the terms “endodontist” and “general dentist.” Kiser challenged the regulations as chilling his exercise of First Amendment commercial speech rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court decision, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) and finding that Kiser alleged facts demonstrating that he faces a credible threat that the regulations will be enforced against him in the future, so that he has standing to assert his pre-enforcement challenge. View "Kiser v. Reitz" on Justia Law

In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker’s appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker’s official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that “[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie” when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky’s privacy and equal protection claims.View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations. View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law

Sorenson is a purveyor of telephones for the hearing-impaired that have words scrolling on a screen during a call. Sorenson's technology uses the Internet to transmit and receive both the call itself and the derived captions (IP CTS). Sorenson gives its phones out for free, with the captioning feature turned on. On appeal, Sorenson challenged the FCC's promulgation of rules regarding IP CTS under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court concluded that the FCC's rule requiring all new users to register and self-certify their hearing loss, but only if the provider sold the IP CTS equipment for $75 or more, was arbitrary and capricious because the FCC failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. Further, the FCC's requirement that IP CTS phones "have a default setting of captions off, so that all IP CTS users must affirmatively turn on captioning," was unsupported by the evidence and, rather, contradicted by it. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review. View "Sorenson Communications Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children’s school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a “bad father.” Bovee claims that this alienated his children’s affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. “The suit is about words, and only words.” Bovee’s lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause.View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with computer tampering in an unrelated case. The docket sheet, the judge’s half sheet, and the court call sheet for the arraignment date indicate that defendant was not in court and that the arraignment did not take place. Defendant’s efforts to have a court reporter change the transcript were unsuccessful. The court reporter referred defendant to her supervisor, Taylor. In a telephone conversation, Taylor explained that any dispute over the accuracy of a transcript should be presented to the judge. Defendant surreptitiously recorded three telephone conversations with Taylor and posted recordings and transcripts of the conversations on her website. Defendant eventually obtained a fraudulent court transcript. Defendant was charged with eavesdropping, (720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), and using or divulging information obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). Defendant claimed am exception for “reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against the person … and there is reason to believe that evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained.” The state argued that the exception did not apply because the reporter accused of creating a forged transcript was not a party to the recorded conversations. After a mistrial, the court found the statute facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding the statutes overbroad as criminalizing a range of innocent conduct. The eavesdropping statute does not distinguish between open and surreptitious recording and burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest in protecting conversational privacy. The language of the recording statute criminalizes the publication of any recording made on a cellphone or other such device, regardless of consent. View "People v. Melongo" on Justia Law