Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Ohio House Bill No. 663 protects the identity of individuals and entities that participate in the lethal injection process (Participants), not to be disclosed in public records or during judicial proceedings, except in limited circumstances, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(A)(1)(cc), 2949.221(B)–(C). It directs courts to seal records that contain information related to the identity of Participants, allowing disclosure only if, “through clear and convincing evidence presented in the private hearing," the court finds that the Participant appears to have acted unlawfully with respect to the person’s involvement in the administration of a lethal injection.” HB 663 prevents licensing authorities from taking disciplinary action against a Participant and permits a Participant to bring a civil suit against any person who discloses that individual’s identity and participation. Plaintiffs, Ohio prisoners sentenced to death, claimed that HB 663 unconstitutionally burdened speech, created a regime of unconstitutional prior restraint, violated the Plaintiffs’ equal-protection and due-process rights, and their right of access to the courts, and denied the Plaintiffs constitutionally protected access to government proceedings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Licensure-Immunity Provision and the Civil-Action Provision. Plaintiffs suffered only “conjectural or hypothetical injuries” rather than a “requisite distinct and palpable injury.” Plaintiffs had no constitutional right to the information they claimed they were being deprived of. View "Phillips v. DeWine" on Justia Law

One sitting judge and two aspiring Kentucky judges challenged the Commonwealth’s Code of Judicial Conduct clauses prohibiting “campaign[ing] as a member of a political organization,” “endors[ing] . . . a candidate for public office,” “mak[ing] a contribution to a political organization,” making any “commitments” with respect to “cases, controversies, or issues” likely to come before the court, making “false” or “misleading” statements. The sitting judge, previously appointed, made statements regarding being “re-elected,” and concerning penalties for heroin use. A candidate for the judiciary referred to himself as a Republic and his opponents as Democrats. The Third plaintiff wanted to publicly participate in Republican Party functions. The district court struck some of these provisions and upheld others. The Sixth Circuit found contributions, leadership, false statements and endorsement clauses valid. The campaigning, speeches, clauses are unconstitutional. The misleading statements prohibition is valid on its face, but may be unconstitutional as applied to one of the plaintiffs. View "Winter v. Wolnitzek" on Justia Law

In 2011, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People submitted an ad for display at the Philadelphia International Airport, offering to pay the prevailing market rate for the ad, which read: “Welcome to America, home to 5% of the world’s people & 25% of the world’s prisoners. Let’s build a better America together. NAACP.org/smartandsafe.” The City of Philadelphia rejected the ad, based on informal practice, While the NAACP’s lawsuit was pending, the city, which owns the airport, adopted the formal policy, preventing private advertisers from displaying noncommercial content at the Airport. Paid advertisements are allowed. The city argued that the policy helps it further its goals of maximizing revenue and avoiding controversy. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding the ban unconstitutional. The court noted that the city acknowledged “substantial flaws” in the city’s justifications. The ban is unreasonable, violates the First Amendment and cannot be enforced as written. View "Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leah Manzari, famous under her professional name, Danni Ashe, for her groundbreaking work in monetizing online pornography, filed a defamation suit claiming that the Daily Mail Online, an online news outlet, used a photograph of her to convey the defamatory impression that she had tested positive for HIV. The Daily Mail filed an interlocutory appeal under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.15. The court agreed with the district court that, at this stage in the litigation, Manzari has presented sufficient evidence to move forward with her claim that the Daily Mail Online employees acted with actual malice when they published the article implying that Manzari was an HIV-positive sex worker. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Daily Mail's motion to strike the complaint. View "Manzari v. Associated Newspapers" on Justia Law

A 2012 event at Allegan High School was intended to educate the public about House Bill 4769, which aimed to limit foreign law’s influence in Michigan. The organizers wanted to warn citizens about the “internal threat to America posed by radical Muslims” and “the dangers ... of Sharia law.” The District agreed to rent the organizers a room. They paid the customary $90 fee. Objectors wrote a letter arguing that the speaker, Saleem, was a purveyor of hatred and asked the district to rescind its permission. The School received calls expressing the same view; the event received local press coverage. Shortly before the event began, an unidentified woman approached the police, claiming that Saleem had a $25 million bounty on his head. Saleem’s body guard discounted the threat. The event began. When it was underway, authorities shut it down. The organizers allege that people were allowed to stay in the building for 30-45 minutes and that Saleem remained inside without law enforcement surveillance. The organizers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the city, for lack of evidence of an applicable municipal policy or custom, and reversed and remanded an order allowing the school district to withdraw its Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 offer to stipulate to judgment of $500. View "Agema v. City of Allegan" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenge the Commission's 2015 Open Internet Order, which reclassified broadband service as a telecommunications service, subject to common carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 201. The Commission determined that broadband service satisfies the statutory definition of a telecommunications service: “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.” In accordance with Brand X, the Commission's conclusions about consumer perception find extensive support in the record and together justify the Commission’s decision to reclassify broadband as a telecommunications service. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services. The court rejected petitioners' numerous challenges to the Commission's decision to reclassify broadband, finding that none have merit. The court concluded that the Commission adequately explained why it reclassified broadband from an information service to a telecommunications service and its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. US Telecom never questions the Commission’s application of the statute’s test for common carriage, and US Telecom cites no case, nor is the court aware of one, holding that when the Commission invokes the statutory test for common carriage, it must also apply the NARUC test. See National Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC. Where the Commission concluded that it could regulate interconnection arrangements under Title II as a component of broadband service, the court rejected US Telecom's two challenges to the Commission's decision. The court rejected mobile petitioners’ arguments and find that the Commission’s reclassification of mobile broadband as a commercial mobile service is reasonable and supported by the record. In the Order, the Commission decided to forbear from numerous provisions of the Communications Act. The court rejected Full Service Network's procedural and substantive challenges to the Commission’s forbearance decision. The Commission promulgated five rules in the Order: rules banning (i) blocking, (ii) throttling, and (iii) paid prioritization; (iv) a General Conduct Rule; and (v) an enhanced transparency rule. The court rejected Alamo's challenge to the anti-paid-prioritization rule as beyond the Commission’s authority and rejected US Telecom's challenge to the General Conduct Rule as unconstitutionally vague. Having upheld the FCC’s reclassification of broadband service as common carriage, the court concluded that the First Amendment poses no bar to the rules and the court rejected Alamo and Berninger's challenges. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "United States Telecom Assoc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Left Field publishes Chicago Baseball magazine, producing four issues per baseball season. Copies are sold for $2 outside Wrigley Field before the Chicago Cubs’ home games. On the day of the Cubs’ 2015 home opener, Chicago police officer Voulgaris saw Left Field’s editor, Smerge, selling the magazine at the corner of Clark and Addison streets. Voulgaris told Smerge to move across the street to comply with Chicago’s Adjacent Sidewalks Ordinance, which forbids all peddling on the streets adjacent to Wrigley Field. Smerge refused to move and was ticketed. Left Field sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Chicago agreed not to enforce the ordinance pending a decision. The 2015 season ran its course. As the playoffs began, the district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, noting the density of the area around the field and the tight passages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The ordinance does not regulate speech. It regulates peddling, without regard to what the peddler sells. The court noted that Left Field has never applied for a license: while additional issues could arise if the ordinance were applied to newspapers, the court expressed doubt that it would be applied to a newspaper. View "Left Field Media LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Over the past decade, Attorney Novoselsky has filed many lawsuits alleging improprieties by Dorothy Brown, in her capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Brown later made statements to private parties, the public, and the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee, accusing Novoselsky of being an unscrupulous attorney. Novoselsky sued Brown under state law for defamation and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, and he sought to hold Cook County liable for Brown’s actions. Brown unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that her communications are protected from liability by immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. On the state‐law defamation claim, Brown’s communications were all statements reasonably related to her official duties. Illinois state law provides immunity to Brown for claims based on these statements. Brown is also entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, for all she did to retaliate was criticize Novoselsky, so Cook County is also entitled to summary judgment. View "Novoselsky v. Brown" on Justia Law

This case arose from a New York Times article about Senator Rand Paul, which briefly quotes Walter Block, an economics professor. Block filed suit against defendants asserting claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Although Block does not dispute that he made the statements at issue, he argues that the article takes the statements so far out of context as to make them untrue and defamatory. The district court granted a special motion to strike under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 971 (anti-SLAPP law), dismissed the complaint, and awarded defendants attorney's fees. In Lozovyy v. Kurtz, the court interpreted Louisiana law and concluded that “the Louisiana Supreme Court would recognize that Article 971’s ‘probability of success’ standard does not permit courts to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve disputed issues of material fact.” Because the district court lacked the benefit of the court's recent guidance in Lozovyy, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to apply the standard. On remand, the district court should consider whether Block has established a genuine dispute of material fact on each element of his claims. View "Block v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

In 2000, Kubiak, a Chicago patrol officer for 14 years, was detailed to the Office of News Affairs, as a media liaison. In 2012, Zala, another media liaison, allegedly ran toward Kubiak, screaming, “Who the fuck do you think you are, you stupid bitch?” He swung his hand back as if to strike her. Officer Perez tried to calm Zala. Kubiak called Director Stratton, stating that Zala had previously directed similar outbursts toward her. During the call, Zala continued to berate and intimidate her. Kubiak alleges that Zala has a history of violence. Stratton told Kubiak that she had spoken with Zala and would not discuss the incident further. Kubiak’s supervising Lieutenant also declined to discuss the incident. Kubiak initiated an Internal Affairs Division investigation, which was “sustained.” Within days, Kubiak was reassigned as a patrol officer on a midnight shift in an allegedly dangerous neighborhood. Perez was also reassigned to patrol. Kubiak, the most senior ONA member, and Perez were the only officers reassigned although others had requested transfer. Kubiak alleges that Zala was never reprimanded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Kubiak’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, concluding that Kubiak’s speech was not constitutionally protected since Kubiak did not speak as a private citizen and did not speak on a matter of public concern. View "Kubiak v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law