Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Prisoners on death row filed suit, challenging Missouri's execution protocol as violating the federal Controlled Substances Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and based on Eighth Amendment due process, ex post facto, and other claims. The district court sealed certain documents or docket entries, making them inaccessible to the public. There was no indication in the record why the entries were sealed, nor any explanation of what types of documents were sealed. Publisher Larry Flynt filed motions to intervene in both cases, under Federal Rule 24(b), and moved to unseal the records and entries. No party opposed Flynt's motions to intervene. One case had already been dismissed. In his motions, Flynt stated he had an interest in the sealed records as a publisher and as an advocate against the death penalty. Flynt claimed a heightened interest because Franklin, who had confessed to shooting Flynt, was a Missouri death row inmate and a plaintiff in both cases. Franklin was executed in November 2013; on that same day the district court denied Flynt's motion to intervene in one case as moot, and in the other, stating that "generalized interest" does not justify intervention. The Eighth Circuit reversed; for reasons of judicial efficiency, Rule 24(b) intervention is often preferable to filing a separate action. View "Flynt v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

In 2007, Werkheiser was elected to the three-member Pocono Township Board of Supervisors. Supervisor Hess was elected in 2009; Bengel was elected in 2011. Supervisors are permitted to be employed by the Township. Werkheiser was appointed Township Roadmaster by the Board. Hess, as Chairman of the Board, Secretary, and Treasurer, received $36,000 per year in salary and benefits. In 2012, Hess took 10-days leave. Froio was selected to assume Hess’s administrative duties. Over Werkheiser’s objection, Bengel and Hess voted to hire Froio as Township Administrator, with compensation of $70,000. As Froio’s position developed, Hess’s responsibilities and workload decreased. Hess continued to be paid. Werkheiser objected to creation of a new position with greater expense and to paying Hess when his duties were being performed by Froio. Hess and Bengel began private deliberations to deny Werkheiser reappointment and to replace him with Bengel. In 2013, Werkheiser was formally denied reappointment. Werkheiser sued, asserting First Amendment retaliation and state law violations. The district court reasoned that there were important differences between public employees and elected officials; found that Werkheiser had established a constitutional violation; and denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; the contours of the First Amendment right at issue were not clearly established. View "Werkheiser v. Pocono Township" on Justia Law

Officer Matthews sued, alleging that the City of New York retaliated against him for speaking to his commanding officers about an arrest quota policy at his precinct. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Matthews spoke as a public employee, not as a citizen, and that his speech was, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. The Second Circuit vacated, reasoning that because Matthews’s comments on precinct policy did not fall within his official duties and because he elected a channel with a civilian analogue to pursue his complaint, he spoke as a citizen. View "Matthews v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721, prohibits individuals from knowingly obtaining or disclosing “personal information” from a motor vehicle record. Chicago police officers brought suit against Sun-Times Media, alleging that the publishing company violated the DPPA by obtaining each officer’s birth date, height, weight, hair color, and eye color from the Illinois Secretary of State’s motor vehicle records, and publishing that information in a newspaper article that criticized a homicide investigation lineup in which the officers participated. Sun-Times unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the officers’ complaint, arguing that the published information does not constitute “personal information” within the meaning of the DPPA, or, in the alternative, that the statute’s prohibition on acquiring and disclosing personal information from driving records violates the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. DPPA’s definition of “personal information” extends to the details Sun-Times published here; Sun-Times possesses no constitutional right either to obtain the officers’ personal information from government records or to subsequently publish that unlawfully obtained information. View "Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC" on Justia Law

Desloge has a population of 5,054; 97.4% are white. The Ku Klux Klan regularly distributes leaflets on streets and sidewalks, wearing robes and hoods. Imperial Wizard Ancona contacted city officials about plans to distribute leaflets in 2012 and learned that an ordinance prohibited "solicitation activities" on public streets. The district court issued an injunction, concluding that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. In 2013 Ancona and the Klan returned to distribute leaflets concerning gun rights. They stood along a sidewalk at a four way stop, holding up leaflets. If a vehicle’s occupant signaled for a leaflet, a Klan member would step into the street to supply one. A police officer told them about a 2013 traffic ordinance , which prohibited "stand[ing] in or enter[ing] upon a roadway for the purpose of soliciting rides, employment, business or charitable contributions from, or distribut[ing] anything to, the occupant of any vehicle." The Klan left. While litigation was pending, the city amended the ordinance, adding a preamble and defining terms to explain that it sought to address "public safety concerns," distracted drivers, and resulting collisions. "Roadway" was defined as the entire road, from one curb or pavement edge to another, including parking lanes. The district court granted an injunction, concluding that some provisions were not narrowly tailored. The Eighth Circuit reversed. There was no evidence that the ordinance was created to curtail the Klan's message or its speech in Desloge; it is not impermissibly underinclusive. View "Traditionalist Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Desloge" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Pittsylvania County, Virginia met twice per month. At the beginning of each meeting, a member of the Board opened the proceedings with an invocation, usually explicitly Christian in nature, and asked the audience to stand for the prayers. Hudson is a non-Christian resident of Pittsylvania County who has attended nearly every Board meeting and alleges that the Christian prayers made her and other non-Christian citizens of Pittsylvania County feel unwelcome. Hudson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violation of the Establishment Clause. The district court entered summary judgment for Hudson and permanently enjoined Pittsylvania “from repeatedly opening its meetings with prayers associated with any one religion,” and struck the case from the active docket while retaining jurisdiction. Hudson sought attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $59,679.92.1. A magistrate judge recommended an award of $53,229.92 and the district court adopted the recommendation. Pittsylvania filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay the proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), 175 days after the court entered its order. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the merits appeal as untimely and affirmed the award of fees. View "Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cnty, Va." on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area but containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas, including the Statehouse and many state-government buildings. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed; as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs have received citations for violating this ordinance and allege that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The parties agreed that panhandling is a form of speech, to which the First Amendment applies, and that if it drew lines on the basis of speech’s content it would be unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the ordinance, which it called “indifferent to the solicitor’s stated reason for seeking money, or whether the requester states any reason at all…. Springfield has not meddled with the marketplace of ideas.” The prohibition is based on where a person says something rather than what position a person takes. View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar’s property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge’s comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct “unique circumstances” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law