Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Medicine Park Telephone Company appeals the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's denial of its application for reimbursement from the Oklahoma Universal Services Fund for reasonable investments and expenses incurred in providing primary universal service to its customers. The FCC created the Interstate Common Line Support (ICLS) program, which was paid from the federal Universal Service Fund. ICLS was available to, among others, rural incumbent carriers and was designed to help such carriers recoup some of the high fixed costs of providing telephone service in areas with fewer customers while also ensuring that their subscriber line charges remained affordable to their customers. Effective January 1, 2012, the FCC changed its rules to limit the operations expenses that may be included in an ICLS calculation. The FCC did not, however, eliminate the legal requirement that Medicine Park and other carriers of last resort continue to provide such services. After its federal ICLS support was eliminated by FCC order, Medicine Park submitted an application for reimbursement to recover losses because of its mandate. The PUD Administrator conducted a thorough review of Medicine Park's application. He ultimately recommended approval of $102,629 for the year 2014 and $8,552.42 per month thereafter, having disallowed $419.00 of the requested lump sum and $1.58 from the requested monthly recurring amount due to a lack of supporting documentation. Various other telecommunications companies, including Sprint, Virgin Mobile, and Verizon requested denial of any reimbursement. Despite the ALJ's recommendation, the Commission issued an order denying Medicine Park's request for reimbursement. The Commission concluded that there was no dispute that Medicine Park was an eligible service provider qualified for reimbursement, or that it had suffered a reduction in federal universal service fund revenues as a result of the FCC order to eliminate the LSS. Nevertheless, the Commission ruled that Medicine Park was not entitled to any funding because the company had made the confidential and proprietary information supporting its application available for onsite review, rather than filing it with the Commission as a matter of public record. Although the Commission was not bound by the Administrator's recommendation, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the record reflected ample evidence with which to support the Administrator's determination. The Administrator, as well as the dissenting Commissioner, both agreed Medicine Park was entitled to reimbursement of the losses it incurred as a result of the FCC order decreasing federal funding. The Commission's wholesale denial of Medicine Park's request was in error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commission and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Medicine Park Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Comm." on Justia Law

Medicine Park Telephone Company appeals the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's denial of its application for reimbursement from the Oklahoma Universal Services Fund for reasonable investments and expenses incurred in providing primary universal service to its customers. The FCC created the Interstate Common Line Support (ICLS) program, which was paid from the federal Universal Service Fund. ICLS was available to, among others, rural incumbent carriers and was designed to help such carriers recoup some of the high fixed costs of providing telephone service in areas with fewer customers while also ensuring that their subscriber line charges remained affordable to their customers. Effective January 1, 2012, the FCC changed its rules to limit the operations expenses that may be included in an ICLS calculation. The FCC did not, however, eliminate the legal requirement that Medicine Park and other carriers of last resort continue to provide such services. After its federal ICLS support was eliminated by FCC order, Medicine Park submitted an application for reimbursement to recover losses because of its mandate; he PUD Administrator ultimately recommended that Medicine Park receive a lump-sum payment of $309,016.90 for calendar year 2014, and monthly recurring payments of $25,751.41, to begin January 1, 2015. Despite the recommendation from the PUD Administrator and the outside consulting firm independently hired by PUD to assist in the process, the Commission rejected the Administrator's final determination. By a vote of 2-1, following a two-day hearing on the merits, the Commission denied Medicine Park's application in full. The Commission found that Medicine Park included requests for reimbursement of expenses and investments that were not incurred entirely for the provision of primary universal services, that the Administrator did not determine whether Medicine Park's rates for primary universal services were reasonable and affordable, that the company did not seek alternative funding, and that recurring funding should not be awarded. Although the Commission was not bound by the Administrator's recommendation, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the record reflected ample evidence with which to support the Administrator's determination. The Administrator, the independent expert hired by PUD to provide a neutral investigation, and one dissenting Commissioner all agreed that Medicine Park was entitled to funding, albeit at a reduced rate of its initial request. The Commission's wholesale denial of any funding was in error. View "Medicine Park Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Comm." on Justia Law

Gallaher is a Santa Rosa real estate developer. During the 2016 Santa Rosa City Council election, The Press Democrat published five articles about substantial independent election expenditures made by Gallaher’s son-in-law, Flater, on behalf of three candidates. Gallaher and Flater allege the articles falsely implied that Gallaher was the source of the funds and sued for defamation, libel per se, and false light invasion of privacy. Defendants moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion in part, denied it in part, and permitted plaintiffs to conduct discovery on the issue of malice. The court of appeal concluded the motion should have been granted in full because plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing the allegedly defamatory statements were false. The articles reporting on Flater’s enormous independent expenditures, explaining Flater’s connection to Gallaher, and raising questions about the source of the funds were clearly in connection with an issue of public interest. It was incumbent on plaintiffs to unambiguously deny Gallaher’s funding of the independent expenditures to make a prima facie showing of falsity. View "Sonoma Media Investments, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs operate California hardware businesses. They sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, claiming that defendants sent them unsolicited fax advertisements. The district judge dismissed, believing that defendants had substantially met the requirements of a section 227(b)(1)(C) defense and had not established injury. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the district court treated a defense as if it were an element of subject-matter jurisdiction. A plaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal court of jurisdiction. When subject-matter jurisdiction is at stake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and make any findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudicatory competence. If the court has jurisdiction, it must take all plausible allegations in favor of the complainant when handling a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs alleged that they received unsolicited fax ads, causing injury: printing the faxes used costly paper and toner and the need to read the incoming faxes diverted employees' time. These are concrete, not abstract losses. The injuries may have been slight, but an “identifiable trifle” suffices. .Plaintiffs’ injuries may be redressed by an award of damages. Whether it is good public policy to use cumbersome and costly litigation to resolve disputes about annoying fax ads is for Congress to decide. A complaint need not anticipate defenses. View "Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Ella Bell, a member of the Alabama State Board of Education ("ASBE"), appealed a circuit court's dismissal of her complaint asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, the tort of outrage, negligence and wantonness, and conspiracy against Cameron Smith, Advance Local Media, LLC ("ALM"), and the R Street Institute ("R Street"). In June 2017, Bell attended a special-called meeting of the ASBE concerning elementary- and secondary-education matters. Among other matters, the ASBE decided during the meeting not to renew the Alabama State Department of Education's contract with ACT Spire Solutions, which provided ACT Spire Assessments for the purpose of tracking academic progress of Alabama's public-school students in kindergarten through 12th grade. In the course of the discussion between ASBE members about that contract, Bell made some comments regarding special-education students and their effect on the aggregate test scores of public-school students throughout the state. In August, AL.com published an article written by Cameron Smith in which he addressed some of Bell's comments in the June 2017, ASBE meeting. At the conclusion of the article, AL.com included the following tagline: "Cameron Smith is a regular columnist for AL.com and vice president for the R Street Institute, a think tank in Washington, D.C." Immediately after the tagline, AL.com included the following statement: "Ella Bell's contact information may be found on the [ASBE] website" and contained an embedded link to the Web site of the ASBE. Following that statement, AL.com embedded a video of the discussion by ASBE members, which included Bell's comments that Smith addressed in the article. Bell alleged Smith made statements that he knew were false about Bell's comments in the June 2017 ASBE meeting. The Alabama Supreme Court found a fair reading of Smith's article revealed it to be an expression of opinion that did not mislead readers about the content of Bell's actual statements, it was not necessary for the circuit court to wait until the summary-judgment stage to dispose of the claims against Smith, ALM, and R Street. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Bell's defamation suit. View "Bell v. Smith" on Justia Law

A student approached Professor Laker, claiming that the department chair, Aptekar, had harassed her. The student brought a formal Title IX complaint. An investigator concluded that Aptekar had sexually harassed the student. Aptekar was disciplined but was allowed to remain as department chair for several weeks. Aptekar was later placed on paid leave. Laker claims that the University and certain administrators, including McVey, covered up prior student complaints about Aptekar. In February 2016, various administrators received an e-mail from the student who had originally filed the Title IX complaint, stating she was experiencing stress from continuing to see Aptekar. The University then investigated Laker based on complaints of “inspiring students to come forward to report sexual and racial harassment by Aptekar.” Laker sued, alleging defamation and retaliation The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court of appeal reversed the denial of the motion as to defamation. Statements Laker identified as defamatory were part of the protected activity of the Aptekar investigation. On remand, the trial court is directed to strike certain language and the claims it supports from the retaliation claim: “publishing false and defamatory statements about Laker to punish him for his ongoing efforts to protect SJSU students from sexual harassment by Aptekar, with the intent of scapegoating Laker as the person who had failed to report Aptekar’s misconduct.” View "Laker v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Garrett Cornelius filed suit alleging invasion of privacy by newspaper, the Chronicle, after newspaper published two articles containing information about him. In a series of orders, the trial court granted newspaper’s motions to strike the claims under the anti-SLAPP statute and awarded newspaper a small fraction of the attorney’s fees it sought. Plaintiff appealed the orders striking his claims, and the newspaper appealed the amount of attorney’s fees. Consolidating the cases for review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the claims were properly stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute, but the court erred in limiting the attorney’s fees award. View "Cornelius v. The Chronicle, Inc." on Justia Law

The Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, imposes restrictions on how private entities collect, retain, disclose and destroy biometric identifiers, including retina or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, scans of hand or face geometry, or biometric information. Under the Act, any person “aggrieved” by a violation of its provisions “shall have a right of action … against an offending party” and “may recover for each violation” the greater of liquidated damages or actual damages, reasonable attorney fees and costs, and any other relief, including an injunction, that the court deems appropriate. Six Flags Great America amusement park sells repeat-entry passes that use a fingerprinting process. The plaintiff alleged that she bought a season pass for her minor son, who was fingerprinted while on a school field trip, and that she had not been previously informed of, nor consented to, the process. She alleges that, although her son has not returned to the Park, Six Flags retains the biometric information. Reversing the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court held that one qualifies as an “aggrieved” person and may seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act even if he has not alleged some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond a violation of his rights under the statute. View "Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp." on Justia Law

T Mobile unsuccessfully applied to Wilmington’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) for permission to erect an antenna. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allows a disappointed wireless service provider to seek review in a district court “within 30 days after” a zoning authority’s “final action,” 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(v), T Mobile filed suit. After the case had proceeded for over a year, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the claim was not ripe; T Mobile filed its complaint before the ZBA released a written decision confirming an earlier oral rejection of the zoning application. T Mobile had not supplemented its complaint to include the ZBA’s written decision within 30 days of its issuance. The Third Circuit remanded the case. While only a written decision can serve as a locality’s final action when denying an application and the issuance of that writing is the government “act” ruled by the 30-day provision, that timing requirement is not jurisdictional. An untimely supplemental complaint can, by relating back, cure an initial complaint that was unripe. The district court had jurisdiction and should not have granted Wilmington’s motion for summary judgment. View "T Mobile Northeast LLC v. Wilmington" on Justia Law

The lead plaintiffs in consolidated purported class actions received faxed advertisements that allegedly did not comply with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 and the Federal Communication Commission’s Solicited Fax Rule. Each district court refused to certify the proposed class, largely on the authority of the D.C. Circuit’s 2017 decision in Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. FCC, regarding the validity of the FCC’s 2006 Solicited Fax Rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At a minimum, it is necessary to distinguish between faxes sent with permission of the recipient and those that are truly unsolicited. The question of what suffices for consent is central, and it is likely to vary from recipient to recipient. The district courts were within their rights to conclude that there are enough other problems with class treatment here that a class action is not a superior mechanism for adjudicating these cases. View "Alpha Tech Pet, Inc. v. Lagasse, LLC" on Justia Law